

Dalton

DALTON'S COMPLETE BRIDGE

1. Bridge (game), 1906,

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Dalton's Complete Bridge

By W. Dalton

Author of


"Bridge Abridged, or Practical Bridge,"

"Bridge at a Glance"

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CONTENTS

	Page
THE LAWS OF BRIDGE	1
CHAP.	
I. THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE	35
II. THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS	52
III. ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS	76
IV. DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS BY THE DEALER	91
V. THE DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND	101
VI. THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE	110
VII. DOUBLING	122
VIII. THE ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP DECLARATION	141
IX. THE OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT DECLARATION	163
X. THE PLAY OF THE THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME	181
XI. THE PLAY OF THE THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT DECLARATION	215
XII. THE DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND	235
XIII. THE DISCARD	240
XIV. THE PLAY OF THE DEALER	256
XV. PRACTICE VERSUS THEORY	302

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

WHICH CAME INTO FORCE JANUARY 1, 1905

AS REVISED BY A JOINT COMMITTEE OF
THE PORTLAND AND TURF CLUBS¹

THE RUBBER

1. The Rubber is the best of three games. If the first two games be won by the same players, the third game is not played.

SCORING

2. A game consists of thirty points obtained by tricks alone, exclusive of any points counted for Honours, Chicane, or Slam.

3. Every hand is played out, and any points in excess of the thirty points necessary for the game are counted.

4. Each trick above six counts two points when spades are trumps, four points when clubs are trumps, six points when diamonds are trumps,

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THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

eight points when hearts are trumps, and twelve points when there are no trumps.

5. Honours consist of ace, king, queen, knave, and ten of the trump suit. When there are no trumps they consist of the four aces.

6. Honours in trumps are thus reckoned: —
If a player and his partner conjointly hold —

- I. The five honours of the trump suit, they score for honours five times the value of the trump suit trick.
- II. Any four honours of the trump suit, they score for honours four times the value of the trump suit trick.
- III. Any three honours of the trump suit, they score for honours twice the value of the trump suit trick.

If a player in his own hand holds —

- I. The five honours of the trump suit, he and his partner score for honours ten times the value of the trump suit trick.
- II. Any four honours of the trump suit, they score for honours eight times the value of the trump suit trick. In this last case, if the player's partner holds the fifth honour, they also score for honours the single value of the trump suit trick.

The value of the trump suit trick referred to in this law is its original value — *e. g.*, two points in

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

spades and six points in diamonds; and the value of honours is in no way affected by any doubling or re-doubling that may take place under Laws 53–60.

7. HONOURS, when there are no trumps, are thus reckoned: —

If a player and his partner conjointly hold —

- I. The four aces, they score for honours forty points.
- II. Any three aces, they score for honours thirty points.

If a player in his own hand holds —

The four aces, he and his partner score for honours one hundred points.

8. CHICANE is thus reckoned: —

If a player holds no trump, he and his partner score for Chicane twice the value of the trump suit trick. The value of Chicane is in no way affected by any doubling or re-doubling that may take place under Laws 53–60.

9. SLAM is thus reckoned: —

If a player and his partner make, independently of any tricks taken for the revoke penalty —

- I. All thirteen tricks, they score for Grand Slam forty points.
- II. Twelve tricks, they score for Little Slam twenty points.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

10. Honours, Chicane, and Slam are reckoned in the score at the end of the rubber.

11. At the end of the rubber, the total scores for tricks, Honours, Chicane, and Slam obtained by each player and his partner are added up, one hundred points are added to the score of the winners of the rubber, and the difference between the two scores is the number of points won, or lost, by the winners of the rubber.

12. If an erroneous score affecting tricks be proved, such mistake may be corrected prior to the conclusion of the game in which it occurred, and such game is not concluded until the last card of the following deal has been dealt, or, in the case of the last game of the rubber, until the score has been made up and agreed.

13. If an erroneous score affecting Honours, Chicane, or Slam be proved, such mistake may be corrected at any time before the score of the rubber has been made up and agreed.

CUTTING

14. The ace is the lowest card.

15. In all cases, every player must cut from the same pack.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

16. Should a player expose more than one card, he must cut again.

FORMATION OF TABLE

17. If there are more than four candidates, the players are selected by cutting, those first in the room having the preference. The four who cut the lowest cards play first, and again cut to decide on partners; the two lowest play against the two highest; the lowest is the dealer, who has choice of cards and seats, and, having once made his selection, must abide by it.

18. When there are more than six candidates, those who cut the two next lowest cards belong to the table, which is complete with six players; on the retirement of one of those six players, the candidate who cut the next lowest card has a prior right to any after-comer to enter the table.

19. Two players cutting cards of equal value, unless such cards are the two highest, cut again; should they be the two lowest, a fresh cut is necessary to decide which of those two deals.

20. Three players cutting cards of equal value cut again; should the fourth (or remaining) card

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

be the highest, the two lowest of the new cut are partners, the lower of those two the dealer; should the fourth card be the lowest, the two highest are partners, the original lowest the dealer.

CUTTING OUT

21. At the end of a rubber, should admission be claimed by any one, or by two candidates, he who has, or they who have, played a greater number of consecutive rubbers than the others is, or are, out; but when all have played the same number, they must cut to decide upon the outgoers; the highest are out.

ENTRY AND RE-ENTRY

22. A candidate, whether he has played or not, can join a table which is not complete by declaring in at any time prior to any of the players having cut a card, either for the purpose of commencing a fresh rubber or of cutting out.

23. In the formation of fresh tables, those candidates who have neither belonged to nor played at any other table have the prior right of entry; the others decide their right of admission by cutting.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

24. Any one quitting a table prior to the conclusion of a rubber, may, with consent of the other three players, appoint a substitute in his absence during that rubber.

25. A player joining one table, whilst belonging to another, loses his right of re-entry into the latter, and takes his chance of cutting in, as if he were a fresh candidate.

26. If any one break up a table, the remaining players have the prior right to him of entry into any other; and should there not be sufficient vacancies at such other table to admit all those candidates, they settle their precedence by cutting.

SHUFFLING

27. The pack must neither be shuffled below the table nor so that the face of any card be seen.

28. The pack must not be shuffled during the play of the hand.

29. A pack, having been played with, must neither be shuffled by dealing it into packets, nor across the table.

30. Each player has a right to shuffle once only (except as provided by Law 33) prior to a

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

deal, after a false cut, or when a new deal has occurred.

31. The dealer's partner must collect the cards for the ensuing deal, and has the first right to shuffle that pack.

32. Each player, after shuffling, must place the cards, properly collected and face downwards, to the left of the player about to deal.

33. The dealer has always the right to shuffle last; but should a card or cards be seen during his shuffling, or whilst giving the pack to be cut, he may be compelled to re-shuffle.

THE DEAL

34. Each player deals in his turn; the order of dealing goes to the left.

35. The player on the dealer's right cuts the pack, and, in dividing it, must not leave fewer than four cards in either packet; if in cutting, or in replacing one of the two packets on the other, a card be exposed, or if there be any confusion of the cards, or a doubt as to the exact place in which the pack was divided, there must be a fresh cut.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

36. When a player, whose duty it is to cut, has once separated the pack, he cannot alter his intention; he can neither re-shuffle nor re-cut the cards.

37. When the pack is cut, should the dealer shuffle the cards, the pack must be cut again.

38. The fifty-two cards shall be dealt face downwards. The deal is not completed until the last card has been dealt face downwards. There is no misdeal.

A NEW DEAL

39. There must be a new deal —

- I. If, during a deal, or during the play of a hand, the pack be proved to be incorrect or imperfect.
- II. If any card be faced in the pack.
- III. Unless the cards are dealt into four packets, one at a time and in regular rotation, beginning at the player to the dealer's left.
- IV. Should the last card not come in its regular order to the dealer.
- V. Should a player have more than thirteen cards, and any one or more of the others less than thirteen cards.
- VI. Should the dealer deal two cards at once, or two cards to the same hand, and then deal a third; but if, prior to dealing that card, the dealer can, by altering the position of one card only, rectify such error, he may do so.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

VII. Should the dealer omit to have the pack cut to him, and the adversaries discover the error prior to the last card being dealt, and before looking at their cards; but not after having done so.

40. If, whilst dealing, a card be exposed by either of the dealer's adversaries, the dealer or his partner may claim a new deal. A card similarly exposed by the dealer or his partner gives the same claim to each adversary. The claim may not be made by a player who has looked at any of his cards. If a new deal does not take place, the exposed card cannot be called.

41. If, in dealing, one of the last cards be exposed, and the dealer completes the deal before there is reasonable time to decide as to a fresh deal, the privilege is not thereby lost.

42. If the dealer, before he has dealt fifty-one cards, look at any card, his adversaries have a right to see it, and may exact a new deal.

43. Should three players have their right number of cards — the fourth have less than thirteen, and not discover such deficiency until he has played any of his cards, the deal stands good; should he have played, he is as answerable for any revoke he may have made as if the missing card,

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

or cards, had been in his hand; he may search the other pack for it, or them.

44. If a pack, during or after a rubber, be proved incorrect or imperfect, such proof does not alter any past score, game, or rubber; that hand in which the imperfection was detected is null and void; the dealer deals again.

45. Any one dealing out of turn, or with the adversary's cards, may be stopped before the last card is dealt, otherwise the deal stands good, and the game must proceed as if no mistake had been made.

46. A player can neither shuffle, cut, nor deal for his partner without the permission of his opponents.

DECLARING TRUMPS

47. The dealer, having examined his hand, has the option of declaring what suit shall be trumps, or whether the hand shall be played without trumps. If he exercise that option, he shall do so by naming the suit, or by saying "No trumps."

48. If the dealer does not wish to exercise his option, he may pass it to his partner by saying, "I

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

leave it to you, Partner," and his partner must thereupon make the necessary declaration, in the manner provided in the preceding law.

49. If the dealer's partner make the trump declaration without receiving permission from the dealer, the eldest hand may demand —

- I. That the declaration so made shall stand.
- II. That there shall be a new deal.

But if any declaration as to doubling or not doubling shall have been made, or if a new deal is not claimed, the declaration wrongly made shall stand. The eldest hand is the player on the left of the dealer.

50. If the dealer's partner pass the declaration to the dealer, the eldest hand may demand —

- I. That there shall be a new deal.
- II. That the dealer's partner shall himself make the declaration.

51. If either of the dealer's adversaries make the declaration, the dealer may, after looking at his hand, either claim a fresh deal or proceed as if no such declaration had been made.

52. A declaration once made cannot be altered, save as provided above.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

DOUBLING AND RE-DOUBLING

53. The effect of doubling and re-doubling, and so on, is that the value of each trick above six is doubled, quadrupled, and so on.

54. After the trump declaration has been made by the dealer or his partner, their adversaries have the right to double. The eldest hand has the first right. If he does not wish to double, he shall say to his partner, "May I lead?" His partner shall answer "Yes," or "I double."

55. If either of their adversaries elect to double, the dealer and his partner have the right to re-double. The player who has declared the trump shall have the first right. He may say "I re-double," or "Satisfied." Should he say the latter, his partner may re-double.

56. If the dealer or his partner elect to re-double, their adversaries shall have the right to again double. The original doubler has the first right.

57. If the right-hand adversary of the dealer double before his partner has asked "May I lead?" the declarer of the trump shall have the

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

right to say whether or not the double shall stand. If he decide that the double shall stand, the process of re-doubling may continue as described in Laws 55, 56, 58.

58. The process of re-doubling may be continued until the limit of 100 points is reached — the first right to continue the re-doubling on behalf of a partnership belonging to that player who has last re-doubled. Should he, however, express himself satisfied, the right to continue the re-doubling passes to his partner. Should any player re-double out of turn, the adversary who last doubled shall decide whether or not such double shall stand. If it is decided that the re-double shall stand, the process of re-doubling may continue as described in this and foregoing laws (55 and 56). If any double or re-double out of turn be not accepted there shall be no further doubling in that hand. Any consultation between partners as to doubling or re-doubling will entitle the maker of the trump or the eldest hand, without consultation, to a new deal.

59. If the eldest hand lead before the doubling be completed, his partner may re-double only with

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

the consent of the adversary who last doubled; but such lead shall not affect the right of either adversary to double.

60. When the question, "May I lead?" has been answered in the affirmative, or when the player who has the last right to continue the doubling expresses himself satisfied, the play shall begin.

61. A declaration once made cannot be altered.

DUMMY

62. As soon as a card is led, whether in or out of turn, the dealer's partner shall place his cards face upwards on the table, and the duty of playing the cards from that hand, which is called Dummy, and of claiming and enforcing any penalties arising during the hand, shall devolve upon the dealer, unassisted by his partner.

63. After exposing Dummy, the dealer's partner has no part whatever in the game, except that he has the right to ask the dealer if he has none of the suit in which he may have renounced. If he call attention to any other incident in the play of the hand, in respect of which any penalty might

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

be exacted, the fact that he has done so shall deprive the dealer of the right of exacting such penalty against his adversaries.

64. If the dealer's partner, by touching a card, or otherwise, suggest the play of a card from Dummy, either of the adversaries may, but without consulting with his partner, call upon the dealer to play or not to play the card suggested.

65. When the dealer draws a card, either from his own hand or from Dummy, such card is not considered as played until actually quitted.

66. A card once played, or named by the dealer as to be played from his own hand or from Dummy, cannot be taken back, except to save a revoke.

67. The dealer's partner may not look over his adversaries' hands, nor leave his seat for the purpose of watching his partner's play.

68. Dummy is not liable to any penalty for a revoke, as his adversaries see his cards. Should he revoke, and the error not be discovered until the trick is turned and quitted, the trick stands good.

69. Dummy being blind and deaf, his partner is not liable to any penalty for an error whence he

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

can gain no advantage. Thus, he may expose some, or all of his cards, without incurring any penalty.

EXPOSED CARDS

70. If after the deal has been completed, and before the trump declaration has been made, either the dealer or his partner expose a card from his hand, the eldest hand may claim a new deal.

71. If after the deal has been completed, and before a card is led, any player shall expose a card, his partner shall forfeit any right to double or re-double which he would otherwise have been entitled to exercise; and in the case of a card being so exposed by the leader's partner, the dealer may, instead of calling the card, require the leader not to lead the suit of the exposed card.

CARDS LIABLE TO BE CALLED

72. All cards exposed by the dealer's adversaries are liable to be called, and must be left face upwards on the table; but a card is not an exposed card when dropped on the floor, or elsewhere below the table.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

73. The following are exposed cards: —

- I. Two or more cards played at once.
- II. Any card dropped with its face upwards, or in any way exposed on or above the table, even though snatched up so quickly that no one can name it.

74. If either of the dealer's adversaries play to an imperfect trick the best card on the table, or lead one which is a winning card as against the dealer and his partner, and then lead again, without waiting for his partner to play, or play several such winning cards, one after the other, without waiting for his partner to play, the latter may be called on to win, if he can, the first or any other of those tricks, and the other cards thus improperly played are exposed cards.

75. Should the dealer indicate that all or any of the remaining tricks are his, he may be required to place his cards face upwards on the table; but they are not liable to be called.

76. If either of the dealer's adversaries throw his cards on the table face upwards, such cards are exposed, and liable to be called by the dealer.

77. If all the players throw their cards on the table face upwards, the hands are abandoned, and

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

the score must be left as claimed and admitted. The hands may be examined for the purpose of establishing a revoke, but for no other purpose.

78. A card detached from the rest of the hand of either of the dealer's adversaries, so as to be named, is liable to be called; but should the dealer name a wrong card, he is liable to have a suit called when first he or his partner have the lead.

79. If a player, who has rendered himself liable to have the highest or lowest of a suit called, or to win or not to win a trick, fail to play as desired, though able to do so, or if when called on to lead one suit, lead another, having in his hand one or more cards of that suit demanded, he incurs the penalty of a revoke.

80. If either of the dealer's adversaries lead out of turn, the dealer may call a suit from him or his partner when it is next the turn of either of them to lead, or may call the card erroneously led.

81. If the dealer lead out of turn, either from his own hand or from Dummy, he incurs no penalty; but he may not rectify the error after the second hand has played.

82. If any player lead out of turn, and the other

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

three have followed him, the trick is complete, and the error cannot be rectified; but if only the second, or the second and third, have played to the false lead, their cards, on discovery of the mistake, are taken back; and there is no penalty against any one, excepting the original offender, and then only when he is one of the dealer's adversaries.

83. In no case can a player be compelled to play a card which would oblige him to revoke.

84. The call of a card may be repeated until such card has been played.

85. If a player called on to lead a suit have none of it, the penalty is paid.

CARDS PLAYED IN ERROR, OR NOT PLAYED TO A TRICK

86. Should the third hand not have played, and the fourth play before his partner, the latter (not being Dummy or his partner) may be called on to win, or not to win, the trick.

87. If any one (not being Dummy) omit playing to a former trick, and such error be not discovered until he has played to the next, the adversaries may claim a new deal; should they

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

decide that the deal stand good, or should Dummy have omitted to play to a former trick, and such error be not discovered till he shall have played to the next, the surplus card at the end of the hand is considered to have been played to the imperfect trick, but does not constitute a revoke therein.

88. If any one play two cards to the same trick, or mix a card with a trick to which it does not properly belong, and the mistake be not discovered until the hand is played out, he (not being Dummy) is answerable for all consequent revokes he may have made. If, during the play of the hand, the error be detected, the tricks may be counted face downwards, in order to ascertain whether there be among them a card too many: should this be the case they may be searched, and the card restored; the player (not being Dummy) is, however, liable for all revokes which he may have meanwhile made.

THE REVOKE

89. Is when a player (other than Dummy), holding one or more cards of the suit led, plays a card of a different suit.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

90. The penalty for a revoke —

- I. Is at the option of the adversaries, who, at the end of the hand, may, after consultation, either take three tricks from the revoking player and add them to their own — or deduct the value of three tricks from his existing score — or add the value of three tricks to their own score;
- II. Can be claimed for as many revokes as occur during the hand;
- III. Is applicable only to the score of the game in which it occurs;
- IV. Cannot be divided — *i.e.*, a player cannot add the value of one or two tricks to his own score and deduct the value of one or two from the revoking player.
- V. In whatever way the penalty may be enforced, under no circumstances can the side revoking score Game, Grand Slam, or Little Slam, that hand. Whatever their previous score may be, the side revoking cannot attain a higher score towards the game than twenty-eight.

91. A revoke is established, if the trick in which it occur be turned and quitted — *i. e.*, the hand removed from that trick after it has been turned face downwards on the table — or if either the revoking player or his partner, whether in his right turn or otherwise, lead or play to the following trick.

92. A player may ask his partner whether he has not a card of the suit which he has renounced;

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

should the question be asked before the trick is turned and quitted, subsequent turning and quitting does not establish the revoke, and the error may be corrected, unless the question be answered in the negative, or unless the revoking player or his partner have led or played to the following trick.

93. At the end of the hand, the claimants of a revoke may search all the tricks.

94. If a player discover his mistake in time to save a revoke, any player or players who have played after him may withdraw their cards and substitute others, and their cards withdrawn are not liable to be called. If the player in fault be one of the dealer's adversaries, the dealer may call the card thus played in error, or may require him to play his highest or lowest card to that trick in which he has renounced.

95. If the player in fault be the dealer, the eldest hand may require him to play the highest or lowest card of the suit in which he has renounced, provided both of the dealer's adversaries have played to the current trick; but this penalty cannot be exacted from the dealer when he is fourth in hand, nor can it be enforced at all from Dummy.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

96. If a revoke be claimed, and the accused player or his partner mix the cards before they have been sufficiently examined by the adversaries, the revoke is established. The mixing of the cards only renders the proof of a revoke difficult, but does not prevent the claim, and possible establishment, of the penalty.

97. A revoke cannot be claimed after the cards have been cut for the following deal.

98. If a revoke occur, be claimed and proved, bets on the odd trick, or on amount of score, must be decided by the actual state of the score after the penalty is paid.

99. Should the players on both sides subject themselves to the penalty of one or more revokes, neither can win the game by that hand; each is punished at the discretion of his adversary.

CALLING FOR NEW CARDS

100. Any player (on paying for them) before, but not after, the pack be cut for the deal, may call for fresh cards. He must call for two new packs, of which the dealer takes his choice.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

GENERAL RULES

101. Any one during the play of a trick, or after the four cards are played, and before, but not after, they are touched for the purpose of gathering them together, may demand that the cards be placed before their respective players.

102. If either of the dealer's adversaries, prior to his partner playing, should call attention to the trick — either by saying that it is his, or by naming his card, or, without being required so to do, by drawing it towards him — the dealer may require that opponent's partner to play his highest or lowest of the suit then led, or to win or lose the trick.

103. Should the partner of the player solely entitled to exact a penalty, suggest or demand the enforcement of it, no penalty can be enforced.

104. In all cases where a penalty has been incurred, the offender is bound to give reasonable time for the decision of his adversaries.

105. If a bystander make any remark which calls the attention of a player or players to an

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

oversight affecting the score, he is liable to be called on, by the players only, to pay the stakes and all bets on that game or rubber.

106. A bystander, by agreement among the players, may decide any question.

107. A card or cards torn or marked must be either replaced by agreement, or new cards called at the expense of the table.

108. Once a trick is complete, turned, and quitted, it must not be looked at (except under Law 88) until the end of the hand.

DUMMY BRIDGE

Is played by three players.

The player who cuts the lowest card deals first, and has the Dummy throughout the first rubber; the player who cuts the next lowest card has the Dummy for the second rubber.

The dealer can make any of the ordinary Bridge declarations on his own hand, or he can leave it to the Dummy, in which case he must look at the Dummy, without exposing it, and must make the declaration as follows: —

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

- I. If Dummy holds three or four aces, he must declare "no trumps."
- II. If Dummy has not three aces, he must declare his numerically longest suit.
- III. If Dummy has two or three suits of equal length, he must declare the strongest, reckoned by addition of the pips, an ace counting eleven, and each of the other honours ten.
- IV. If Dummy's equal suits are also of equal strength, reckoned as above, then the most valuable of them must be declared.

The adversaries can double as at ordinary Bridge, and the dealer has the right of re-doubling, although he has seen two hands; but he may not look at his own hand again before deciding whether to re-double. The hand is then played as at ordinary Bridge.

When either of his opponents deals, the player of Dummy must look first at the hand which has to lead, and must double or lead to the first trick before looking at his other hand.

The game can be played in either of the two following ways:—

- I. As soon as the first card is led, Dummy's hand is exposed on the table, and the game proceeds as at ordinary Bridge.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

II. As soon as the first card is led, both the Dummy's hand and the dealer's partner's hand are exposed on the table, and the hand is played Double Dummy.

When it is Dummy's deal, his partner looks at his own hand first, and makes the declaration or passes it precisely as in the case of his own deal, the only difference in the play being that the first lead is by the player on his right, and is consequently through his hand instead of up to it.

In all other cases the Laws of Bridge apply.

DOUBLE DUMMY

The rules are the same as in Dummy Bridge, with the following exceptions: —

The dealer deals for himself each time, never for his Dummy; and the hand on his left always leads first, and has the first right of doubling.

Neither player may look at more than one of his two hands before the first card is led, excepting in the case of the dealer when the call is passed to Dummy.

Either player is liable to the penalty of a revoke in his own hand, but not in his Dummy.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

THREE-HANDED BRIDGE

Is played by three players, all against all.

The player who cuts the lowest card has the first deal, and plays the Dummy for that hand. The player cutting the next lowest card sits on the dealer's left, and the remaining player on the dealer's right.

When the first hand is finished, the player on the right moves into Dummy's place, and the player on the left (*i. e.*, he who had cut the second lowest card) deals and plays the Dummy for that hand, and so on, until the completion of the rubber; the player on the dealer's right always moving into the vacant seat.

The rules for declaring, leading, and doubling are the same as at Dummy Bridge.

When the dealer wins the odd trick or more, the value of such trick or tricks is scored by him precisely as at ordinary Bridge; but when he loses one or more tricks, the value of it or them is scored to each of his opponents *above* the line, instead of below it.

Under no circumstances do the dealer's oppo-

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

nents score anything below the line. Honours are scored as at ordinary Bridge; and when they are against the dealer they are scored to each opponent equally, however they are held.

The game is 30 scored below the line, as at ordinary Bridge, and the player who first wins two games wins the rubber and adds 100 to his score; but the fact of one player winning his first game does not affect the scores of the other two — they still retain anything that they have scored below the line to count towards the next game.

The rubber consists of four games; but when two games have been won by the same player, the other or others are not played.

At the conclusion of the rubber, the total scores for tricks, Honours, Chicane, and Slam obtained by each player are added up, one hundred points are added to the score of the winner, and the difference between his score and that of each of his opponents is the number of points won from, or lost to, each of them separately by the winner of the rubber. The difference between the scores of the two losers is also paid by the third player to the second.

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

ETIQUETTE OF BRIDGE

The following rules belong to the established Etiquette of Bridge. They are not called laws, as it is difficult — in some cases impossible — to apply any penalty to their infraction, and the only remedy is to cease to play with players who habitually disregard them.

It is to be borne in mind that, from the nature of the conditions under which the game is played, acts may be so done, and words so spoken, as to convey a very distinct intimation to a partner. To do so is to offend against the most important of the proprieties of the game.

Declarations ought to be made in a simple manner — *e. g.*, by saying, “I make hearts trumps”; “There are no trumps”; or, “I leave it to you.” There ought to be neither intimation of doubt in, or reason for, making this declaration. Nothing ought to be done or said by the declarant which may afford an indication or intimation of the hand which he holds, or draws attention to the state of the score.

A player should avoid any unnecessary hesita-

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

tion in passing the trump declaration to his partner, or giving any well-marked indication of doubt or perplexity.

Similarly, a player who has the first right of doubling or re-doubling on behalf of a partnership ought not to decline to exercise that right, and so pass it to his partner, after any unnecessary hesitation, or after giving any well-marked indication of doubt or perplexity.

Any one, having the lead and one or more winning cards to play, should not draw a second card out of his hand until his partner has played to the first trick, such act being a distinct intimation that the former has played a winning card.

A player who has looked at his cards ought not to give any indication by word or gesture as to the nature of his hand, or call the attention of his partner to the score of the game.

A player who desires the cards to be placed, should do it for his own information only, and not in order to invite the attention of his partner.

No player should object to refer to a bystander, who professes himself uninterested in the game and able to decide, a disputed question of facts;

THE LAWS OF BRIDGE

as to who played any particular card — whether honours were claimed though not scored, or *vice versa* — etc., etc.

It is unfair to revoke purposely; having made a revoke, a player is not justified in making a second in order to conceal the first.

CHAPTER I

THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC

THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC are a systematic treatment
of the science of the mind. It is a science which
is concerned with the laws of thought, and the
principles which govern the process of reasoning.
It is a science which is of the highest importance
to the human mind, and which is the foundation
of all other sciences. It is a science which is
of the highest importance to the human mind, and
which is the foundation of all other sciences. It
is a science which is of the highest importance
to the human mind, and which is the foundation
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of the highest importance to the human mind, and
which is the foundation of all other sciences.

There is no other science which is of the highest
importance to the human mind, and which is the
foundation of all other sciences.

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

approaching modern Bridge. The game, as we play it, is far more likely to have been of Levantine origin. It was certainly played, very much in its present form, some forty years ago, in Eastern Europe, notably in Constantinople and in Greece, and, if there were any necessity to assign to it a definite nationality, we should not hesitate to award that honour to Greece.

The prevalent idea that Bridge was unknown in England up to the time of its introduction at the Portland Club in 1894 is an entirely mistaken one. It was quite unknown in Clubland, but there is indisputable evidence of its having been known and regularly played in private circles for many years prior to that date (1894).

It is stated in the supplement to the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* that the game was first introduced into England in the year 1880, but no information is given as to who furnished this statement, or as to what authority if any, there is for it.

We have received a letter — for which we are greatly indebted — from an English gentleman of Greek extraction, now resident in London, in

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

which we are assured that the writer can remember the game of Bridge, very much in its present form, being regularly played among a colony of Greeks, settled in Manchester, of whom his own father was one, as far back as the seventies of the last century. The only important point of difference between the game as it was then played and as it is played now was, that the value of No Trumps was 10 points per trick instead of 12, and that the four aces in one hand counted 80 above the line instead of 100 as at present. Also, the lead of a heart, in answer to a double of No Trumps by the leader's partner, which is commonly supposed to have originated in America, was the general custom. There was no agreed-upon convention on the subject, but, when there was any possible doubt in the leader's mind as to which suit his partner wanted led, it was the invariable custom to lead a heart. The short-suit convention had not then been heard of. That was probably a purely English convention of a later date.

It seems evident that the Greeks cannot be a proselytising nation, for, just as the game of Bridge took upwards of twenty years to spread

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

from Greece to Western Europe, so these Greeks, who played the game so many years ago in England, do not appear to have been anxious to gain converts in this country, but were content to go on playing it among themselves, and it seems to have been confined exclusively to these small coteries.

In the year 1886, a small pamphlet was printed in London, entitled *Biritch, or Russian Whist*. There is said to be only one copy of this pamphlet in existence, and that is in the library of the British Museum (press mark 7913 aa 51). It gives a very attenuated description of the game, with the method of scoring and a few laws as to declaring, passing the declaration, etc., but again we are without available information as to who framed these laws, or by whose authority they were published.

The most valuable declaration, corresponding to our present call of "No Trumps," was "Biritch," or playing without trumps, and the value of this call was again 10 points per trick instead of 12, and also four aces in one hand counted 80 not 100. The winners of the rubber added 40 points to their

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

score, instead of 100 points as in our present game, and this extra score was called "Consolation."

There can be no doubt that the score for No Trumps ought to be 10 points per trick and not 12, as that is following the regular upward sequence of the suit declarations, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10; and also, if the value of the tricks at No Trumps is to be 12 points, why should the honour score for aces not be also 12 points instead of 10? When, or why, or how, or by whom the change was made is quite unknown. When the game was first introduced at the Portland Club we were certainly told that the value of No Trumps was 12 points per trick, and the error, if error it was, must somehow have crept in accidentally.

There is quite another version of the origin of the title of "Bridge." The story goes that, some twenty years ago, long before Bridge was known in London clubs, two families who played the game under the name of "Russian Whist" were living in neighbouring houses, at or near Great Dalby in Leicestershire. They were in the habit of visiting each other's houses on alternate evenings to play this fascinating game, and the only

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

road of communication between the two houses lay over a broken-down and somewhat dangerous bridge, which was very awkward to cross in the dark. It was a frequent occurrence for the departing guests to say to their hosts, "Thank goodness, it is your 'Bridge' to-morrow," meaning that the other party would have to cross the dangerous bridge the next night. Hence is said to have arisen the title of "Bridge." We give this story for what it is worth, but in our own mind we have little doubt that the modern name of "Bridge" is merely a very easy corruption of the old title of "Biritch." The two words "Biritch" and "Bridge" have absolutely the same sound when spoken quickly, so that it is easy to imagine how the change of spelling came to pass.

Mr. Jean Boussac, in his *Encyclopedie des Jeux de Cartes*, quotes an extract from the *Figaro* of November 26, 1893, to prove that the game of Bridge was played in Paris as early as 1893, but it must have been played there for several years before that date, as it was directly from Paris that the game was taken to America.

1 In April, 1892, Mr. Henry Barbey returned to

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

New York, after spending the winter in Paris, very full of the new and delightful card game which he had learnt in that city. Shortly after his return he gave a dinner-party at his own house, with the special object of introducing the new game to his friends, but the experiment was not much of a success. His guests did not appear to be at all enraptured with the novelty, saying that the scoring was too difficult and the game altogether too complicated, and one or two of them left early and broke up the party.

Mr. Barbey, in no way disheartened, consulted with Mr. H. de Forrest Weekes, whom he had converted to his own way of thinking, as to what was to be done next. They agreed that the wrong sort of men had been present at the first trial, and a second dinner was given to a carefully selected few, who were all enthusiastic card players, and this time the result was very different.

In the meantime Mr. Barbey had drawn up on a sheet of paper a short *précis* of the method of scoring, and of the principal points of the game. He adopted the somewhat novel method of cutting out pips from a pack of ordinary playing-cards and

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

pasting them on to the aforesaid sheet of paper, to indicate the different suits. This original document is now framed, and hanging in the card-room of the Whist Club of New York. After the second dinner-party Mr. Weekes had copies of this document printed, and sent them round to all the leading clubs in New York. From this time the game took on like wild-fire, and it has never looked back since; still, it did not have quite the same meteoric success in New York that it had in London, and Whist did not die the same sudden and unexpected death in America that it did in England. The game of Whist is still very much alive in America, and in this present year of grace, 1906, a new magazine, entitled *Whist*, has been started in New York.

It is not necessary to repeat the oft-told tale of how Lord Brougham introduced Bridge into the Portland Club in London in the autumn of 1894. The game was quite unknown there up to that date, although it was not quite unheard of. Echoes of its existence had penetrated even into that sanctum, hitherto sacred to the cult of Whist. Friends staying in Cairo had written home glowing ac-

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

counts of the new card-game being played there, and certain members of the New York Clubs, who are always welcome at the Portland, had given a full description of Bridge to members of that club in 1893, but nobody seemed inclined to give it a trial. Again, when the Americans came over in the spring of 1894, they expressed unbounded surprise to find us still playing Whist, and many members will remember Mr. Winthrop Gray saying: "What, have n't you learnt Bridge yet? You are quite behind the times, but you are bound to come to it before long." When he returned in 1895, he found that his words had been carried out to the letter, and that a very different state of affairs prevailed.

When once Lord Brougham had explained the mysteries and charms of Bridge to a few members of the Club, and when once it was given a fair trial, the game of Whist was routed root and branch, and Bridge immediately took its place as the standard card game. Nobody who once played Bridge ever cared to go back to Whist. The triumph of the new game was sudden, complete, and overwhelming.

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

From the Portland it soon found its way to the Turf Club, which had many members in common with the Portland, and there it has been received with even a warmer welcome. For a short time, a very short time, it was confined to these two clubs, but it soon began to spread to others, and wherever it was once introduced there it stayed, so that, in an incredibly short space of time the game of Whist came to be numbered with other relics of the past.

The necessity then arose for a recognised and authorised code of laws for the new game, and a committee of three members of the Portland was appointed in December, 1895, to draft the required code. The task was a difficult one, as their knowledge of the game was at that early stage a very elementary one, but the work was so skilfully and successfully done that the code of laws then drawn up lasted, practically unaltered, for a period of ten years, and stood the test of covering all the debatable points of the game. These laws were issued early in 1895, and in July of the same year they were submitted to a joint committee of the Portland and Turf Clubs, and, being passed

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

with a few unimportant alterations, they became the standard laws of English Bridge, and remained so until another joint committee of the same clubs issued the "Revised Laws of Bridge," at the end of 1904.

In February, 1895, Messrs. T. De La Rue & Co., published "The Laws of Bridge, with a guide to the game," by "Boaz." This was the first Bridge book, with the exception of the small pamphlet already mentioned, ever published in England, or, as far as we know, in any other country. A second edition of it appeared later in the same year, giving the authorised code of laws after they had been passed by the joint committee, and this was followed by two subsequent editions in 1896 and 1897. In March, 1898, a fifth edition was published, together with a short treatise entitled "How to play Bridge," by "Badsworth." "Badsworth" was the *nom-de-plume* of a well known member of the Portland Club, one of the ablest exponents of the game, and this little brochure remained the standard book on the subject for some three years.

In 1899 a book on Bridge was published in

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

India by "John Doe," and an English edition of the same work was published in London in 1900. Also in 1899 appeared "Bridge, and how to play it," by Archibald Dunn, Junior; but by far the most important book on the game published in that year, although it is now very little known, was the "Pons Asinorum, or Bridge for Beginners," by A. G. Hulme-Beaman. Mr. Hulme-Beaman, author of "Twenty Years in the Near East," started as a student dragoman in the Levant, and he wrote of the game of Bridge from many years' personal experience of it as played in Eastern Europe. Here again we find the value of the No Trump call given as 10 points per trick instead of 12, and Mr. Beaman writes of the methods of "the well-known veteran bridge player, M. Mavrogordato," which goes to prove that the game of Bridge was no novelty in those climes, but an institution of many years' standing.

It was not until 1901 that any real standard work on the subject made its appearance. In that year Messrs. T. De La Rue & Co., who have ever been the pioneers of card literature, pub-

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

lished, almost simultaneously, "Bridge Abridged, or Practical Bridge," by the present writer, and "Hellespont on Bridge," "Hellespont" being the pseudonym of a gentleman, residing in India, who is said to have had great experience of the game as it is played in the East. These two books have both had a large sale, and both have run through several editions, and they still hold their place as the two standard works on the game. About the same time, or possibly a little earlier, an excellent elementary book for beginners was written by Mrs. J. R. Tennant, entitled, "The A B C of Bridge." This little book also had, as it well deserved, a large sale, and many were the players whom it initiated into the mysteries of the game.

After these came a perfect flood of Bridge literature, good, bad, and indifferent; going over the same old ground, again and again, and adding little of interest to what had been already written on the subject. There were a few notable exceptions such as "Badsworth's" larger book, published in 1903, Mr. J. B. Elwell's two excellent books, published in New York, and Mr. Foster's

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

many books, published both in New York and in London; but most of the subsequent books were little more than a repetition, more or less paraphrased, of what had been written in the earlier text books.

For a considerable period after the introduction of the game into London in 1894, Bridge remained almost exclusively a club game.

Men who played it at London clubs, also played it in their own country houses, or wherever they could get up a rubber, but it was by no means the popular social game that it has since become. It was not until the beginning of the present century, 1900 or 1901, that the ladies discovered what a delightful field of amusement and mild speculation was open to them.

The game of Whist had never appealed strongly to ladies. The scientific conventions of the game, its solemnity, and, above all, the enforced silence from which "Whist" probably derived its name, were not at all to their liking, but here was a very different matter. Here was a game at which it was not considered wicked to smile, or to make a harmless irrelevant remark. Here was a game at

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

which they could meet men on even terms and hold their own with them, a game at which their naturally quick sense of intuition was of the greatest service, a game which offered that greatest of all charms to the female mind — infinite variety.

When once the ladies discovered the fascination of the game, they adopted it as their own, and became even more enthusiastic about it than the men. There are at the present time many very fine women Bridge players, and their number is increasing every day. The general standard of Bridge has improved enormously in the last three or four years. Whereas it was at one time the exception to meet a really first-class player, they are to be met with now in every club and in every walk of life. The latest innovation is mixed Bridge clubs for men and ladies, and very popular they seem to be, and the standard of play at some of them is quite as good as that of many men's clubs.

Bridge has to a certain extent revolutionised society. It has shortened the long, weary, and unwholesome dinners of ten years ago. It has

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

altered entirely the dreadful tedious hour in the drawing-room after dinner, when one used to count the minutes until one could decently take one's departure. It has done away with the monotony of that awful wet day in a country house, which we used to know so well, and it has given an added interest in life to many people. In short, like the Pickwick pen, it has "come as a boon and a blessing to men," and still more so to ladies.

We are sometimes asked, "Is the popularity of Bridge on the wane?" We unhesitatingly answer "No." There is a strong tendency, everywhere, to play for lower points. The twos and tens (2s. points, with £10 on the rubber) of the days of "The Boozers," are no longer heard of. The highest game played in London at the present time is 1s. points, or £5 per 100, and the tendency to reduce this is so strongly marked, that it seems probable that threepenny points will become the standard game at the leading London clubs in the near future.

Possibly Bridge may not be growing in popularity in London — there was hardly any room for

THE EVOLUTION OF BRIDGE

it to do so — but in the country, at the seaside, wherever people most do congregate, there the game is growing and flourishing like a green bay tree.

Long may it continue to do so.

NOTE. — *For much of the information in this chapter I am indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Frederick Jessel, who not only furnished me with many interesting facts, but also gave me free access to his unique library of card literature. — W. D.*

CHAPTER II

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

THE declaration at Bridge affords an opportunity for the exercise of certain qualities which were never called into use in the game of whist. Precisely the same technical skill is required for the management and play of the cards in both games, but in whist the trump suit is arbitrarily settled by the turn-up card, whereas in Bridge the right of choosing the trump suit, and so fixing the value of the game, devolves upon the dealer or his partner, and the result of the game will frequently depend upon the judicious exercise of that right. If the dealer had only to consider the cards in his own hand his task would be quite simple, but he has to consider, not only the value of his own cards and how many tricks they are likely to win, but also the value of them combined with the unknown cards in his partner's hand. This demands sound judgment, a good knowledge of probabilities, and care-

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

ful attention to the state of the score. The cards in his partner's hand being entirely unknown, the dealer can only be guided by the doctrine of average. The average hand at Bridge consists of one ace, one king, one queen, one knave and so on down to one two; there may be greater strength or there may be less, but he is fairly entitled to credit his partner with an average hand, and on this assumption all his calculations should be based. A golden general rule for the guidance of the declarer, whether he be the dealer or the dummy, is that when he has a good hand, that is, a hand considerably above the average, he should make the game as expensive as possible, and conversely, when he has a bad hand, or a hand below the average, he should make the game as cheap as possible.

The most expensive declaration in Bridge being No Trumps, when the value of each trick is twelve points, or more than a third of the whole game, the first consideration of the dealer should always be whether his hand is strong enough for this call. He should always declare No Trumps at the score of love, when he can see a probability of winning

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

the odd trick and a possibility of winning the game, with the assistance of an average hand from his partner — that is the point to be always remembered, that an average hand from his partner is a contingency on which he is entitled to speculate. If his partner has a bad hand, the result will possibly be temporary disaster, but he who never risks disaster will never court success, and waiting for a certainty is a very tedious business. The advantage of the No Trump game to the dealer lies, not only in the increased value of each trick, but also in the greater facilities that it gives him for the successful combination of the two hands under his charge. Directly the first card is led and the dummy exposed he can see at a glance what forces are at his disposal, he can note exactly where his strength or his weakness lies, and he can utilise every element of strength in either hand to the greatest advantage, while his opponents are still in the dark, and know only that the leader has certain strength in the suit originally opened.

It is very difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what does or does not constitute a No Trump hand. Some hands have no great

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

strength in themselves, but being protected in every suit, they become very useful indeed when played in combination with another useful hand, although combined with an indifferent hand they become of very little use. Aces are a great element of strength in declaring No Trumps, and any hand containing three aces is considered a *jeu de règle* No Trump, even when there is not another court card in it. True, the three aces can only win three tricks, but they command their three respective suits, and they enable the dealer to get the lead three times so as to play for any useful suit that his partner may have. Another valuable element of strength is a long suit with one or two high cards at its head, such a suit as king, knave, ten, and two others. Although this has not a single certain trick in it, it has great possibilities, because, if either the ace or queen is found in the partner's hand, four tricks in that suit become a certainty at once.

By no means an uncommon type of No Trump declaration is a well-protected hand, with no great trick-making power in itself, but with a guard in every suit, and, consequently, with a certainty of

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

stopping the opponents' opening lead, whatever suit may be selected. Such a hand as —

Hearts — Ace, 8, 4.

Clubs — Ace, 10, 3.

Diamonds — King, 9, 5.

Spades — Queen, 9, 5, 2.

This is an undoubted No Trump call for the dealer, although in itself it will not win many tricks, but, paradoxical as it may appear, the declaration is made on the strength of the unknown cards in the dummy hand. If the dummy is found with any one good strong suit, whatever it may be, that suit is certain to be easy to establish, and there is at once the nucleus of a fine No Trumper. The great strength and advantage of the No Trump call lies, not in holding a certain number of winning cards in one hand or the other, but in the combination of the two hands, and in the opportunity afforded to the dealer of being able to see at once where his two hands will combine to the greatest advantage, so that he can attack in the most vulnerable spot without any loss of time.

When there is a question in the dealer's mind between a doubtful red suit declaration, and a rather light No Trump call, he should always go for the No Trump, so as to give himself the best

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

chance of utilising every element of strength in his partner's hand, without being tied to one particular suit.

A well-known writer on Bridge, in his latest book, published in 1903, gives two instances of hands on which he tells his readers that he himself would not hesitate to declare hearts. The two hands are: —

No. 1.

Hearts — King, queen, 10, 7.

Diamonds — Ace, 8, 6.

Clubs — Ace, 5.

Spades — 10, 9, 4, 2.

No. 2.

Hearts — Queen, knave, 9, 8.

Diamonds — Ace, 10, 3.

Clubs — Queen, knave, 8.

Spades — King, queen, 9.

The greater part of the book in question is thoroughly sound and instructive, but what can be said of such teaching as this, laid down for the instruction of beginners by a recognised authority? To our way of thinking it is almost heretical. Neither of these hands is even a doubtful one. They are both good sound No Trump calls, with a fine chance of winning the game, and why in the world any player should tie his partner down to one particular suit, when he has such all-round strength in his own hand, is entirely beyond our

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

comprehension. Even at the score of 22 or 24, when one odd trick in either hearts or No Trumps would win the game, we should still declare No Trumps on either of these two hands, as being the best chance of winning the odd trick. The so-called border-line No Trump call, provided that it does not touch the border line, is always justifiable in the early stages of the game, and it will be found to succeed far more often than it will fail, but both of the hands quoted above are sound No Trumppers, not even approaching the border line.

A necessary qualification for a justifiable No Trump hand is that it should be guarded in three of the four suits. The dealer should never be deterred from declaring No Trumps because he is very weak in, or even entirely devoid of, one suit, provided that his other three suits are strong. The fourth suit can be left for the dummy to protect, and it will be unlucky if he has not some sort of protection in it. Chancing two suits is quite a different matter, and should only be resorted to as a very extreme measure, except in the case of what is known as a one suit No Trumper, which will be dealt with later on.

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

There can be no doubt that the game of Bridge owes a great part of its charm to the No Trump declaration. If the No Trump call were to be eliminated altogether, and the game confined to suit declarations, the popularity of Bridge would very quickly disappear, and it would soon be numbered with whist, solo, boston, and other games of the past. But the No Trump call remains, and will always remain, as long as Bridge lasts, as the life and soul of the game, and a player's first consideration, when he is dealer, should always be whether he has the requisite strength to declare No Trumps — not being unduly rash, nor taking any desperate risks, but, on the other hand, never throwing away a chance of a good score at No Trumps, because he is afraid of finding a bad hand in his dummy. The dealer is quite entitled to assume that his dummy will be capable of winning three tricks, not on its own merits alone, and not by any means certain tricks, but that the combination of the two hands will enable dummy to win three tricks. When the dealer has five such probable tricks in his own hand, assuming average assistance from his dummy, he has an undoubted

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

No Trump call, provided that he is guarded in three suits, and that one, at least, of those three is headed by the ace.

We will now consider the actual requirements for a No Trump declaration.

With four aces in one hand, No Trumps should always be declared, but it is possible to imagine an exception even to this rule.

With such a hand as —

Hearts — Ace, knave, 10, 9, 8, 5, 3, 2.	Clubs — Ace, 3.
Diamonds — Ace, 5.	Spades — Ace.

the right declaration at the score of love would be hearts and not No Trumps. The winning of the game would be practically a certainty with hearts as trumps, whereas, if No Trumps were declared, there would be a great danger of one of the other suits being brought in by the adversaries, and four or five tricks being lost in it, before the heart suit could be established. There would be a very substantial and appreciable loss in the honour score by declaring hearts on this hand, but winning the game is the primary consideration, and the winning or losing of the rubber involves a difference of over 200 points; therefore, in such a case, it

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

would be right to accept the loss of 68 or 84 points above the line for the certainty of winning the game, especially if it were the last game of the rubber.

There are many players, with the gambling instinct strongly developed, who will not accept this theory, but who would unhesitatingly declare No Trumps on such a hand, for the sake of scoring 100 above the line. The principle, however, is not sound. The best and soundest advice which can be given is, always to take the most likely chance of winning the game, quite regardless of extra points, either above or below the line, which might result from a bolder policy, if the cards happened to lie favourably.

Holding three aces in his own hand, the dealer should never pass the call in the early stages of the game. A bare three-ace hand is not a strong No Trump call; in fact, it is a very weak one, but it has possibilities. The three aces are only good for three tricks, but they enable the dealer to stop each of the three suits which they command, and they give him a fine chance of establishing and bringing in any long suit which he

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

may be fortunate enough to find in his dummy. Here again, the dealer makes the No Trump declaration, not on his three aces, not on the strength of his own hand, but on the assistance which his own hand will give to the strength which he hopes to find in the dummy. If the dummy has a bad hand there is certain to be disaster, but a three-ace hand always presents possibilities, and on those possibilities the forward declaration should be made.

Any hand containing three aces is a *jeu de règle* No Trump call, but do not run away with the idea that the dealer is bound to declare No Trumps whenever he has three aces in his own hand. He must not pass the call with three aces, he is bound to make some declaration himself, but that declaration need not necessarily be No Trumps. That is, the danger of laying down a hard and fast rule, such as that a three-ace hand is a *jeu de règle* No Trump. Beginners are apt to think that they are not playing the game if they do not declare No Trumps with three aces, whatever the rest of their hand may be. Take the following two hands, for instance:—

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

No. 1.

Hearts — Ace, queen, 10, 9, 2.

Diamonds — Ace, 7, 4.

Clubs — 9, 7, 3.

Spades — Ace, 10.

No. 2.

Hearts — 7, 3.

Diamonds — Ace, king, knave,
10, 4, 2.

Clubs — Ace, 8, 5.

Spades — Ace, 9.

Both of these hands contain the requisite three aces, yet no experienced Bridge player would declare No Trumps on either of them at the score of love all. He would declare hearts on No. 1, and diamonds on No. 2. A light No Trump, however anæmic it may be, is always preferable to a light red suit declaration, but a strong red suit declaration, such as either of the above, is far better than an average No Trump call. There is a certainty of making a good score, and a good possibility of winning the game, without taking any risks at all. If the dummy puts down a good hand, with protection in the dealer's unguarded suit, the game would be won at No Trumps, but in that case it would probably be won also on the suit declaration, although the winning score would not be so great. On the other hand, if the dummy has a very bad hand, every trick in the dealer's weak suit may be made

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

against him, and it may be all that he can do to save the game.

We are particularly anxious to disabuse the beginner's mind of the idea that he is bound to declare No Trumps whenever he holds three aces. He certainly should make a declaration on his own hand, and, if he has not got a good red suit, he must declare No Trumps, but if he has a good suit of either hearts or diamonds, and one other suit entirely unguarded, he will often find that he has sacrificed the substance for the shadow if he is so fed up with the knowledge of his three aces that he considers himself bound to declare No Trumps, in preference to going for a safer game and a certain score.

It has been already said that a three-ace hand is a *jeu de règle* No Trump, and it is the only *jeu de règle* in the game of Bridge, but there are many good No Trump hands which contain two aces, or only one, or even no ace at all. Aces are a good solid foundation for a No Trump hand, but they are not everything, and it is quite possible to attach too much importance to the possession of them. Certainly, a No Trump declaration with-

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

out an ace at all is an extreme measure, but there are occasions when extreme measures must be resorted to. The dealer may quite well have a hand, without an ace, which is too strong and well guarded to pass the declaration with, but on which he cannot declare a red suit. In this case, he has no alternative but to declare No Trumps. It should be remembered that, when the dealer has no ace in his own hand, the odds are, approximately, 9 to 2 on his partner holding one or more, and only 6 to 4 against his partner holding two or more. Two aces in his partner's hand will turn such a hand as we are supposing the dealer to hold into a very fine No Trumper, and one ace will fortify it immensely; so that it is not a case of running an enormous risk for the dealer to declare No Trumps without an ace, provided that his hand is sufficiently good to warrant it. Four kings are a necessity, or at least three kings, with queen, knave, and others in the fourth suit, and two at least of the kings, or better still three of them, should have the queen or knave behind them. The following are two hands taken from Captain Beasley's "London Bridge," on which the author

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

says that he should always declare No Trumps at the score of love all:—

No. 1.

Hearts — King, knave, 10.

Diamonds — King, 2.

Clubs — King, knave, 9.

Spades — King, queen, knave,
10, 3.

No. 2.

Hearts — King, 10.

Diamonds — Queen, 8, 7.

Clubs — King, queen, 10, 3, 2.

Spades — King, queen, 8.

In No. 2 we should prefer to have the knave of diamonds as well, but here you have the opinion of a first-class player as to what he would do himself. Of course, there is always the danger of finding 100 aces against you in one hand, but the odds against this are $56\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and such extreme odds need hardly be taken into consideration.

A good general formula for a No Trump hand is that it should be at least the value of one queen above the average, and that three of the suits should be properly guarded, and we should add to this that it must have at least one ace.

A very difficult hand on which to declare is, when the dealer holds considerable strength in both the red suits, but not strength enough to make a good red suit declaration.

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

Say that he has

Hearts — Ace, king, 9, 8.

Diamonds — Ace, queen, knave, 5.

Clubs — 10, 7, 4.

Spades — 9, 6.

What is he to do with this hand? It is a bad No Trump declaration, because he is chancing two entire suits, and neither red suit is quite strong enough for an attacking declaration. The hand, containing five honours in the red suits, is one of distinct value, and yet, if the dealer passes the declaration, it is practically certain that his partner will be obliged to declare a black suit, in which case all the attacking value of the hand is gone. With such a hand as this, the dealer must harden his heart, take a little extra risk, and boldly declare No Trumps. If the hand goes very wrong, he is certain to be told by his irate partner that it was an unjustifiable call, but such ignorant criticism by results is one of the penalties that one has to pay for playing an intelligent game, and for taking risks that are well worth taking.

The hand is far too good a one to pass for an almost certain black suit declaration, and it is better to take the wider chance of declaring No

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

Trumps than to tie one's partner to one particular suit. If either red suit is declared, and the dummy happens to be very weak in the declared suit, no material good can possibly result, however good the rest of the dummy's cards may be. If the suits were reversed, and the dealer's two strong suits were the black ones, he should not hesitate to pass the declaration, hoping for a strong red suit declaration from his partner, in which case his own winning black cards would be very useful; but, when he has strength in both the red suits, there is little hope of a left No Trump call, and he is almost certain to get a black suit declaration. The declaration of the dealer must be governed a great deal by the consideration of what his partner is likely to declare if he leaves it.

Take such a hand as —

Hearts — 8, 3.

Clubs — Queen, knave, 10, 6.

Diamonds — Ace, queen, 9, 4. Spades — King, 8, 5.

This is a weak No Trump declaration, but if the dealer passes with this hand, what can he expect? Hearts, probably, in which he is very weak himself. If his partner has strength in hearts, it at

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

once becomes a good No Trumper, therefore he had better speculate on his partner being strong in that suit, rather than risk an expensive declaration being made in a suit in which his own hand can give no material assistance.

As a summary, we cannot do better than quote "Hellespont's" "Analysis of No Trump Declarations." He says: —

The dealer should always declare No Trumps at the score of love all, when his hand contains:

- (a) Four aces, whatever the other cards may be;
- (b) Three aces, unless six or more hearts are held;
- (c) At least one queen in excess of a hand of average strength, and three suits securely guarded;
- (d) Six or more certain tricks in spades or clubs, and one other ace;
- (e) Generally when he holds both the red aces and kings, accompanied by one or two small ones in each suit, and nothing in the black suits.

Unless, in (b), (c), and (a), five honours or four honours in hearts or diamonds are held, when the suit should be declared in preference.

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

Without an ace, No Trumps should not be declared at the score of love all, except with four kings and four queens, and an evenly divided hand; and not even then, if four honours in hearts or diamonds are held.

We do not quite agree with clause (*b*). Five hearts, or six diamonds, with honours at the head of them, and two other aces, is a far better and sounder suit declaration than a No Trump; and again, when the dealer holds four kings and no ace, it is not necessary to hold the four queens in addition. When three of the kings, or even two, have the queen or knave behind them, a No Trump call is quite justifiable at the score of love all.

There is a system, known as the Robertsonian or Robertson Rule, which came to us from India, and which professes to establish a standard for a justifiable No Trump call by assigning a figure value to the court cards. This will sometimes be found of great use to a beginner, by helping him to determine whether a doubtful hand has the requisite strength for a No Trump call, but it is by no means to be regarded as final.

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

It is quite impossible to lay down any general rule or formula which will cover all the variations of No Trump declarations. The practised Bridge player learns by experience what constitutes a justifiable No Trump call and what is a very risky declaration, but the player of less experience will do well to commit this formula to memory and to be guided a great deal by it, when he finds himself with such a hand that he is in doubt whether to declare No Trumps himself or to pass the declaration to his partner.

The Robertsonian system is the following: —

Each Ace	counts 7.	Each Queen	counts 3.
„ King	„ 5.	„ Knave	„ 1.

When the collective value of the court cards in the hand amounts to 21 or more it is supposed to be a justifiable No Trump, provided that the counting cards are spread over at least three of the suits, and that they are all properly guarded, that is to say, that a king has at least one guard, a queen at least two, and a knave three. This system is obviously based on the bare three-ace No Trump, as the value of three aces amounts to exactly 21. It is of more value negatively than positively,

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

by which is meant that no hand which does not count 21 is a justifiable No Trump, but it does not quite follow that any hand which does count up to 21 will succeed at No Trumps. For instance, the four kings and one knave would count 21, but it would be a desperately risky declaration, and again the bare three-ace call, spoken of above, is a declaration which requires considerable assistance from your partner to carry it through with success. The following are two very light calls, which reach the required standard:—

No. 1.

Hearts — Ace, 8, 6.

Diamonds — Queen, 9, 7, 2.

Clubs — King, knave, 3.

Spades — King, 8, 5.

No. 2.

Hearts — Ace, knave, 3.

Diamonds — King, 9, 6.

Clubs — King, queen, 7, 2.

Spades — 9, 8, 4.

The figure value of both these hands amounts to exactly 21, and they are both very near the border line, but experience has abundantly proved that border-line No Trumps succeed far more often than they fail, and No Trumps should be declared on either hand at the score of love all. No. 1 is slightly better than No. 2 because it is guarded in all the four suits. The weakest point

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

in the Robertsonian Rule is that it does not take into consideration the backbone given to a hand by a long suit. Take such a hand as —

Hearts — King, 4. Clubs — King, knave, 10, 9, 7, 5.
Diamonds — Queen, 8, 3. Spades — Ace, 7.

This hand counts only 21, but it is a hand with great possibilities, and no Bridge player of any experience would hesitate to declare No Trumps on it.

One other variety of the No Trump call must be mentioned. When you hold six or more cards of a black suit, thoroughly established, and one other card of entry, No Trumps should always be declared at the score of love. You will, of course, be running a considerable risk with two entire suits against you, but you may trust your partner to hold something of value in one or both of them, and the probable gain is well worth the risk. Directly either you or your partner can get in, the odd trick at least, and very probably the game, is a certainty, but your suit must be thoroughly established — the ace, king, queen at the head of it is a necessity.

THE DECLARATION — NO TRUMPS

Take such a hand as —

Hearts — Ace, 7.	Clubs — Ace, king, queen, 9, 7, 5, 4.
Diamonds — 8, 5, 3.	Spades — 10.

This is an undeniable No Trump. It is somewhat of a gamble, as you may find an equally powerful suit of diamonds or spades in the leader's hand, in which case you will be doubled and probably lose the game, but the chance is well worth risking, and you will find that you will win the game on it in four cases out of five.

In the early days of Bridge No Trump calls were far less frequent than they are at the present day. Players had not fully recognised the possibilities of the call, and the very great advantage which it gives to the player of the two hands. They were rather shy of declaring No Trumps without some protection in every suit, and were often surprised to find what chances they had missed by refusing to take a little extra risk. In these latter days a certain section of players are inclined to run to the opposite extreme, and to declare No Trumps on the most shadowy pretext. Such a one will say to you at the beginning of a rubber, "I hope you do not mind light No

THE DÉCLARATION — NO TRUMPS

Trumps, partner, I am a very forward player.” This is the most dangerous type of partner, and you will be lucky if you get out of it without disaster. Bridge is a game in which, if you are holding fairly good cards, it will pay you to declare to their full value, but directly you try to force the game, and declare beyond the legitimate value of the cards in your hand, disaster is certain to follow. There is no player more easy to beat in the long run than the one who tries to import into the game the bluff element peculiar to poker, by declaring above the value of his hand. The old hackneyed proverb, *medio tutissimus ibis*, applies strongly to the game of Bridge, and especially to the making of No Trumps.

CHAPTER III

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

FAILING No Trumps, the next consideration of the dealer should be whether he is strong enough to make an attacking red suit declaration.

HEARTS

There are certain hands which admit of no doubt as to the suit to be declared; these need not be discussed. It is nearly always right to declare hearts when holding four honours, as the honour score of 64 is too valuable an asset to be lightly given up; also hearts should be declared in preference to diamonds when holding cards of nearly equal value in the two suits. A good heart is a very sound call, but there is no greater pitfall in Bridge than a doubtful or light heart hand.

Many players seem utterly unable to realise this, and no amount of experience teaches them. A genuine heart hand should contain five probable

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

tricks, and a good rule to remember is that four probable tricks is the very lowest strength on which hearts should ever be declared. By five probable tricks is meant such a hand as —

Hearts — Ace, queen, 9, 8, 3. Clubs — 10, 3.

Diamonds — King, 7, 4. Spades — Queen, knave, 4.

With this hand the dealer might reckon on three tricks in hearts, one in diamonds, and one in spades. The five tricks are by no means certain, but he would be justified in expecting to win five tricks with an ordinary placing of the cards.

Ace, king, queen, and the two other hearts also represent five probable tricks, and hearts should always be declared on that strength, even with no other card higher than a 9, the dealer's partner being certainly to be trusted to win two or three other tricks in the other suits.

Some players are very fond of making what they are pleased to call a "defensive" red suit declaration. They will declare hearts on such a hand as —

Hearts — King, 9, 8, 6, 2.

Clubs — 10, 8, 4.

Diamonds — Knave, 7, 5.

Spades — 7, 6.

their argument being that the hand is worth nothing unless hearts are trumps. Never was

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

there a more fallacious argument. Certainly the hand is worth next to nothing unless hearts are trumps, but it is worth very little even when hearts are trumps, and yet such a player will voluntarily fix the value of the trump suit at its highest point, besides depriving his unhappy partner of the opportunity of declaring a good suit if he has one. The very utmost value of the above hand is three tricks, consequently, in order to win the odd trick, the dealer's partner is expected to do more than the dealer himself, without the option of making a declaration. Again, six hearts headed by the 9 or 10, and no other elements of strength in the hand, is worth, at the very outside, three tricks, yet this is a declaration that one sees made every day. If the long suit in either of the above-mentioned hands was spades instead of hearts, there might be some sense in the dealer snatching at the declaration, so as to make the value of the game as cheap as possible, but there can be no sense in his voluntarily fixing the trick value at its highest point, when he knows that one of the two hands which he has to play is a bad one. Somehow, five hearts, whatever the value of them, seem

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

to have a subtle fascination for some players, and they cannot bear to pass the declaration in such a case.

As it has become a recognised fact that fairly light No Trump declarations pay in the long run, so it has become clearly established among knowledgeable players that to declare hearts without reasonable justification is the high road to Bridge perdition.

The following table will be found to cover all genuine heart declarations at the score of love all. The dealer should declare hearts when he holds —

- (1) *a.* Any four honours.
 - b.* Five, with three honours, including the ace or king.
 - c.* Six, with one honour higher than the 10, however bad the rest of his hand may be.
- (2) *d.* Five headed by the ace.
 - e.* Five headed by king, queen, or king, knave.
 - f.* Five headed by queen, knave, or queen, with two probable tricks in other suits.
- (3) *g.* Five headed by king or queen.

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

- h.* Four, with three honours, including ace or king, with three probable tricks in other suits.

With less strength than any of the above, the dealer should not declare hearts at the score of love all, under ordinary circumstances. It should be remembered that, when the dealer declares hearts, he is at once assuming the offensive, and making the game as expensive as possible, short of a No Trump declaration. If he elects, on his own responsibility, to make the game expensive, surely the chances of success ought to be strongly in his favour. The No Trump declaration has possibilities which the heart declaration does not possess. When the dealer declares a light heart, he ties his partner down to have some assistance in the heart suit. His partner may have useful cards in other suits, but, if he has no assistance in the trump suit, the usefulness of those cards is very seriously impaired. For this reason alone, apart from other considerations, a light heart declaration is a very dangerous call.

Here again, as with regard to the No Trump

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

call, the dealer must be greatly influenced by the consideration of what his partner is likely to declare if he passes the declaration.

Suppose the dealer to hold —

Hearts — King, queen, 10, 6.	Clubs — 7, 2.
Diamonds — King, queen, 5.	Spades — Queen, 10, 8, 3.

This is not strong enough for a No Trump call, but yet it is a good hand, too good to pass the declaration, for an almost certain black suit. True, there is a chance of a three-ace No Trump declaration by the dummy, but that is a 9 to 1 against chance, and a defensive black suit declaration is much more likely. With this hand the dealer should declare hearts, having a probability of four or possibly five tricks in his own hand, against a very faint possibility of a more valuable declaration by passing.

Again, suppose the dealer's hand to consist of —

Hearts — Ace, 9, 8, 6, 4.	Clubs — 10, 5.
Diamonds — Ace, knave, 8, 3.	Spades — 8, 3.

This is a bad heart hand. It cannot be reckoned as being good for more than four tricks; but what is the dealer to expect if he passes the declaration?

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

A No Trump call is very unlikely, as he himself holds the two red aces, and dummy will probably declare either clubs or spades, in both of which suits his own hand is very weak. The hand has a distinct value with a red suit as trumps, but very little value with a black suit. Therefore, seeing that there is only a faint prospect of anything but a black suit declaration if he passes, the dealer should choose the lesser of two evils, and declare hearts himself, being influenced solely by the consideration of what his partner would be likely to do if he left it.

Let us again repeat that a good heart call is better than an average No Trump. The following hands are all better heart than No Trump calls: —

No. 1.

Hearts — Ace, 10, 8, 7, 6, 2.
 Diamonds — Ace, 9.
 Clubs — 10, 3.
 Spades — Ace, knave, 5.

No. 2.

Hearts — Ace, queen, 10, 5, 4.
 Diamonds — Ace, knave, 6.
 Clubs — King, queen, 9, 2.
 Spades — 4.

No. 3.

Hearts — Ace, king, knave, 6, 2.
 Diamonds — 7, 3.
 Clubs — Ace.
 Spades — King, knave, 10, 8, 4.

No. 4.

Hearts — Ace, queen, knave, 9, 5.
 Diamonds — 7.
 Clubs — Queen, knave, 10, 4.
 Spades — Ace, king.

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

Each of these four hands fulfils the requirements for a No Trump call, but the question is whether the dealer is not quite as likely, or more likely, to win four by cards with hearts as trumps, than to win three by cards at No Trumps. Also there is no risk with the heart declaration. All these hands have one unguarded suit, with the consequent probability of being attacked in that suit. It must not be forgotten that the opponents have an unpleasant habit of attacking in the declarer's weakest suit. They do not usually attack in a suit of which he holds two or three honours. It happens so sometimes, but much more often they find the weak spot at the first attempt, and then what becomes of the fine No Trumper, unless the dummy happens to be guarded in that suit. We said in the last article that the dealer should not be afraid of chancing one suit at No Trumps, when he is strong in the other three, and we adhere to that statement; but, when he is really strong in hearts, it is a safer and sounder policy to declare that suit, rather than to run the risk of finding his partner also weak in his own unguarded spot.

It is a very excellent general rule that the

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

dealer should declare hearts when he can see a probability of five tricks in his own hand, with average assistance from his dummy. If his hand is worth less than that, he will do better, in the long run, to pass the declaration.

The five-heart craze appears to be so strongly ingrained in the minds of many Bridge players that they are incapable of realising the fact that four good hearts are stronger than five moderate ones. Surely ace, king, queen, 2 of hearts must be stronger than king, knave, 9, 7, 5. The ace, king, queen hand is good for three tricks at least, and will be able to extract most, if not all, of the opponents' trumps, but not so the other. If the high trumps happen to lie over this hand, it is good for very few tricks, and, as regards extracting the opponents' trumps, it is practically useless, yet there are many players who would cheerfully declare hearts on the latter hand, but who would be very chary of doing so on the former, because they had only four of the suit. The four-trump heart declaration is not one to be strongly recommended, because, if it has the requisite strength behind it, it must be getting near to a No Trump

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

call, which would be generally preferable. But if the hand is not strong enough for No Trumps, and the dealer can see that there is little or no chance of a good declaration by dummy, the fact that he has only four trumps should not deter him from declaring hearts, provided that he can see a fair chance of winning the odd trick or more.

The one fact which we desire to impress upon our readers is that there is no more useless and dangerous call at Bridge, nor one which leads to more trouble, and loses more games day by day, and week by week, than a light heart declaration by the dealer without proper backing-up strength behind it.

DIAMONDS

The declaration of diamonds by the dealer is a subject on which there is considerable difference of opinion. The best American players, who are very sound judges of the game, never make an original diamond declaration at the score of love, unless they are overwhelmingly strong in the suit. They would always leave it to their partner with ace, king, and three other diamonds, and two

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

other probable tricks in their hand, in fact, they hardly recognise the diamond call as an original offensive declaration. Some of our English players go to the other extreme and declare diamonds as dealer with the same strength on which they declare hearts. The American system is undoubtedly the sounder of the two, but it is sometimes carried a little too far. When the dealer makes an original diamond declaration, he is giving up the chance of two more valuable declarations by his partner, namely, hearts and No Trumps, and it must be taken as a Bridge axiom that when the cards are above the average strength the highest declaration possible to either of the hands should be aimed at.

All experienced Bridge players will acknowledge that the diamond call is a proverbially unlucky one, and one that rarely does any material good, either because the hands would have worked out much better with a heart or a No Trump call by the dummy, or because the dummy is very weak and able to give little or no assistance. Occasionally the original diamond declaration succeeds well, and either wins the game or makes a good

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

score, but in the long run the player who is very shy of declaring an original diamond will profit by his shyness. The worst of all reasons, yet one of the most common, for the dealer declaring diamonds is that he is very weak in hearts. This should be the very reason for passing the declaration. When he is very weak in hearts, there is a greatly increased probability of his partner being very strong in that suit and a good heart call is far preferable to a strong diamond. The time to declare diamonds is when the dealer has also such strength in the heart suit that a declaration of hearts by his partner is extremely improbable. Suppose that he holds ace, king, and three small diamonds, and ace, knave, and two small hearts. In this case it is almost a certainty that his partner must declare a black suit, as he is very unlikely to be able to declare hearts, nor is he likely to declare No Trumps without either of the red aces, therefore the dealer should declare diamonds as the means of giving the hand its highest available value. If the ace, knave, and two others were in clubs or spades the declaration should be passed, in the hope of a heart declaration by the dummy.

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

A few months ago there was considerable discussion and a substantial wager as to the correct declaration on the following hand:—

Hearts—King, queen, 10, 6. Clubs—9.
Diamonds—King, queen, 10, 6. Spades—King, queen, 10, 6.

It was agreed to submit the hand to four of the best known authorities on the game, with the request that they would state what they would declare on it at the score of love all, if the declaration were passed to them. This was done, but it was a case of “Who shall decide when doctors disagree?” Of the four experts, one said “spades,” one said “No trumps,” and two said “hearts.” It is a very doubtful hand, but the spade declaration would be an exceedingly backward and timid one and is not worth considering. The hand is distinctly above the average, and therefore either the dealer or the dummy with such a hand ought to give it a scoring value. The No Trump declaration on the other hand, is forward to rashness. True, the hand fully answers the requirements of a No Trump under the Robertsonian Rule, as the figure value of it amounts to 24, and three suits are well guarded, but the Robertsonian Rule can hardly be

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

applied to such a hand as this. To declare No Trumps, on a passed hand, without an ace and with one suit entirely unguarded, would be rather asking for trouble, especially as there is a strong probability of 30, and a possibility of 100, against you in the honour score. This leaves the choice between hearts and diamonds, and as the hand is above the average, it would seem right to declare hearts at the score of love, or at any point in the score when less tricks would be required to win the game in hearts than in diamonds. Still it cannot be called a good heart, and with the dealer's score at 12, 18, 20, 24, or 26, it would be sounder to declare diamonds, as the same amount of tricks would then win the game in hearts and diamonds and a lesser liability would be incurred if the hand went wrong. With the score at 28 it would be an undoubted spade declaration.

In the early days of Bridge many players used to declare their best suit, irrespective of trick value, when they could see a practical certainty of the odd trick or more; thus they would declare clubs or even spades as dealer, when they were very strong in that suit, so as to be sure of

ATTACKING SUIT DECLARATIONS

scoring something. This has been entirely altered by experience, and it is not now considered right to make any declaration as an aggressive measure on which there is no possibility of winning the game.

CHAPTER IV

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS BY THE DEALER

It should be understood that these present articles deal only with the declaration at the score of love all; that is to say, the deal in question is the first one of the rubber. The question of declarations to the score is dealt with later, at page 110.

Let us take this opportunity of saying that the dealer, when he elects to pass the declaration, should do so in the simplest possible manner, without hesitation and without undue haste, always using the same formula, and not interlarding it with unnecessary and inconsequential remarks. Any of the expressions "I pass," or "I leave it to you, partner," or "Will you make the trump, please," meet the case admirably, and one of these, or some similar expression, should always be employed, without any embroidery whatever.

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

RED SUIT DECLARATIONS

We have already alluded to the so-called “defensive heart” declaration, but the very term itself is a misnomer. Where does the defense come in when the dealer makes the game expensive because he has a very moderate hand? Where is the defence in engaging in a fight before half one’s forces have been brought into action? A similar case would be two allied armies opposed to a common enemy, and the one general, having arrived first upon the scene of action, taking upon himself the responsibility of engaging the enemy, with a very inadequate force, because he was afraid of the allied general imperilling the position by some grave error of tactics, if he were waited for and allowed to take a part in the proceedings.

The player who makes a “defensive” red suit declaration as dealer is in the position — to use a somewhat vulgar colloquialism — of “standing a licking to nothing.” He has very little chance of doing any good unless his partner has a hand on which some useful declaration could have been made, and, if his partner has a bad hand, there is

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

a certainty of heavy loss, and a great possibility of being doubled and losing the game. Can it be sound play to make the game expensive on such a prospect as this?

When the dealer picks up a hand on which he cannot make a good attacking suit declaration, he should pass the call to his partner, or, if he is of that way of thinking, declares spades, so as to get out as cheaply as possible. He can never be justified in making an expensive declaration, on the ground that his own hand is of no use with any other suit as trumps, unless he can see a fair chance of winning at least the odd trick, assuming average strength, not more, in his partner's hand.

CLUBS

An original club declaration by the dealer, when he has a very strong suit of clubs, and nothing else in his hand, has something to be said for it. When the dealer holds six clubs, with three or four honours, he has the option of taking a certain score, although a small one, both above and below the line, or of leaving it to his partner and possibly getting a doubled spade, or a rather sketchy red suit

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

declaration. The principle of declaring clubs on such a hand is the old one of the bird in hand being worth two in the bush, but, in this case, the birds in the bush are not confined to two — there may be a whole flock of them. If the No Trump declaration on a passed hand did not exist, we should have no doubt that the dealer ought to declare clubs with great strength in that suit, but there is always a possibility, and not a very slight one, with such a hand, of a No Trump declaration, in which case the strong club suit becomes of great value, and the game will probably be won. This is a chance well worth taking, and on this chance alone we should advise our readers never to declare clubs when dealer as an aggressive measure. If a player chooses to declare clubs as a defensive measure, that is quite a different matter. There is real defence in a strong club hand, with no risk of loss, and it then becomes simply a question of whether the player in question belongs to the school which believes in defensive black suit declarations by the dealer, or to the other, bolder school, which argues that defence is the province of the dummy and not of the dealer.

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

The original club declaration is a very debatable point, because there are a considerable number of good players, of long experience, who habitually declare clubs as dealer, when they are very strong in that suit, but not strong enough to declare No Trumps. They prefer to take a certain score, rather than to go for larger, if somewhat speculative, possibilities. They may possibly be right, although we ourselves do not hold with the theory.

SPADES

The "defensive" spade declaration by the dealer because he has a very bad hand, is quite an innovation of modern times, and the Bridge-playing world is at present divided into two distinct schools on this point. The "defensive" school argue that when the dealer has a bad hand, he ought to fix the value of the game at its lowest point by declaring spades himself, and ought not to run the risk of his partner making an expensive declaration, when his own hand is able to render little or no assistance. Some of its disciples even go so far as to say that the dealer has no right to pass the declaration, unless he has a probability

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

of at least two or three tricks in his own hand. The other school maintain that attack only is the province of the dealer, and that defence should be left entirely to the dummy. They argue that, by declaring spades, the dealer not only arbitrarily deprives his partner of giving a proper value to his hand, if he should happen to have a good one, but that he also makes an unnecessary confession of weakness, and gives his opponents almost the same opportunities of finessing against him as if they had seen his cards. Certainly, nothing in Bridge can be more annoying than to play with a partner who declares a defensive spade, when you, as dummy, are waiting with an exceptionally good hand, possibly 100 aces, or six or seven hearts with four by honours; but, on the other hand, many a game is lost on a rather light No Trump declaration by the dummy, which could easily have been saved if the dealer had had the courage to take the reins into his own hands.

Both systems have their advantages, and both have their drawbacks, and it cannot be said that either is right or wrong. No end of statistics have

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

been published by the advocates of the defensive call to prove that their method is the right one; but against this there is the acknowledged fact that the best Bridge players of the day do not adopt it — in fact, at the one club, which is recognised as the headquarters of scientific Bridge in London, such a call is almost unknown. The defensive declaration may almost be called the refuge of the second-rate player, or at any rate of the player playing in second-rate company, when he dare not pass the declaration on a bad hand for fear of what his partner will do. A common penalty which a first-rate player has to pay for his greatness is that indifferent partners are very apt to make extremely light declarations when he passes the call, and then to say, “I only did that because you had to play the cards.” This is no doubt very complimentary, but it is also, at times, very expensive. A good player may be able to make every possible use of the cards dealt to him, but he cannot do conjuring tricks with them, nor can he give nines the value of kings or knaves the value of aces; when playing with such a partner as this, any player is fully justified in protecting

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

himself by taking the right of declaration away from his partner.

Every Bridge player of any experience will recognise the sensation of heaving a sort of sigh of relief when his partner declares spades, after he has passed the call on a very bad hand. It would certainly seem a sound argument that a player should not pass the call on such a hand that it will be a positive relief to him to hear his partner declare spades. With an evenly divided hand, which contains no card above a ten, the dealer is quite justified in declaring an original spade, as he cannot possibly win a single trick with his own cards whatever his partner declares, and it is too much to expect his partner's hand to fight the other two absolutely unaided; but when he has any possibility, however small, of helping his partner he should pass the declaration on the chance of finding an exceptionally strong hand in the dummy.

A few months ago a question was asked through the inquiry columns of a weekly contemporary as to what the dealer should do with the following hand: —

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

Hearts — 7, 6.

Diamonds — None.

Clubs — Queen, knave, 7, 5, 2.

Spades — Queen, knave, 9, 6, 4, 3.

The answer given was, "The dealer should declare spades on this hand at any point of the score." As has been already stated, opinions differ widely on this point, but it is difficult to see by what process of reasoning this decision could have been arrived at. When the dealer passes the call there are five declarations open to his partner, and on only one of these five would the above hand be without distinct value. If diamonds are declared, then it is a very bad hand, but with any other declaration it will win two or three tricks at least. Even if hearts are declared, two tricks can be made by ruffing the diamonds, while with No Trumps or a black suit it would be quite a useful hand, therefore it surely follows that the best policy must be to pass the call. The time to make a defensive declaration is when the dealer's side has a strong advantage in the score, such as a game to the good, and possibly 12 or 18 towards the next game. In this case it is of such great importance not to give the opponents a chance of

DEFENSIVE SUIT DECLARATIONS

materially improving their position, that the dealer ought to make any declaration which will tend to keep them in check.

To sum up the whole question — when the dealer has an utterly impossible hand, so that it will come as a positive relief to him to hear spades declared by his partner, then and then only ought he to declare spades himself; but when, at the score of love, he has any possible element of strength in his hand, however bad the rest of it may be, he had better pass the declaration, provided that he is playing with a partner he can trust. The defensive declaration is a very dangerous weapon to put into the hands of an inexperienced player.

CHAPTER V

THE DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

THE declaration by the dummy is a very different matter from the declaration by the dealer. It has already been laid down as a Bridge axiom, that the dealer, in making his declaration, is perfectly entitled to assume that his partner will hold an average hand, but the dummy is not entitled to this assumption, when the call has been passed to him. He knows for certain that his partner is not strong enough to declare either No Trumps or a red suit, and the probability is that his hand is below the average; still it does not necessarily follow that he has nothing of value. The dummy's first consideration should still be whether he is strong enough to declare No Trumps, trusting his partner for assistance in one or two suits, but always bearing in mind that his partner's hand is probably somewhat below the average.

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

An exposed No Trump hand, that is, a hand which has to be laid down on the table, requires to have the value of one trick more in it than a hand which is held up. There are two reasons for this: first, that the opponents will be able to see exactly what the declaration has been made upon and will attack the hand in its most vulnerable point at the first opportunity; and secondly, that the opening lead will be through the hand instead of up to it, which is a very important consideration. For instance, a singly guarded king is a very useful asset in a held up No Trump hand, as, if the attack is commenced in that suit, one trick at least and a useful entry early in the game is a certainty, but, when the singly guarded king is led through, it becomes of very little use indeed unless the ace happens to lie behind it.

It has long been a favourite maxim of one of our best Bridge players that a No Trump call on a passed hand rarely does any good without two aces. This is by no means a rule; it is only an opinion, and it would be easy to give numerous imaginary instances of good sound No Trump calls on a passed hand with only one ace, but if any

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

one will take the trouble to watch it in actual play, he will be surprised to find how true it is and how well the maxim works out.

Any player who elects to follow the Robertsonian rule in declaring No Trumps, will do well to fix the figure value at 24 on a passed hand, instead of 21 as on an original call, which gives the hand the extra value of one queen. Again, a passed No Trump which is weak in the red suits is a dangerous call. The dummy's partner has practically told him, by passing the declaration, that he is not strong in the red suits, but he has told him nothing about the black ones, therefore the dummy should not hesitate to trust him for support in one or both of the black suits, but should be very shy of a doubtful No Trumper when his own weakness lies in the red ones.

The following is a type of No Trump hand, with which it makes all the difference whether it is held up by the dealer or exposed on the table by the dummy: —

Hearts — King, 8.

Clubs — Ace, queen, 9, 8, 5.

Diamonds — Knave, 6, 4.

Spades — King, knave, 3.

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

Although this is not a particularly strong hand, it is an undoubted No Trump when held by the dealer, but it would be a decidedly risky hand to declare No Trumps on when the declaration had been passed. The figure value of it, under the Robertsonian rule, amounts to 22, therefore it should be declared by the dealer but not by the dummy, especially as the weak spots in it are both in the red suits.

The *jeu de règle*, or three-ace No Trump, with little or nothing else, applies also to the declaration on a passed hand. It is universally declared among good players, but it partakes of the nature of a risky call, and sometimes leads to serious disaster; still it should be done, the three certain cards of entry being a great element of strength if the partner's hand is found to contain a long suit of five or six cards. The dummy has a somewhat freer hand in declaring No Trumps, if his partner is known to be a player who makes a defensive spade declaration as dealer when he has a worthless hand. Indeed, this is the strongest argument in favour of the defensive call, which was explained in the last chapter. When dummy has a difficult

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

declaration to make, it is of the greatest use to him to know that his partner's hand can be depended upon to make at least two tricks, but opinions differ so widely concerning the defensive declaration, that it is not safe to assume this knowledge unless one's partner's methods of play are thoroughly understood.

The first consideration of the dummy, when the declaration is passed to him, should always be whether he has a hand for attack or defence. "Badsworth" sums up this situation very concisely. He says: "If he determines to attack, dare he declare No Trumps? If he feels obliged to defend, must it be a spade?" It has been already stated that dummy should always declare No Trumps at the score of love when his hand offers a fair chance of success; failing No Trumps, the useful scoring suits of hearts, diamonds, and clubs present themselves, and they are all open to him. Hearts should always be declared by dummy on the same, or even on somewhat less, strength than is required to justify an original heart declaration by the dealer. Diamonds should be declared on considerably less strength; such hands as ace,

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

king, ten, and two other diamonds with little else, or five diamonds headed by king, queen, with one king or two queens in other suits, are undoubted diamond calls for the dummy, although not so for the dealer. The club suit also, which the dealer should never think of as an attacking measure, is often a very useful weapon in the hands of the dummy.

When the dealer has the option of making a declaration, he has to consider what more valuable declarations his partner may make if he passes the call, but this consideration does not enter into the calculations of the dummy at all. He has no option in the matter, he has to make a declaration of some kind, and his business should be either to give his cards their fullest value, if he has an attacking hand, or to escape as cheaply as possible, if he has a moderate or bad hand.

A very good general rule for the guidance of dummy is that he should make an expensive declaration when his hand offers a fair chance of the odd trick or more, with the assistance of a moderate, not an average, hand from his partner; also the honour score should enter more into his calcu-

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

lations than into those of the dealer. The dealer's game should be an attacking one, and he should only consider honours as trick-making factors, but the dummy is in a different position altogether — his province is defence, and when he sees but little chance of substantially advancing his score below the line he should consider whether he cannot benefit it above, and so minimise any possible loss. For instance, the hand quoted above — ace, king, 10, and two other diamonds, with little or nothing else — is undeniably a poor hand to attack with, and yet it has a distinct value. In the first place, it is not likely to be doubled; secondly, there is a certainty of 12 and a good chance of 24 for honours, and also the strength in trumps will prevent the hand from being cut up, and will give an increased value to any useful cards that the partner may hold.

The typical bad hand on which to make an expensive declaration is something of this kind: —

Hearts — Queen, 9, 8, 6, 3.	Clubs — 10, 8, 4.
Diamonds — Knave, 5.	Spades — King, knave, 3.

Yet this is just the sort of hand on which one constantly sees hearts declared by people who are

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

pleased to call themselves "forward players." They are "forward" to their own and their partner's destruction. There is absolutely no strength in this hand. It is worth at the very outside four tricks, and, if the cards happen to lie badly, only two or possibly even only one trick. It has four by honours against it, and it is extremely likely to be doubled, in which case the game is probably lost on the declarer's own deal. It is a spade call, and nothing but a spade call, at the score of love.

The club suit is extremely useful to the dummy. It constantly offers him a haven of refuge when he is obliged to make a declaration on a doubtful hand, and it is a sort of compromise between attack and defence. When he holds such a hand that he can see a fair probability of six tricks, or even five, with clubs as trumps, counting on moderate assistance only from his partner, he should accept a little probable loss and declare clubs as the best chance of saving the situation, but let him not be deluded into declaring clubs, without the necessary qualification, because he is weaker still in spades. It is quite true that an impotent spade will probably be doubled, and will become as expensive as

DECLARATION ON A PASSED HAND

clubs, but it must not be forgotten that clubs may also be doubled, and become as expensive as hearts, in which case the loss may be very serious.

The expression that one so often hears, "I could not declare spades, partner, because I was so weak in them," is an absolute confession of want of knowledge of the game. The spade call is the refuge of the dummy, and it is futile and almost childish to risk a more expensive declaration when the gain can be so small and the loss may be so great.

It cannot be too often repeated that absolute defence is the business of the dummy when he has a bad hand. The value of the spades in the hand has nothing whatever to do with the call of spades — it merely means that the dummy has a moderate or bad hand, and that he elects to take the least possible loss, according to the lights vouchsafed to him.

This chapter refers entirely to the declaration at the score of love. In the next chapter we will consider advanced points in the score, and the varying effects that the score should have on the declaration.

CHAPTER VI

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

THE variations in the state of the score affect the game of Bridge more than any other card game. The correct play of the cards often alters materially when only one or two tricks are required to win the game, and still more often should the declaration be influenced by the fact that the declaring side is within a few points of the desired total. It must obviously be foolish to run any undue risk on the chance of making a big score when there appears a practical certainty of winning the game on a cheap declaration. Winning or losing the rubber makes a difference of 200 points, and winning one game is about two-fifths of the way towards winning the rubber, and therefore represents, roughly speaking, about 80 points. Surely this is too great a difference to risk for the sake of possibly scoring a few more points either above or below the line.

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

A notable instance of this once occurred to the present writer. The declaration was passed to him at the score of a game and 28 in his favour, against one game. The hand was —

Hearts — King, queen.

Diamonds — Ace, king, 7.

Clubs — Queen.

Spades — Ace, king, queen, knave, 7, 5, 2.

He declared spades, and, of course, the game and rubber were won. It so happened that there was rather a large gallery of critical onlookers, and when the hand was put down it was greeted with a chorus of uncomplimentary remarks — “Well, of all the cowards ——” “What do you expect?” “A No Trump at any point of the score,” etc., etc. When the cards were played it turned out that the leader had six clubs headed by king, knave, while his partner had the ace and two other clubs and the ace of hearts, so that the odd trick must have been lost at No Trumps. It is worth noticing that, when the declarer has an evenly divided hand, that is, a hand containing three cards of every suit, the other hands will in all probability be constituted in very much the

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

same manner, but when the declarer has one very long suit in his own hand he must be fully prepared to find an uneven distribution of the cards and possibly an equally long suit in the leader's hand.

Any original declaration which presents a chance of winning the game from the score of love must, *a fortiori*, present an increased chance of doing so at a more advanced point of the score, and any suit declaration which is a sound one for the dealer to make at the score of love will also be sound at any other point of the score. When the dealer's score is at 12 or 18, the objection to an original diamond declaration disappears altogether. Only two or three by cards are now required to win the game, and that should be well within the compass of a good diamond hand; also the consideration of whether his partner may be able to make a more expensive declaration does not now concern him at all. Whenever the dealer can see a fair chance of winning the game on any declaration, even if it is only in spades, he should make that declaration without hesitation, quite regardless of the fact that his partner may have a much

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

more valuable suit on which the game would also be won. Winning the game should always be the first consideration.

The No Trump declaration by the dealer is not affected by any point in the score under 20, except in the case of what is known as the One Suit No Trump. Six or seven clubs, headed by the ace, king, queen, and another ace, is a recognised No Trump call early in the game; but if the dealer's score is at anything over 12 he should declare clubs, and trust to his partner for the extra one or two tricks required to win the game. When the dealer has a fairly good hand, protected in every suit, but with no great strength in any particular one, he would not hesitate to declare No Trumps at the score of love; but at the score of 22 or 24 he should pass the declaration for his partner to declare his best suit, rather than risk disaster if his partner's hand should be very bad.

There are two kinds of declaration to the score by the dealer. The safe call, when the declaring side is well ahead and tries to make certain of winning the game without taking any undue risks, and the call of desperation, when the opponents

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

are almost certain to win the rubber on their next deal, and it becomes necessary to take even the most forlorn hope of snatching the game out of the fire. In the latter case, the dealer should declare No Trumps on the flimsiest of pretexts, say two aces, or one ace and two kings, or moderate protection in three suits. Failing a possibility of No Trumps, the dealer should always pass the declaration with his opponents at 24 or more and a game up, unless of course he has such a heart or diamond hand that there is a possibility of winning the game.

With the score at a game and 24 to love against the dealer, he should not think of making an ordinary red suit declaration, but, if he is not in a position to make a dash for the game himself, he should leave it to his partner, so as to take every chance of saving the situation, if it is in any way possible. When the opponents are 24 up, without a game to their credit, the situation is quite different. This is an occasion for extra caution on the dealer's part, so as to give the other side as little chance as possible of winning the game on that hand.

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

The state of the score affects the declaration by the dummy much more than it affects that of the dealer. When the score of the declaring side is well advanced, say to 24 against the opponents' love, the dealer will make any declaration which is likely to score the necessary 6 points, but if he does not see a good chance of doing this he at once shifts the responsibility on to his partner's shoulders by passing the call. The unhappy dummy is then obliged to declare something, and his position is often very difficult.

If he has either a good hand or a very bad one there is little or no difficulty, but there comes the sort of intermediate hand, with a chance of winning the game on a bold declaration, and an equal or greater chance of turning a strong position into a very weak one, if his effort misses fire.

It is very difficult to know what to do at the score of a game and 24, against a game and love, with such a hand as —

Hearts — Knave, 8, 6.

Clubs — 9, 5.

Diamonds — King, 9, 7, 4, 3.

Spades — King, 10, 6.

At the score of love the dummy should declare spades on this hand, but with his score at 24 he has

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

to make up his mind whether to have a dash for the required six points by declaring diamonds, or whether to fall back on the safety spade. On the one hand there is a distinct chance of winning the game and rubber, and on the other hand there is the fact staring him in the face that his opponents will double diamonds very readily at this point of score, and the game may be lost instead of being won. With the opponents at love, the spade declaration is better on this hand, as the opponents are not likely to double or to win three by cards, and they will want a big hand to win the game on their next deal; but if they are at 16 or 18, a dash for the game ought to be made while it is yet possible.

Not long ago the declaration was left to dummy with the following hand, score a game and 24, against a game and 12: —

Hearts — 3.

Clubs — Queen, 10, 6, 2.

Diamonds — King, queen, 9, 5.

Spades — Ace, 10, 7, 4.

He declared diamonds, was doubled, and lost the game and rubber. The only declaration which would have won the trick was clubs, and clubs

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

was probably the right declaration. The opponents will not double clubs without overwhelming strength at the score of 24, and also the king, and queen of diamonds are very useful cards, with clubs as trumps. The declarer was no doubt influenced by the fact that one trick won the game in diamonds, whereas it required two tricks in clubs, but his declaration cost him the rubber.

Yet another difficult hand has been much discussed lately. The score was a game all, and 16 all. Dummy held —

Hearts — Ace, king, 7.

Clubs — 10, 8, 6.

Diamonds — Ace, queen, 9, 3.

Spades — 9, 7, 3.

He declared No Trumps and won the game, which, however, proves nothing. The declaration was very much criticised by the bystanders, and the declarer offered to bet that it was the right call at the score. He was promptly accommodated, and it was agreed to ask the committee of the Portland Club to decide the question. The Portland committee, however, do not adjudicate on questions of play, only on the interpretations of the rules, and it was therefore left to five well-known players.

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

Four of them said that the declaration was right at the score, and the one dissentient said spades.

It is an undoubted spade call at love all, but, with the opponents 16 up in the last game, some extra risk must be taken. Also, the spades are very weak, and unless the partner has some strength in that suit, the opponents are almost certain to win two or three tricks which will put them in a fine position. If the declarer's partner has strength in spades it must be a fair No Trump.

One suggestion made was diamonds, but that does not bear looking into. With diamonds as trumps the hand is worth little over four tricks, say four and a half, and nine tricks are wanted to win the game; therefore the declarer is asking his partner to do as much as he does himself, and guessing at his suit. When the declaration is left to the dummy at the score of games all and 24 all, he must declare his best suit even if it is no better than king and three others. There is now no question of defence, and he must declare the suit in which he can give his partner most assistance, quite regardless of the fact that a few extra

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

points will probably be lost by so doing. It is the case of a drowning man snatching at a straw.

When the opponents are a game and 24 up, it is a time to take even the most forlorn hope, and the wildest No Trumps become reasonable in a despairing effort to retrieve the position, but when the opponents are 24 in the first game, or still more strongly when the declaring side is a game to the good, the position is entirely reversed, and it becomes a position for defence.

The most common of all the mistakes at Bridge is to confuse these two positions. Almost every day one sees a wild No Trump declaration made because the opponents are at 24 or more in the first game, and then, when the inevitable disaster has occurred, the declarer says, "I am sorry, partner, but it was a declaration to the score." It is not a declaration to the score, it is exactly the opposite; but this is a fact that some players seem absolutely incapable of comprehending.

It cannot be too much insisted upon that, when the opponents are 24 or more up, without a game to their credit, is the time for a backward policy, not a forward one. This is the time when a de-

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

defensive declaration by the dealer, if he has a bad hand himself, is not only justifiable, but almost compulsory. Look what a difference it entails. If the opponents can win the game on his deal, they are in a fine position. They have the first deal in the next game, with one game to their credit, and it is well within the bounds of possibility that they may win the next game and the rubber straight away. But if they can be kept back, the position is entirely different. They may now have to utilise a No Trump hand to win the requisite 6, or 4, or 2 points, and when they have won it, the other side will have the first deal, with all its attendant possibilities, in the next game. Moreover, they are not certain to win the game on their own deal. Many and many a game is saved when the dealer is 24 or more up. It is undoubtedly a very desirable position to have the deal with 24 points already to your credit, but it is by no means a certainty. On the contrary, it is a position of some danger. Your opponents are in a fine position to double any expensive declaration, and you may depend upon it that they will not hesitate to do so upon the slightest pretext, and you may find

THE DECLARATION TO THE SCORE

your fine position suddenly changing into one of great danger. It is a great mistake to abandon hope because your opponents are within a few points of game. It is just those last few points which are often so difficult to get. Above all things, never make a desperate declaration because your opponents are 24 up, unless they have already won a game. Do just the opposite; make an original spade on your own hand as dealer, or declare anything which is likely to prevent their winning the game on your deal. When they are a game and 24 up the position is indeed desperate, and desperate measures must be resorted to, but even this should be tempered with reason. If there is any possible chance of saving the situation, that chance should be taken, however forlorn a hope it may be, but it is folly to incur extra loss by an absolutely wild declaration, without some reasonable chance of success. On the sad occasions when you can see that you have got to die, die as cheaply as possible, and with a good grace.

CHAPTER VII

DOUBLING

Nothing in the game of Bridge appeals so strongly to the fancy of the inexperienced player as the privilege afforded to him of doubling the declaration, and he is always looking out for opportunities of exercising this privilege. The more experienced player, on the other hand, is very chary of exercising it, and it requires something extra good to induce him to double an original declaration made by a trustworthy opponent. If he has a good hand, on which he can see a certainty of saving the game, and a possibility of increasing his own score, he accepts that blessing with gratitude, and does not risk converting a secure position into an insecure one by a rash double. It must not be understood from this that a player should never double on anything short of a certainty — there are occasions when it would amount to a very backward policy not to do so,

DOUBLING

but he should always remember that doubling is attended by two grave dangers. In the first place, the matter does not end with the doubler, his opponents have the option of re-doubling, and he may find himself in the unpleasant position of losing a game which he had an absolute certainty of saving if he had restrained his ardour. Secondly, doubling a suit declaration gives enormous assistance to the player of the two hands. It tells him exactly where the strength in trumps lies, which is the very thing that he wants to know, and which it should be the policy of his opponents to conceal from him by every means in their power.

In the early days of Bridge doubling was far more common than it is at the present day, partly because the principles of declaring were not thoroughly understood, and some players' declarations used to be very wild and unsound, and partly because in those days certain players imagined that there was a sort of poker element in the game and that it was possible to bluff with success. Experience very soon proved that any attempt at bluffing had a way of recoiling sharply on the head of the would-be bluffer, and the recognised declara-

DOUBLING

tions are now so well known that the opportunities of doubling are by no means common.

As there are two distinct games at Bridge, the No Trump game and the suit game, so there are two distinct forms of the double, doubling No Trumps and doubling a suit declaration. The double of No Trumps again must be divided under two heads, doubling with the lead and doubling as third player.

Doubling with the lead is comparatively simple. If the leader has seven certain or extremely probable tricks he should always double. Seven of a suit headed by ace, king, queen, or six headed by ace, king, queen, and another ace, are doubling hands. Some players do not double with the latter combination, as they say that the odd trick is a certainty if their long suit is good, and that, if it is not good, they may lose the game by doubling. There is reason in this argument, but experience teaches us that instances of a game, which could have been saved, being lost by this double are very rare, whereas there is a strong probability of the doubler advancing his score to the very useful point of 24, besides the considerable chance of

DOUBLING

winning the game. Players who do not take such a chance as this when it offers itself are unlikely to win much at the game. It is not sound to double No Trumps with six certain tricks, and then to say that you only trusted your partner for one trick. What do you imagine that the dealer declared No Trumps on? The probability is that, when your six tricks are accounted for, the dealer will put down his cards and say, "The rest are mine," thereby scoring 24 instead of 12, and that point of 24 is such a very important one, either to get to yourself or to keep your opponents from reaching. It need hardly be said that, if the dealer's score is at 18 or more, the leader should not hesitate to double on six tricks, as it is practically immaterial whether the other side score 12 or 24, when 12 will win the game.

When the leader doubles No Trumps on one long suit, and is re-doubled by the declarer, he ought not to re-double again on anything short of an absolute certainty. He should remember that any distribution of the cards, however improbable, is always possible. Even if he hold eight of one suit, headed by ace, king, queen, it is quite pos-

DOUBLING

sible that four of the remaining five cards may be in one hand, and when the declarer, being a sound player, re-doubles, the inferences point strongly to their being so placed.

Certain players may recollect an instance of this which occurred in actual play a few years ago. No Trumps was declared by the dealer, the eldest hand doubled, holding ace, king, queen, and four other clubs, and the ace and queen of diamonds. The dealer re-doubled and the process was continued up to the maximum of 100 points.

The dealer's hand was —

Hearts — Ace.

Diamonds — King, 6.

Clubs — Knave, 7, 5, 2.

Spades — Ace, king, queen, knave, 4, 2.

The leader led out his three winning clubs and then another one, hoping to come in with his ace of diamonds, but he never got another trick and lost four by cards amounting to 400 points. The dummy had two winning hearts and the ten and a small spade. The first double was not only perfectly sound but a very strong one; when it was re-doubled, however, the original doubler ought to

DOUBLING

have realised that the dealer must be guarded in every suit.

As to doubling a call of No Trumps without the lead, that is, as third player, there exists a wide difference of opinion. English Bridge players are, at the present time, divided into two distinct parties, the one adopting the American, or Heart Convention, and the other adhering to the original English method, now known as the Short-suit Convention.

From the earliest days of Bridge it has been the custom in England for the third player to double a declaration of No Trumps, whether made by the dealer or the dummy, when he holds one long-established suit of seven or at least six cards. If he does not double on such a hand, there is no chance of his suit being led, and he will probably be obliged to discard from it, and may possibly never make a single trick in it; therefore he doubles on the chance of his partner being able to guess which suit he has doubled on, and to lead it at once. In answer to such a double the leader should sacrifice his own hand altogether and play entirely for his partner's. If he has an ace he

DOUBLING

should lead it out and have a look at the exposed hand, when he will generally be able to locate the required suit, especially if the call has been made by the dummy. Not having an ace, he should lead the highest card of his weakest suit; his weakest suit meaning, not necessarily the numerically weakest, but a suit in which he holds no high card; also, *cæteris paribus*, giving preference to a red suit over a black one. The reason of this is easy to see; his partner has obviously doubled on entire command of one suit, therefore it cannot be a suit of which he, the leader, holds a high card, such as ace, king, or queen, and it is more likely to be a red suit than a black one, as the declarer would have preferred a suit declaration to a risky No Trump if he had been very strong in either red suit. This is called the Short-suit Convention. The Heart Convention is that the third hand only doubles when he wants a heart led to him, and it is obligatory on the leader, under this convention, to lead his hearts, from the highest downwards, however many he may hold. It is now the universal custom to ask one's partner, before commencing a rubber, which party he

DOUBLING

belongs to, and this precaution should never be neglected.

Both systems have their merits. The heart convention ensures the success of the double, but it narrows the field very much, and a player is only able to double once, under this convention, for four times that he can do so under the short-suit convention, leaving out the very rare occasions when he will have a long-established suit, and a certain entry card in hearts as well. On the other hand the short-suit doubler is by no means certain to get his desired suit led to him. The leader may be in doubt between two or more suits and lead the wrong one, or it occasionally happens that he is entirely void of his partner's suit and cannot lead it, in which case severe disaster will probably occur. To players of the mathematical order, who object to taking chances, and wish to make the game as nearly a scientific certainty as possible, the heart convention commends itself strongly, and such players invariably adopt it; but to the real lovers of the game the speculative element in it is one of its greatest charms, and these are adherents of the old short-suit convention.

DOUBLING

One curious point about the two systems is that, whereas many English players now adopt the American system, a considerable number of the Americans, who have been over here and played with us, say that they prefer our system, and some of them, on their return to the other side, have introduced the short-suit convention at their clubs. The heart convention has a minor disadvantage, which none of the learned writers on the subject have touched upon. It may be taken for granted that the opponents know that the doubler is a heart conventionist, and the dealer is sometimes in a grand position to re-double when he knows for certain that the first card led will be a heart.

Suppose he has declared No Trumps on seven winning spades and the ace of hearts, the third hand doubles on a long suit of hearts and one or both of the other aces, the dealer can re-double with the greatest certainty when he knows that a heart will be led, but he would not dare to do so against the short-suit convention.

It is sometimes very difficult for the leader to know what to lead with the short-suit system, and he simply has to guess, but generally speaking he

DOUBLING

will have a king or a queen in one or more suits, which will limit his area of guesswork very much.

The following curious case recently occurred. The dealer declared No Trumps, and the third hand doubled. The leader's hand was —

Hearts — 6.

Clubs — 9, 8, 7.

Diamonds — Queen, 6, 4, 2.

Spades — Knave, 8, 6, 5, 2.

He naturally was going to lead the 6 of hearts, but the dummy re-doubled, which put quite a different aspect on affairs. The leader argued to himself, "My partner's suit must be either hearts or clubs, presumably hearts, but dummy would never have re-doubled without some strength in hearts," so, in fear and trembling, he led the 9 of clubs, and he was right. His partner had seven clubs with the quart major, and they won the game.

There is a curious analogy between the heart convention and the defensive spade declaration by the dealer (see page 95). The player who is in favour of the one is almost certain to be an advocate of the other. They are both prompted by the same idea — a desire to make the game as nearly a mathematical certainty as is possible, and to leave little or nothing to chance, taking no

DOUBLING

risks, which can be avoided. It has been frequently demonstrated by theoretical writers on the subject that these backward tactics show a profit — on paper — in the long run; that is, over a large number of hands, but each rubber must be judged on its own merits, and a rubber of Bridge is not a question of a large number of hands. It is a very short affair, so that if a player does not take every chance that presents itself of materially increasing his score, the rubber will probably be over before another such chance presents itself.

The advocates of the safe game do not seem to recognise this view of the situation, and they occasionally find themselves in the position of a man who has been waiting behind, and reserving his energies, in a short distant race. He may be full of running, and capable of doing great things, but the race is over, he has lost his chance, and the man who has made every post a winning post has beaten him, as he always will do.

After the publication of the above article we received a most interesting letter from Mr. R. H. Cunnington, analysing the respective chances rep-

DOUBLING

resented by the double of a No Trump call under the heart convention and under the short-suit convention.

This letter is so much to the point, that we cannot do better than quote it verbatim.

“MAY 29th, 1905.

“To the Editor of the *Saturday Review*.

“SIR, — In the article on doubling No Trumps as third player in Bridge, it is unfortunate that the author has given no definite help to those uncertain whether to adopt the heart convention or the short-suit convention, nor is any reasonable analysis given in the text-books.

“Playing in the short-suit convention the third hand should not double unless he has ace, king, queen, and four others at least of a suit. This gives him a practical certainty of winning the odd trick if the suit is led, and makes it probable that the suit will be led. His partner is guided in his choice of suits by knowing that no suit in which he has an ace, king, or queen is right.

“The relative advantages of the heart convention and short-suit convention can be best discussed as a matter of mathematical probabilities. A player using the former can only double if he has the ace

DOUBLING

of hearts, either included or in addition to his long suit. A long suit of seven, with ace, king, queen, under these conditions is only obtained once in 600 times, but when it does occur he will almost certainly obtain the odd trick (*i. e.*, eleven times in twelve). The dealer, however, is not so likely to declare No Trumps with an ace in addition to a whole suit against him, and practically the chance is still more remote. The doubler's long suit will be hearts only once in 900 times. Once in 800 times he will be justified in doubling with ace, king, queen, and three of a suit, with the ace of hearts; but in one in five of these times the suit will be blocked by an adversary. Summarising: on 2,400 occasions he can double four times with an eleven to one chance of winning, and three times with a four to one chance, or seven times in all.

“On the other hand if the short-suit convention is played, the opportunity of doubling — *i. e.*, having ace, king, queen, and four others of a suit — occurs once in a little over 200 times, or nearly twice as often as under the hearts convention. It is not quite so safe, but the risk of a wrong lead is small, because in twelve cases where No Trumps are thus doubled, ten cases will find the leader with one, two, or three of the suit, and eight cases will find him with only

DOUBLING

one or two. Then, bearing in mind that the leader must not choose a suit in which he has an ace, king, or queen, it is clear that almost certainly in eight cases, and probably in ten, the right suit will be led. If led it is eleven to one that the doubler will win the odd trick.

“Summarising, on 2,400 occasions he has an opportunity of doubling twelve times, and although in only eight of these times can he be almost certain of winning, he has a very fair probability in two more. In the other two cases he probably loses, as his partner has either none or more than three of his suit.

“I think most players will agree that the adoption of the short-suit convention is worth the risk; but, to double, the third hand must have ace, king, and queen, with four of a suit. I remain,

“Yours faithfully,

“R. N. CUNNINGTON.”

We do not quite agree with the writer's theory that the third hand should not double unless he has ace, king, queen, and four others of a suit. With the adversaries' score at love, we should always double as third player with ace, king, queen, and three others. The odd trick is by no means ensured, if the required suit is led and is

DOUBLING

good; but the saving of the game is then ensured, and it is very likely that another trick may be squeezed out of it. The great object of doubling with such a hand is to save the game, and the consideration that the adversaries may get to 24 should weigh very lightly against the chance of preventing them from winning those coveted three tricks.

In the article to which Mr. Cunningham refers, special prominence was purposely not given to one system over the other. Both systems are extensively practised among London players at the present time, and it was thought better to set forth the advantages and disadvantages of both impartially, although our own sympathies are strongly in favour of the short-suit convention. Mr. Cunningham's valuable analyses, which we have never seen published before, tend to prove that this convention is the better, and his figures altogether do away with the theory, which is often advanced by the opponents of the short-suit convention, that, when a player doubles, it is 2 to 1 against the desired suit being led. According to Mr. Cunningham's figures it works out at something like 4 to 1 on it, instead of odds against it.

DOUBLING

We have now to consider the question of doubling a suit declaration. To double an original suit declaration made by a reliable player requires very great strength, and it is a comparatively rare occurrence among experienced players. There are many occasions when it could be done with success, but the opponents of the dealer are quite in the dark as to what amount of strength he has, and it must be remembered that any combination of the cards, however improbable, is always possible. A very extraordinary instance of this once occurred in actual play.

The dealer declared hearts, and the player on his left doubled, holding —

Hearts — Ace, king, queen, knave, 10.

Diamonds — Ace, king, 7.

Clubs — 10, 9.

Spades — Ace, king, knave.

The dealer re-doubled and it was continued up to the maximum of 100 points.

The dealer's hand was —

Hearts — 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2.

Diamonds — None.

Clubs — Ace, king, queen, 7, 2.

Spades — None.

DOUBLING

The result was that the dealer won two by cards, the doubler making nothing but his five best trumps. This was a justifiable double if ever there was one, and it looked as nearly a certainty as it is possible to get; but it only shows what extraordinary combinations do occur at times and how careful one ought to be. Doubling a suit declaration gives very useful information to the dealer, inasmuch as it tells him where the strength in trumps lies, and enables him to regulate his game accordingly. It may be taken as a sound general rule that the act of doubling will give an advantage to the dealer of one trick at least in the play of the cards; therefore if a player doubles and wins the odd trick, he has gained nothing by his double, as he would have won two by cards without the double. It is a most unsound proceeding to double one suit because you are strong in the others. If you have four trumps with two honours, and a very good playing hand, it may be right to double because you have good protection in the trump suit, but to double with only three trumps, however good the rest of the hand may be, is fraught with great danger.

DOUBLING

A declaration made by dummy may be doubled much more readily. The dummy is obliged to make a declaration when the call is left to him, and sometimes it has to be a very forced one; also it is known that the dealer has not a very good hand, and again, it is sometimes very important for the third player to have a trump led, which he can only ensure by doubling the declaration. Spades are doubled far more often than any other suit, because the spade call does not necessarily mean strength in the spade suit, but is a declaration of weakness and may mean absolute impotence. A spade call should be doubled with great strength in other suits and only two or three spades. Occasionally one gets caught at it and is re-doubled on a long spade suit, but at the score of love all it is so very important to get to the point of 6 on one's opponent's deal, that it is worth while to take a little risk in one's endeavour to do so.

Thus, doubling an original red-suit declaration cannot be recommended on anything very short of a certainty. The last word does not rest with the doubler; he may be re-doubled by the dealer or by the dealer's partner, and very often the

DOUBLING

dealer's partner has a considerable voice in the matter. The partner of the dealer, provided that he knows him to be a sound declarer, should always be on the look-out for an opportunity to re-double, when an original red-suit declaration is doubled. The value of the trumps in his hand should be a very small consideration. If he can see three tricks in his own hand, say an ace of one suit and ace, king of another, he should re-double without hesitation. The trump suit is plainly divided between the dealer and the doubler, and three tricks from the dealer's partner ought easily to turn the scale. This is an opportunity which is frequently missed, but an observant player will always be prepared to seize it when it presents itself.

CHAPTER VIII .

THE ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP DECLARATION

QUITE the most important point in the whole gamut of Bridge, and at the same time one of the most difficult, is the original or blind lead before the dummy's hand is exposed on the table. So much frequently depends upon this opening lead, and the leader has so little to guide him. Like most other points of Bridge, this question divides itself into two branches, the lead against a No Trump declaration, and the lead against a suit declaration. These two branches are quite distinct from each other, and the correct lead in either case is governed by entirely different principles. Let us first consider the lead against a No Trump call.

It is a hard and fast rule that, when No Trumps are declared, the leader must open his numerically strongest suit, and this is a rule from which there

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

should be no departure, unless under very exceptional circumstances. There must now be no leading out a winning card to have a look round. Every possible card of entry is of such great value that it is a fatal mistake to sacrifice one for the sake of that "look round," which may or may not be of any use. When the dealer declares a genuine No Trump, the opponents are strictly on the defensive, and the best that they can hope for is to establish one long suit, and to win tricks with the small cards of that suit, by the aid of any other cards of re-entry which they may hold, and all their united energies should be devoted to this purpose. In no province of the game of Bridge does the combination of the two defending hands come in so strongly as when playing against a No Trump declaration, therefore the leader ought to be careful to give his partner all the information that is possible by his first lead. Not only is it important that the original lead should always be from the leader's numerically strongest suit, but also it is very important that every player should thoroughly understand the accepted leads from the different combinations of cards. These leads are

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

clearly defined, and there is remarkably little divergence in the tables quoted in the various textbooks by different authors.

The following will be found substantially correct.

Against a No Trump declaration, from a suit headed by —

Ace, king, queen	lead Queen, followed by king.
Ace, king, with five others	" King.
Ace, king, with less than five others ..	" Fourth-best.
Ace, king, knave, with a card of entry ..	" King.
Ace, king, knave, without a card of entry	" Fourth-best.
Ace, queen, knave	" Queen.
Ace, queen	" Fourth-best.
Ace, knave, ten	" Knave.
Ace, and any other combination	" Fourth-best.
King, queen, knave, and one other	" King, followed by queen.
King, queen, knave, and two or more others	" Knave, followed by queen.
King, queen, with five others	" King.
King, queen, with less than five others	" Fourth-best.
King, knave, ten	" Knave.
Queen, knave, ten	" Queen.
Queen, knave	" Fourth-best.
Knave, ten, nine, or lower sequence ..	" Highest of se- quence.
Any other combination	" Fourth-best.

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

These are the ordinary accepted leads of everyday Bridge, and it behoves every would-be Bridge player to learn them thoroughly by heart, so that he will be in no doubt about the right card to lead when he is eldest hand, and also, conversely, so that he will be able to judge correctly, from the card led by his partner, what is the strength or weakness of his partner's hand. For instance, when a knave is led, the leader's partner should know that it is either from ace, knave, ten, or king, knave, ten, or from a sequence headed by the knave, and, in the majority of cases, an observation of his own and the dummy's cards will enable him accurately to place the missing cards. In the case of the lead from king, knave, ten, some players adopt the old whist lead of the ten instead of the knave, and it is probably the better lead, inasmuch as it distinguishes between ace, knave, ten, and king, knave, ten, but the knave is the generally accepted lead from either combination, so it is better to abide by it, but all the same a player should be prepared to read the lead of a ten as being probably from king, knave, ten, and others.

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

A lead which is absolutely peculiar to Bridge, and a very necessary one to understand, is from ace, queen, knave, and others, with no card of re-entry. The whist lead from this combination, and also the correct lead at Bridge against a suit declaration, is the ace, followed by the queen, but in the No Trump game the queen is the correct and only lead. When the leader holds ace, queen, knave, and two or more others, it is highly improbable that his partner will have more than two of the suit, so that, if he leads out the ace and queen, the suit is established after the second round, but it is rendered absolutely useless by the fact that his partner cannot put him in again. The lead of the queen, on the other hand, offers great possibilities. If the dealer holds the king he wins the first trick with it and the suit is cleared. If the king and two others are in dummy, he will allow the queen to win, and the knave is then led, putting the dealer badly on the horns of a dilemma. He is in great doubt whether to treat the lead as being from queen, knave, ten, in which case the ace in the third hand must block the suit, or whether to play the king second

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP.

in hand on the chance of the lead being from ace, queen, knave, and he is very liable to read it wrong. If the third hand holds the king, singly guarded, he should always play it on the queen led, and, if it wins, return the suit at once. If he holds king and two others, he should pass the first trick and play his king on the second round, whatever card is led, so as to get out of his partner's way.

Whenever the leader has to lead a small card against a No Trump declaration, he should be particularly careful to lead his fourth-best. Never let him think that it does not matter which of his small cards he leads, when they are apparently equally valueless — it matters a great deal to an intelligent partner. The object of the fourth-best lead is to enable his partner to apply the Eleven Rule. What Bridge player is there who has not heard of the Eleven Rule? and how few thoroughly understand it! The Eleven Rule is one of the few valuable legacies bequeathed by scientific whist to skilful Bridge. Note the distinction between the two adjectives. Whereas whist was a game of elaborated science and combination,

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

Bridge is a game of individual skill, common sense, and observation. In the early days of whist the original lead was always the lowest card of the leader's longest suit, irrespective of numbers, then came the lead of the penultimate to show five, then "Cavendish" introduced the antepenultimate lead to show six, and from that, some ingenious mortal, whose name is not given to posterity, evolved the idea of the fourth-best lead and the "Eleven Rule."

The Eleven Rule is that, when a player leads his fourth-best card of a suit, if the value of the card led is deducted from eleven, the remainder gives the number of cards, higher than the one led, which are not in the leader's hand. At first sight it is difficult to see why the figure should be eleven, but the explanation is quite simple. The ace being the highest card instead of the lowest, the value of the cards in each suit does not run from one to thirteen, but from two, the lowest card, to fourteen, that being the real value given to the ace, by placing it higher than the king, counting the knave as eleven, the queen as twelve, and the king as thirteen. It is obvious,

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

therefore, that the number of cards in the suit, higher than the one led, will be the difference between the value of that card and fourteen. Three of these high cards being known to be in the leader's hand, the number that is against him is at once reduced to eleven — hence the Eleven Rule. Useful as the Eleven Rule was at whist, it is far more useful at Bridge, because the third player has the extra advantage of seeing the dummy's cards in addition to his own.

Suppose that a 7 is led, the third hand holds queen, 8, 4, and the dummy puts down knave, 6, 5. By an easy application of the Eleven Rule, the third hand can see at once that the dealer has one card, and one only, of that suit higher than the 7, and, if the dealer has made the declaration of No Trumps, there is a strong supposition that his one high card is either the ace or king, therefore the third hand should pass the 7 led, and if his supposition is correct, the suit is established. If the third player did not understand the Eleven Rule, he would naturally play his highest, the queen, third hand, the dealer would win it with his ace or king, and would be free to go on with

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

his own game, leaving the knave guarded in dummy to stop his opponent's suit on the third round.

This is where the great advantage of the fourth-best lead and the Eleven Rule comes in. It does occasionally happen that the application of the Eleven Rule discloses to the third player the fact that the dealer has no card in his hand capable of beating the one led, but these occasions are very rare, and when such a situation does arise, the player of the two hands, if he has any knowledge of the game, is certain to cover the original lead with a higher card from dummy's hand, so as to prevent the third player from passing it up. The real advantage of the Eleven Rule shows itself with such a hand as the one quoted above, when the third player is able to locate the exact number of high cards held by the dealer, and thereby to form a pretty correct estimate of what strength his partner has led from. It must be remembered that the dealer is perfectly well aware of the state of affairs. He knows that the third player can count the high cards in his hand of the suit originally led. When he has no card in his own hand

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

capable of beating the one led, he knows that that fact is patent also to the third player.

This is the one drawback to the Eleven Rule — that it can be applied by the dealer just as well as by the third player.

Not long ago, the present writer was looking over the hand of a man who is a very fine natural card player, but who disdains, and expresses the greatest contempt for, the conventions of Bridge. The player in question dealt and declared No Trumps on a good all-round hand, the 8 of hearts was led, his dummy put down the king, 10, 3, and he held the ace and 5 only. To any disciple of the Eleven Rule it was obvious that dummy's 10 was good enough to win the first trick, but our friend played the 3 and it took the ace to beat the 8. The game proceeded and he won two by cards, and then turned round and said, "It could never have been won." The answer was, "It could have been won if you had put on the 10 of hearts second in hand." To which he replied, "Yes, very likely, but I could not possibly tell, and I hoped that the third hand would play either queen or knave and leave me with the ten, ace in dummy." It is only waste

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

of breath to try to explain things to people who refuse to understand, so the only answer he got was, "Of course you could not tell," and everybody was satisfied; but no Eleven Rule player could have failed to win three by cards and the game. Any amount of instances of the value of the Eleven Rule could be adduced, they are always occurring, but the two instances given above will illustrate the point sufficiently for present purposes. The Eleven Rule is rarely of any use when the card led is below a 5, but anything above that is extremely valuable. Even the lead of a 3 or a 2 has a negative value. The lead of a 2, or a 3 if the 2 can be accounted for, tells the leader's partner that the suit is one of four cards exactly, and this information is occasionally very useful when it comes to a question of placing the last three or four cards correctly in order to save the game.

Some players adopt the fourth-best lead also when playing against a suit declaration, but this can be of no use, and may do considerable harm. When the strength in trumps is declared against the leader, as it clearly is by an original declara-

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

tion of hearts or diamonds, there is no chance of the leader's side bringing in a long suit, and therefore it is no use to adopt a number showing lead. The leader's business in this case is to make what tricks he can, as quickly as he can, and not to attempt the impossible. The lead of the fourth-best is invaluable at No Trumps, but it is wrong when there is a suit declaration. It is very apt to be mistaken by the leader's partner for the highest of a weak suit, and for this reason the eldest hand should lead the lowest of his long suit, if he elects to lead from a long suit, quite regardless of how many he holds. When he plays to the second round a higher card than the one led, his partner will be in no doubt, but will know that he has led the lowest of a suit of four or more, the exact number being practically immaterial.

It was necessary to devote considerable space to an explanation of the Eleven Rule, because a proper understanding of the nature and application of this rule is essential to success in the No Trump game. Having, we trust, thoroughly explained it, we will now revert to our original subject — the opening lead against a No Trump

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

declaration. A table of leads has been already given on page 143. These leads are generally adopted with very little variation, and there is a twofold reason why they should be adhered to. First, because they are the leads which have been proved, by long practice, to be the most profitable method of opening the game, and secondly, because a strict adherence to them will give the greatest amount of information to the leader's partner. Let us run through them in order.

Holding ace, king, queen, and others, the usual lead is the queen, followed by the king, the object being to give the leader's partner the opportunity of unblocking, should he hold four of the suit.

Holding ace, king, and others, the fourth-best should be led, unless the leader holds seven altogether. In that case there is a good chance of dropping the other six in two rounds and winning seven tricks in the suit, therefore the king and ace should be led out; but with less than seven of the suit it is not possible for the leader to exhaust all the rest, and, if he leads out his king and ace, he will probably not make another trick in the suit. When he holds less than seven he should give away

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

the first trick by leading an under card, always his fourth-best, trusting that his partner will be able to get in in some other suit and return the original lead, in which case the ace and king are winners, and probably all the small cards as well.

Holding ace, king, knave, and others, some players lead the king and then open another suit, if the queen is not in dummy, waiting for their partner to get in and return the lead, but every fresh suit opened by the defenders in a No Trump game is such a great disadvantage to them that this policy is not to be recommended. It is far better to give away the first trick and leave the dealer to open another suit for himself. Precisely the same argument applies to the lead from king, queen, 10, and others. If the leader opens with the king and neither the ace nor knave appears, he is no better off than he was before; he then has either to go on with a small one or to change his suit, and he is at a disadvantage in either case. He will do far better in the long run by leading his fourth-best and trusting to his partner for either the ace or knave. This is a lead about which there is much difference of opinion. Some

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

players always lead the king from king, queen, 10, and other players never do it. If the leader has a certain card of re-entry in another suit, the king is probably the better lead, but with no card of re-entry, the best chance of establishing the suit is the fourth-best lead. Holding king, queen, and small ones, the fourth-best should always be led with less than seven. When the leader holds seven his partner is unlikely to hold more than two, and may only hold one or even none, so that there is considerable risk of never making a trick at all in the suit unless the king is led.

Holding ace, queen, knave, and others, the queen should always be led. This is far the most useful of any of the conventional leads, and it is one which very frequently occurs. When the leader has five or six of a suit his partner cannot be reckoned upon to hold more than two, and if the ace is led followed by the queen, the suit is indeed cleared after the second round, but it is rendered quite useless by the fact that the holder of it cannot get in again to lead it. Also, if the dealer has king and two others, which is a very likely combination, he can hold up the

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

king until the third round, when the ace is out; but he dare not do so if the ace is still in, for fear of being led through and never making his king at all. The value of this lead is very great, and cannot be too much insisted upon.

Holding king, knave, 10, and others, the knave is the usual lead, but some players adopt the whist lead of the 10. It matters very little which of the two is led, and the lead of the 10 has the extra advantage of distinguishing between the lead from king, knave, 10, and the lead from ace, knave, 10. Either lead is equally correct, but it is generally better to abide by established custom, and custom ordains the lead of the knave.

Holding queen, knave, 10, and others, the queen is the lead, and as soon as the ace makes its appearance, the leader's partner can place the knave and 10 in the leader's hand. In all other cases the fourth-best should be led, unless the leader has three or more cards in sequence at the head of his suit, in which case he should lead the highest. All the foregoing leads are framed on the supposition that the leader has no certain card of re-entry in his hand. When he is fortunate

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

enough to hold a long suit, and one or more cards of entry in the other suits, he can afford to play a much more forward game and to lead out winning cards at once. For instance, holding ace, king, 10, 7, 4, 2 of one suit and the ace of another, he could have three rounds of his long suit and clear it at once, keeping his other ace to come in with, but such a hand as this is not common against a genuine No Trump declaration.

“Cavendish” said, in his most excellent book on whist, that the object of leading from the numerically strongest suit is to “obtain for the small cards of it a value which does not intrinsically belong to them.” The same argument applies, much more forcibly, to the original lead against a No Trump declaration at Bridge. When the leader holds the ace, king, and three or four others of a suit, he knows that he is, in all probability, making his opponents a present of the first trick by leading a small card; but he does it, in the hope of “obtaining for his small cards in that suit a value which does not intrinsically belong to them.” Directly either he or his partner can re-

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

gain the lead, every card of his suit will be a winning one, with anything like an ordinary distribution of the cards, whereas, if he leads out the king and ace, he will win two tricks for certain, but there the power of his hand will end, and his numerically strong suit will have no value.

The reason why the opening lead should be so different against a No Trump declaration and against a suit declaration, is that, when there is a declared trump, if the dealer does not win tricks with his ace and king on the first two rounds of the suit, he will have no chance of winning tricks with them at all, as they will inevitably be trumped later on. In the No Trump game this danger does not exist, and it will always be worth the leader's while to give away one certain trick, on the chance of winning two or three tricks later in the hand by so doing. Nothing is more satisfactory, or more profitable, than bringing in a long suit against a No Trump declaration, and seeing the small cards of it become as valuable as aces and kings. This is the result which should be aimed at in the opening lead, rather than annexing one or two tricks in

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

a hurry, which may indeed save some small loss, but which cannot save the game. Occasionally when the declarer has a very strong hand, this policy will lose a trick, and it may possibly entail the loss of the small, or even the grand slam, but that is a slight consideration compared with taking a reasonable chance of saving the game.

Not only is it good policy to give away the first trick with the object of establishing a long suit, but sometimes the second trick in a suit has to be given away with the same object. Say that the leader holds ace, knave, 8, 4, 2 of a suit, and no other possible card of entry. He holds the 4, the dummy put down the king and two others, and plays a small one, the third hand wins the trick with the queen and returns the suit; now how is the leader to play? If he puts on the ace he certainly wins the trick, but his whole hand is then worth one trick and one only, and he is asking his partner to win three more tricks in order to save the game, supposing the opponents to be nothing up. If, on the other hand, he plays the knave, and allows the king in dummy to win the trick, his partner may hold the remaining card of his

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

suit, and one card of entry in another suit, in which case there are five tricks accounted for. It is seeing these chances, and taking these chances, and not being too anxious to win one trick, when winning that one trick ends the possibilities of his hand, that gives the good Bridge player so much advantage over his inferior brother in the No Trump game. The issue of more games hangs on this opening lead against a No Trump call than on any other point in the play of the cards at Bridge, and that is the reason why it has been dwelt on at such length. There is a great element of chance in it, as the position of the remaining cards is entirely unknown, but even chance can be brought within certain limits, and the accumulated experience of our most practised Bridge players having clearly defined the leads which offer the best chances of success, those leads should be rigidly adhered to.

In a previous article it was stated that the rule of leading from the numerically strongest suit was one from which there should be no departure, "unless under very exceptional circumstances." The exceptional circumstances referred to are when

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

the leader has absolutely no suit of any trick-making value. With such a hand as

Hearts — Knave, 9, 2.

Clubs — 10, 7, 5, 4.

Diamonds — 9, 6.

Spades — Knave, 8, 5, 3.

the theoretically correct lead would be the 3 of spades, but four spades to the knave is a perfectly hopeless suit to lead from. The hand itself is perfectly hopeless from a trick-making point of view, therefore the leader should, in such a case, depart from rule, and lead the card which is most likely to help his partner. With the hand given above it would be the knave of hearts. It is a very forlorn hope, and only to be resorted to *in extremis*, but sometimes it will come off and retrieve an otherwise impossible situation. When the leader has an absolutely hopeless hand, containing no suit of more than four cards, and no strength in that, he should lead his best heart, especially if the declaration has been passed and the call made by dummy. The only information that a passed No Trump call gives to the opponent is that neither the dealer nor the dummy has a strong heart hand; they may have protection in the suit, but neither of them can be very strong in

ORIGINAL LEAD AGAINST A NO TRUMP

it or they would have declared hearts, therefore a heart is the best bow to draw at a venture. This strengthening lead is fraught with great danger, as it requires an intelligent partner to grasp the situation and to understand that it is a strengthening lead, otherwise he may sacrifice a high card in the suit with the idea of unblocking, but desperate situations demand desperate measures.

CHAPTER IX

THE OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT DECLARATION

THE principles which govern the opening lead against a No Trump declaration and against a suit declaration are diametrically opposed to one another. We have already explained at some length that against a declaration of No Trumps the leader should not hesitate to give away one trick at first in the hope of establishing and bringing in the remaining cards of his long suit, but it would be a suicidal policy to do this against a strong suit declaration. When the dealer makes an original declaration of hearts or diamonds, the strength in trumps is then and there marked in his hand, and it is obviously useless for the opponents to aim at establishing a long suit which will have no value when it is established. Their first object should now be to win the number of tricks necessary to save the game, before their small

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

trumps are taken away from them, and before the dealer has an opportunity of discarding any of his losing cards.

The best of all the original leads against a strong suit declaration is a singleton, provided that the leader has two or three small trumps. This lead was rightly considered a bad one at whist, and there still remain certain ultra-conservative players who cannot bring themselves to acknowledge the value of it at Bridge, the reason being that they fail to recognise the fact that the conditions at whist and at Bridge are entirely dissimilar. The number of such dissentients, however, is decreasing day by day, and it has begun to dawn on even the slowest minded of them that many a game is saved by this lead, which could never have been saved by any other means. The lead of a singleton was, undeniably, a bad one at whist. At whist both sides start on equal terms, the strength in trumps is not declared in any one hand, and the leader's object is not to annex one or two tricks as quickly as possible, but rather to play for a big game, and to aim at winning the odd trick or more on that hand. At Bridge the con-

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

ditions are quite different. When a red-suit declaration has been made by either the dealer or the dummy, the opponents' game should be purely defensive. Their first care should be to win the requisite number of tricks to save the game, and the original leader should take the best chance which offers itself of winning those three or four tricks before he thinks of anything further. As soon as the saving of the game is secure, he can then go for better results, but saving the game should always be his first consideration. The more experience that a player gains of the game of Bridge, the more fully he will realise what a strong weapon of defence is placed in his hand by this lead of a singleton against a strong suit declaration. It does not always succeed. Occasionally it may lead to disaster, but experience has abundantly proved that more games are saved by this lead than by any other. Great stress has been laid upon the singleton lead, because there does still exist a prejudice against it in some quarters, and certain writers on the game have rather gone out of their way to condemn it, but the fact remains that there is hardly a first-class Bridge player at the present

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

day who will not eagerly seize the opportunity of leading a singleton when he has the chance.

It must be borne in mind that the first lead is the only blind one. As soon as a card is led the dummy's hand is exposed on the table, and the leader is able to see, to a certain extent, how the hand lies. Holding ace, king, and others of a suit, the king is an excellent card to lead, as it enables the leader to see the exposed hand without parting with the lead and without losing the command of his suit; but, even when he holds an ace, king suit, a singleton in another suit is generally a better opening lead. Suppose that the dealer declares hearts, the leader's hand is —

Hearts — 9, 5, 2.

Clubs — Ace, king, 7, 5, 3.

Diamonds — 8.

Spades — Knave, 8, 4, 2.

If he leads the king of clubs first and then his single diamond, how can his partner be expected to know what he is playing at, or which suit he wants returned? His partner will probably credit him with ace, king, knave of clubs, and will return that suit, unless the queen is in dummy, and the value of the singleton lead will be lost. He had far better lead his singleton at once, and not con-

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

fuse his partner by opening two suits. It is only as an original lead that the singleton is so valuable; when it is led as a second consideration, it is difficult for the leader's partner to understand the situation, whereas a good player is always on the look-out for the opening lead being a singleton.

The first lead being the only blind one, it behoves the leader to regulate his opening lead so as to do as little harm as possible before the dummy hand is exposed. If the first lead cannot be aggressive, it should be purely defensive. The lead of a singleton has already been strongly recommended, as an aggressive measure, in the hope of making a small trump or two by ruffing, before the leader is able to draw all the trumps. Not having a singleton, the king from ace, king, and others is an excellent lead. Next to this, the king from king, queen, or king, queen, knave, and others, is a good lead, or the queen from queen, knave, 10, or the knave from knave, 10, and another, or, in fact, the highest card of any sequence. None of these leads can do any harm, and either of the two latter, from queen, knave, 10, or from knave, 10, and another, may be a fine one for the leader's partner, and

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

may enable him to kill a high card of the suit in the dummy hand. The lead from king, queen, and one other is not such a good one, as it may lose a trick if the ace is in the dealer's hand, still this lead enables the leader to have a look at dummy without losing the command of the suit, and if one trick is sacrificed by it, it is sacrificed in a good cause.

The leads to be specially avoided are from any suit headed by a tenace, such as ace, queen, or king, knave, or queen, 10, or from a suit headed by a high card well guarded, such as king, 10, and others. The leader's objective in opening the game against a strong suit declaration should not be to make a big score, but rather to endeavour to save the game, and he should be very chary of opening a suit in which he is likely to win one or two tricks, if that suit is opened by anybody but himself. It is far better to lead the highest of two or three valueless cards than to open from an ace, queen, or a king, knave suit. There are many men, who were good whist players, in times now fast growing historic, who have the idea that they must open their strongest suit so firmly rooted

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

in their minds, that no amount of experience will ever eradicate it. They cannot, or will not, recognise the different conditions existing in the two games. When the opening lead from weakness proves, as it must occasionally prove, disastrous, they say, "If you had only opened your strong suit, we should have saved the game." They quite ignore, or are obstinately blind to, the fact that, for one game that is saved by the lead from a long, guarded suit, three or four games are lost by it.

When hearts are declared, at the score of love, the defender's first aim and object is to win the necessary four tricks to save the game, and a guarded king, if the ace is not in the dummy hand, represents one trick, or a fourth of that aim and object, provided that the leader does not open the suit. On the same principle, a suit headed by ace, queen, in the leader's hand is probably good for two of the necessary four tricks, unless the king is in dummy, and unless the suit is opened by the leader. It is quite a common occurrence, when the leader has had occasion to open a weak suit — say he has led the 8 from 8, 7, 4 of hearts, against an original declaration of diamonds, and his partner's

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

king has been captured by the ace — to hear the partner say, in tones of deep reproach, “You sacrificed my king by your lead from nothing,” but is this so? The leader’s partner not having either the queen or knave, they must be both against him. The ace is in the dealer’s hand, and the queen and knave must be either in the dealer’s hand or in the dummy’s or one in one and one in the other, and in any of these three cases the king is as dead as the proverbial doornail. Certainly the king was sacrificed, but he was doomed to sacrifice from the start of the hand, and nothing could have prevented it, short of the dummy being unable to get the lead. It is idle to say that the lead from weakness sacrificed the king, when it was foredoomed to destruction in any case.

The lead of the knave, from knave, 10, and another, is one of the best and most useful openings. Not only is it a lead which may be of great assistance to the leader’s partner and strengthen his hand enormously, but also it can do no harm, as it is impossible to place the remaining high cards of the suit so that a trick will be lost by it. Even if the ace and queen are

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

in the dealer's hand, and the king with the leader's partner, nothing is lost by it, as the ace and queen must make, and the leader is left with the command of the suit on the third round, whereas, if the king should happen to be in the dummy, and the ace and queen with the leader's partner, every trick in the suit is secured.

Another useful opening lead, which cannot do harm and may prove very successful, is the lead of the queen from queen and one other. This is entirely opposed to all the cherished principles of whist leads, but it is a very useful opening at Bridge in spite of that. If the ace and king are both against the leader, his singly guarded queen is bound to fall on the second round, but if he should chance to find his partner with either or both of the two higher cards, the lead of the queen cannot fail to be a good one. Such leads as these, which cannot do harm and may do much good by strengthening the partner's hand, are far preferable to a blind lead from a guarded suit, when opening the game against a strong suit declaration.

Some players are very fond of leading out an ace at once, when they hold one, with the object

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

of having a look round. This lead has its advantages, inasmuch as it enables the leader to see the exposed hand before parting with the lead, but it is questionable whether this advantage may not be gained at too great a cost. Holding ace and king only of a suit, the ace, followed by the king, is an excellent opening. To lead the ace before the king is the recognised method of indicating to a partner that the leader holds no more of the suit led, and his partner, if he is possessed of ordinary intelligence, will give him the opportunity of making a small trump by a ruff as soon as he is able to obtain the lead. Holding ace and others of a suit, without a king, the advantage gained by leading out the ace and having a look round may be far too dearly bought. An ace has other uses beyond the winning of one trick, even when winning that one trick is coupled with the advantage of having a look at the dummy.

The primary object of an ace's existence is to kill a high card of the adversary's, and also that ace may become so invaluable as a card of re-entry later on, when the lead is badly wanted for a specific purpose. The lead is of very small advan-

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

tage at first, before the dummy hand is exposed, and before the game has had time to develop, but later on in the hand it is a very different matter. The original leader has now had the opportunity of gaining a great deal of information from the fall of the cards, and it may be all-important to him to be able to get the lead, and he will very likely have occasion to bitterly regret that ace, lightly parted with at first for no adequate result.

When it is necessary to lead from a suit of ace and three or four others, the ace must be led by all means. There is too much danger of it being trumped and never making a trick at all, unless it is led originally, but why need that ace suit be touched at all? The leader must have some other suit which he could open. He should rather lead the highest of a weak suit, containing nothing of any value, and retain his ace as a certain card of re-entry later on, when he will know something about the position of the cards, and when the lead may be of real use to him. This is all in strict accordance with what has been already said, that the first lead should be purely defensive. Once in a while the small or even the grand slam may be

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

lost by not leading out an ace, but very rarely indeed will a game be lost by it which could have been saved by any other means. When the game is bound to be lost in any case, the consideration of whether one or even two tricks could have been saved is practically immaterial. The small extra loss incurred is nothing compared with the chance of saving the game.

When the dealer has passed the declaration and a suit has been declared by dummy, one of the very best opening leads is a trump through the declaring hand. This is an opening which is not made use of nearly often enough, even by our best players. It has so many advantages. When the leader has a fairly good protected hand and two or three small trumps, it relieves him from the responsibility of leading from any of his guarded suits, and it can do so little harm. It is possible that it may lose one trick. For instance, supposing that the dummy has declared hearts with ace, knave, and three others, the leader's partner has queen and two others, and the dealer king and one other. In this case the lead of a trump will undeniably sacrifice the partner's queen and will lose

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

a trick, but this is only one distribution of the cards out of many, and in the long run this lead will pay well. Suppose the dummy has declared hearts, and the leader's hand is —

Hearts — 10, 7, 5.

Clubs — Ace, queen, 8, 6.

Diamonds — King, 9.

Spades — Queen, 10, 5, 2.

Here there can be no possible doubt as to the right lead. The one lead is the 10 of hearts, partly with a view of helping the partner if he should happen to hold strength in the trump suit, and still more to avoid having to open any of the three guarded plain suits. The leader's partner, if he wins the first trick, will not return the trump suit, but will lead up to weakness in the dummy, and the leader's hand cannot fail to be materially benefited thereby. As we said before, the value of this opening lead is not anything like sufficiently recognised, even by good players.

There was an old adage at whist: "When in doubt lead trumps." There should be a still stronger adage at Bridge: "When in doubt lead a trump through the declaring hand, but not up to it."

An exception to the rule of the opening lead

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

being purely defensive is when the leader holds considerable strength in the trump suit — not sufficient strength to double on, but still strength enough to keep the declaring hand in check, and to prevent the dealer from extracting all the trumps. In this case the position of affairs is entirely altered. The game is in no danger, and the leader's plan of campaign should be an attacking, not a defensive one. He should open his best suit, and try to weaken the declaring hand by forcing him to trump, with the ulterior object of bringing in his own long suit, as at whist, when all the trumps are exhausted. Say that hearts are declared by the dealer, and the leader holds —

Hearts — King, knave, 9, 8.	Clubs — King, knave, 10, 9, 3.
Diamonds — 6.	Spades — Ace, 6, 2.

This is not a doubling hand, but it is a good hand, a hand on which there is practically no chance of losing the game, and a very fair chance of winning the odd trick or more with the assistance of one or two useful cards in the partner's hand. The lead of the single diamond would be a very bad one with this hand. The leader is in no hurry to make his trumps by ruffing. At least two, and

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

very likely three, of them are certain to make, with the declared strength behind him, and he would be only weakening his own hand by leading for a ruff. His lead here should be the knave of clubs, because, if his partner has either the ace or queen, the suit is at once established, and the strong hand against him can be forced with manifest advantage. The dealer has probably declared hearts on five, headed by ace, queen, or ace, queen, 10, and directly the dealer's hand is once forced, the strength in trumps is equalised between the dealer and the original leader. With these sorts of hands it is generally a case of the player who gets the first force on his adversary winning the odd trick or more.

When the dealer has passed the declaration, and the dummy has declared either diamonds, clubs, or spades, the heart suit is a very safe one to open, especially if the leader is himself weak in that suit. Somebody must have strength in hearts. Neither the dealer nor the dummy has declared hearts, therefore the strength does not lie with either of them, and it must be with the leader's partner.

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

It is always dangerous to open a weak black suit against a passed call. The dealer has practically declared, by passing the declaration, that he has no great strength in either hearts or diamonds, but he has said nothing about the black suits, and he may be very strong in either of them. When the declaration has been passed, it is always better, *ceteris paribus*, to open a red suit in preference to a black one.

The conditions are again entirely altered when the leader's partner doubles a suit declaration. The leader must now abandon his own game altogether, and play solely for his partner's hand. When the declaration has been made by the dummy, it is right, in nine cases out of ten, for the leader to open with his highest trump, whatever it may be, and whatever the rest of his hand may consist of. Showing his strong suit first, which some players are very fond of, is a mistake. His partner may be trusted to find out his strong suit without that, and it may happen that his partner has only one of that strong suit, and is not able to put him in again. When a player doubles, lying over the declarer, it is tantamount

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

to asking his partner to lead his highest trump on the first opportunity, and this demand should always be complied with. When the leader holds a singleton, and two or three small trumps, it is very tempting to lead the singleton, but it is not the right game. By so doing he is playing for his own hand instead of for his partner's, and when any declaration is doubled it is obligatory on the doubler's partner to give up his own game and to play entirely for his partner.

On the rare occasions when the leader's partner doubles a strong suit declaration made by the dealer the position is again different. Here the leader should not begin with a trump, as the declarer is now lying over the doubler. In this case he should lead a singleton if he has one, or failing that, he should open his strongest suit, and play an attacking game, not a defensive one, the strength in trumps being now declared with him instead of against him.

An extraordinary idea prevails among a large section of Bridge players that when the leader's partner doubles a declaration of spades made by the dummy, it is not right to lead a trump. It is

OPENING LEAD AGAINST A SUIT

impossible to ascribe any why or wherefore to this idea, but there it is. In these latter days, aided by the light of experience, this idea is being slowly rooted out, but very slowly. Even now one meets many players who cannot be induced to lead a trump at once when their partner doubles spades — they will lead anything rather. “Hellespont” says, “If the leader’s partner does not wish a trump led to him at once, he has no business to double,” and in this case “Hellespont” is very right. The doubler has either doubled on strength in trumps, or on great strength in plain suits, or on a good all-round hand, and in any case it must be to his advantage to have a trump led at once, as no sane man would double simply on the chance of making a small trump or two by ruffing. Whenever a player, on the left of the declarer, doubles a suit declaration, it is obligatory on his partner to lead his highest trump, at the earliest possible opportunity.

CHAPTER X

THE PLAY OF THE THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

It has been written, by a recognised authority on the game, that "The play of the third hand presents less difficulties than the original lead, because he has the light of the exposed hand to guide him." This is no doubt true to a certain extent, but the matter is not quite so simple as the writer would have it appear. Let it be granted that the third hand has "the light of the exposed hand to guide him"; but this light may, or may not, be an illuminating one. When the declaration of No Trumps has been made by the dummy, the light is a very shining one, inasmuch as the strength on which the declaration was made is fully exposed, but, when the dealer has made the declaration, the light afforded by a view of the dummy hand may be a veritable will-o'-the-wisp, and not only may tell the leader nothing, but may even lead him into altogether false deductions.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

The third player may be said to have responsibility thrust upon him. He has no voice in the original opening of the game. That is entirely in the hands of his partner. All that he knows is that his partner has opened his numerically strongest suit, and he has to draw his conclusions, and to determine upon the game to be played, by inferences that he can draw from the value of the card originally led, and from the forces exposed in the dummy hand. For this reason, it is absolutely essential that every player should have a thorough knowledge of the established and accepted leads against a No Trump declaration, a table of which will be found on page 143, and that he should be able to draw reliable deductions therefrom.

The deductions to be drawn from these leads are as follows: — The lead of

Ace indicates Ace, queen, knave, and others, with a card of re-entry.

King “ (1) Ace, king, and five others.
 (2) Ace, king, knave, and others.
 (3) King, queen, knave, and one other.

Queen “ (1) Ace, king, queen, and others.
 (2) Ace, queen, knave, and others.
 (3) Queen, knave, 10, and others.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

Knave indicates (1) Ace, knave, 10, and others.

(2) King, knave, 10, and others.

(3) King, queen, knave, and more than one other.

(4) Highest of a sequence.

Ten “ (1) King, knave, 10, and others.

(2) Sequence headed by the 10.

Any lower card indicates (1) Highest of a sequence.

(2) Three higher cards exactly in the leader's hand.

These are the only accepted leads against a No Trump declaration, and every player who professes to play scientific Bridge ought to have them thoroughly at his finger-ends, so that he will never be in a position to say to his partner, “ I did not understand what your lead meant.” If he knows these leads by heart, he cannot fail to read his partner's lead correctly, or, at the worst, to be in doubt between one or two possible combinations. Thus, supposing the leader opens with the queen of a suit, there is nothing of any value in dummy, and the third hand holds king and two others. It is absolutely certain that the lead is either from ace, queen, knave, and others, or from queen, knave, 10, and others, and in either case the king should be played on the leader's queen at once —

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

not for purposes of unblocking, but to show the leader where the other high card lies. Or again, to take a more forcible example, suppose the leader opens with a knave, the dummy puts down two or three small ones, and the third hand holds queen and two others. In this case the lead is either from ace, knave, 10, or from king, knave, 10, or from a sequence headed by the knave, and in any case the queen should be played on the partner's knave without a moment's hesitation. It is a singular fact that many players, who would at once get out of their partner's way if they held queen and one other, will not do so when they hold queen and two or more others. They will say, "I saw no good in unblocking until it was necessary." But that is not the point. It is not a question of unblocking, but of making the game easy for their partner. The queen is of no possible value as regards establishing the suit, but what the leader wants to know is where the queen is situated, and that information they studiously withhold from him.

Take a very common instance. The leader holds ace, knave, 10, to five of a suit; he opens with the

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

knave, the second and third hands both play small ones, and the dealer wins with the king, leaving the position of the queen entirely unknown, but with a strong presumption that it is in the dealer's hand. The original leader gets in again, and what is he to do? He probably has no other card of entry, and he is afraid to lead out his ace for fear of leaving the queen in the dealer's hand to command the situation, so he tries to put his partner in with some other suit in the hope of having his original suit led to him through the dealer's hand, and the result is probably disaster. If the third hand had only made the game easy for him by showing him the queen, instead of leaving him to guess, four tricks in the suit would have been absolutely assured, but this is what they will not do — they will not make the game easy. What harm can it possibly do, with any combination of the cards, to throw a queen on the partner's knave led? The leader of the knave is bound to have either ace and 10, or king and 10, or 10 and 9, in addition to his knave, and in none of these three cases can it be anything but an assistance to him to see a high card played by his partner, supposing

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

of course that there is nothing of value in the dummy hand.

There is no more tiresome partner in a No Trump game than one who will persist in holding up a high card in your original suit. He will not block you — he flatters himself that he is too good a player to do that — but neither will he make the game easy for you by getting rid of a high card of your suit, which can be of no possible value to him, but which is bound to cramp your game as long as you do not know where it lies.

There is one golden rule laid down for the guidance of the third player against a No Trump declaration, and that is, always to return his partner's original lead, unless the ultimate establishment and bringing in of that suit is obviously hopeless. It will frequently happen that the third player has a stronger suit than the one originally opened, and that it would have been far better if he had had the opening lead, but he did not have it. His partner had to open the game, he has opened it with his best suit, and the attack must be continued in that suit, unless the cards ex-

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

posed in dummy are such as to render it manifestly fatal to do so. There are certain timorous players who will not return their partner's suit, when they have won the first trick with the king or queen, because they see the ace in the dummy hand. They will say afterwards, when the game has probably been lost through their bad play, "I did not like to return your suit up to the ace," but why not? An ace is by no means a bad card to lead up to — rather the reverse. The ace is bound to make, and, by returning the suit at once, the third player gives his partner a fine chance of utilising any tenace which he may hold, without helping his opponents in any way. The effect of opening some other suit, up to weakness in the dummy, is only to take a card of entry out of the partner's hand, and those precious cards of entry — there are not likely to be many of them — are so invaluable that they should never be lightly sacrificed.

It is a very strong measure for the third hand to abandon his partner's suit, and to open his own. By so doing, he is practically saying to his partner, "Give up your suit altogether, and play for

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

mine, it is by far the stronger of the two." There are occasions when it is right to change the suit, as, for instance, when the third player holds a suit of king, queen, knave to five, which will be established with the loss of only one trick, whereas the leader's suit will take two more rounds to establish; but these occasions are few and far between, and are only the exceptions which prove the rule. The general rule is, that it is a fatal policy for the two defenders to have disjointed interests by each playing for his own suit.

It will occasionally happen that the dummy puts down such a powerful hand as to render it patent to the third player that the game must be lost unless his partner holds one or more named cards. When this is the case, he should play for that card, or those cards, being in his partner's hand, as though he had seen them there, regardless of the fact that an extra trick may be lost by so doing. Saving the game, not saving one or two tricks, is the object to be played for.

The following hand, which occurred in actual play, is a very illustrative instance of this. A B were partners against Y Z. The score was love

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

all. A dealt and left it to B, who declared No Trumps. Y led the knave of hearts, and B's and Z's hands were as follows: —

	Y	
A		B
(dealer)		(dummy)
	Z	

Hearts — King, queen.

Diamonds — Queen.

Clubs — Ace, king, queen, knave,
7, 4.

Spades — Ace, 9, 8, 5.

Hearts — Ace, 8, 3.

Clubs — 9, 7, 6.

Diamonds — King, 10, 9, 8.

Spades — Knave, 10, 4.

Z won the first trick with the ace of hearts, and he then had to consider how the game was to be saved. It was at once obvious that his partner must hold the ace of diamonds, otherwise the game was lost, six tricks in clubs, one in hearts, one in diamonds, and one in spades — three by cards. If he returned the heart, that suit was at once established, but it was then necessary for his partner to hold the king of spades in addition to the ace of diamonds. After a moment's hesitation, he led the king of diamonds, not a small one, as in that case his partner must have the knave as well as the ace to save the game. It came off to perfection. The dealer held knave

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

and three other diamonds, and the king, queen of spades; and any other lead than the king of diamonds must have lost at least five by cards. As it was, they made the ace of hearts and four diamonds and saved the game. This is not quoted as any great coup, but just as an instance of placing a high card in the partner's hand, and playing as though it were marked there, when it was absolutely necessary for it to be there in order to save the game. An inferior player would not have played it in that way, but would probably have returned the heart, and would then have said to his partner, after the game was lost, "If I had only known that you had the ace of diamonds, I could have saved that game." He could not possibly have known it, but he ought to have recognised that the game was lost unless it was there, and to have played as though he did know it.

At first sight it appears a very deadly game for the third player to return his partner's suit up to a major tenace, or two winning cards, in dummy, but to do so is often the lesser of two evils. Say that the leader has opened with a small heart, the third hand, holding queen and two small ones,

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

wins with the queen, leaving ace and knave in dummy. If he returns the suit, he is leading up to a certain tenace over his partner's king, but the tenace is there whatever he does. If he does not lead the suit, the dealer will do so as soon as he gets in, and the ace and knave will win all the same, so that he is really giving away nothing by returning the suit. It is far better to do this than to open a fresh suit at random, unless it is a very good one.

One of the strongest axioms of bridge is that every fresh suit opened by the opponents of the declarer of No Trumps is an enormous disadvantage to them. Where the attack is first begun, there it should be continued, unless the result of doing so will obviously be fatal.

The application of the "Eleven Rule," which was fully explained at page 147, is the one bright guiding star for the play of the third hand. For the benefit of any of our readers who may not have read, or, if they did read, may not have attached sufficient importance to this particular point, we will here repeat the conditions of the "Eleven Rule." When the original leader has

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

led his fourth-best card, if the value of the pips on the card led is deducted from eleven, the remainder will be the number of cards of that suit, higher than the one led, which are not in the leader's hand. The correct application of this rule is frequently of inestimable value to the player of the third hand. There are occasions when the position of every card in the suit can be accurately gauged, such as when the leader opens with the 7 of a suit, the dummy puts down queen, 8 and another, and the third hand holds ace, 10, and a small one. In this case it is a certainty that the dealer cannot beat the 7, as there are only four cards against the leader, higher than the one led, and they are all visible to the third player. Therefore, if the second hand covers the 7 with the 8, the third player puts on his 10, leads out the ace and a small one, and every trick in the suit is assured. This is an extreme case, which does not often happen. Much more frequently the third hand is able to judge that the dealer has one card and one only higher than the card led, and he then has to determine what that one card is likely to be. This is by far the most

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

common form of the application of the "Eleven Rule." Say that the leader opens with a 6, which shows five higher cards against him in the suit, the dummy puts down knave, 7, 4, and the third hand holds king, 9, 2. The dealer is marked with one card only higher than the 6, and that card may be ace, queen, 10, or 8. If the declaration of No Trumps has been made by the dealer, the probability is that that one card is the ace, or at any rate the queen, in neither of which cases can anything be gained by putting on the king as third hand. There is, of course, the possibility of the dealer having chanced that suit entirely, and of the original leader holding both ace and queen; but bridge is a game of probabilities, not possibilities, and the third hand has to consider the probable placings of the cards, not possible but improbable combinations. In this case he should play his 9 on the 6 led, whether the second hand covers or not, and, if his 9 is allowed to win, lead the king at once, so as to clear his partner's suit and to avoid blocking him. If the dealer holds ace and two small ones, he will probably allow the king also to win. The third one should then be

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

led in the hope that the leader may have a card of re-entry to bring in his thirteenth.

Let us take another case, which is by no means uncommon. Suppose the leader opens with a 5, the dummy puts down knave, 7, 3, and the third hand holds queen, 9, 6. According to the Eleven Rule the dealer can have one card only higher than the 5, and, if the declaration has been made by him, there is a very strong presumption that his one card is either the ace or the king. If the third hand puts on the queen, it is won by the ace or king in the dealer's hand, and the knave in dummy remains good for the third trick. If, on the other hand, the third player presumes that the dealer's one card is either the ace or king, and finessees his 9, every subsequent trick in the suit is assured, should his presumption prove correct. This is a good instance of the sort of chances that must be taken, and of the kind of finesses that should be made by the third player, and this is where the Eleven Rule helps him so much. It may happen that his partner has led from an ace, king suit, in which case several tricks, and probably the game, will be lost by his finesse; but the balance

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

of probability is strongly against it, and it is foolish to play for one possible combination of the cards, when there are many other combinations which are distinctly more probable.

The value of the card led, if it is a moderately high one, affords great information to an observant player of the third hand. Suppose the leader opens with the 7 of a suit, the dummy puts down the 8 and the 3, and the third hand holds king, 9, 4. Here again, the dealer is marked with only one card higher than the 7, but in this case the value of that one card is absolutely certain. The four missing higher cards are ace, queen, knave, and 10, and it is certain that the original leader cannot hold either ace, queen, knave, or ace, knave, 10, or queen, knave, 10, as he would have led one of the honours from either combination; therefore the cards in his hand must be ace, queen, 10, leaving the knave marked with the dealer. This should be as plainly apparent to the third player as though he had seen the knave in the dealer's hand. In this particular case the information is not of much use to him, as he would of course play the king in any case, there being nothing of

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

value in the dummy hand; but it is given as an instance of being able to place the high cards of the suit led, with the assistance of the Eleven Rule.

The dealer is acknowledged to have quite a disproportionate advantage in the play of the two hands when there are No Trumps, but the Eleven Rule is a strong weapon of defence against him in the hands of skilful adversaries, and the correct application of it will to some extent minimise the great advantages which he undoubtedly possesses.

It is a good wholesome general rule that it can never be good play to finesse against one's partner, but this rule admits of considerable exception in the case of the third player in a No Trump game. When an adverse call of No Trumps has been made, it is of such supreme importance to establish the suit originally led, that any finesse should be taken by the third hand, which offers a fair chance of defeating the cards exposed in dummy. If there is nothing of any value in dummy, then any finesse is bad. In this case the third hand should play his highest card of the suit led, or the lowest of two or more such cards in sequence,

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

and leave all the finessing to his partner, and he should also endeavour to help his partner as much as possible by returning a higher card than the best one in dummy, so as to force the dealer to cover on the second round. It seems hardly necessary to say that when the third player holds four of the suit originally led, and the dummy puts down three, the dealer cannot possibly hold more than two, as the original leader must have at least four. It follows that the dealer's remaining card, whatever it may be, is bound to be played on the second round, therefore it is unnecessary for the third player to lead a strengthening card; he should rather show his partner four of the suit by returning a low one.

The time when a strengthening card becomes so useful is when dummy has two only of the suit. Suppose the leader opens with 3 of diamonds, dummy puts down 10, 5, and the third player holds king, knave, 4, 2. The third player puts on the king which wins the trick, and he should at once return the knave, in direct opposition to the old whist rule of showing four of the suit by returning a low one. The situation is so

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

obvious: the dealer has two diamonds, one of which is very probably the queen, and if the third player returns a small one, his partner has to put on the ace to beat the 10 in dummy, and the queen remains mistress of the situation, whereas by returning the knave both the queen and 10 are killed. All this is only common sense, but common sense is a faculty which many would-be Bridge players seem very devoid of at the Bridge table, however well furnished they may be with it in other walks of life. They get an idea fixed in their heads, such as that it is right to return the highest of three and the lowest of four, and they fail to see that the rule must be varied under differing conditions.

When there is a high card exposed in the dummy, the situation is entirely altered. In this case any reasonable finesse, not only may, but must, be taken by the third hand. Holding ace, 10, and another, the finesse of the 10 should always be made, if either the king or queen is in the dummy hand. It is quite possible that the leader has both of the other honours, but if he has only one of them, and the other is in the dealer's

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

hand, nothing can be lost by finessing the 10, as the dealer is bound to win at least one trick in the suit in any case. When the knave and two others are in dummy, on the other hand, nothing can be gained by finessing.

It is at all times radically wrong to take a finesse by which nothing can be gained, and this particular combination affords a common instance of such a mistake. When the dummy puts down knave and two others, and the third hand holds ace, 10, and another, it is impossible to place the cards so that the finesse of the 10 can gain a trick. The original leader may have both the king and queen, but in this case nothing is gained by the finesse, as all the other cards must fall — if he has only one of them, it is absolutely impossible to avoid losing a trick in the suit, and the only result of the third hand finessing is to mystify his partner by leaving him in doubt as to the position of the ace. The finesse of the 10 is in this case a bad one, because nothing can be gained by it, but the same finesse with either king or queen in dummy is a good one, because nothing can be lost by it, and much may be gained.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

This is the principle which should govern the play of the third hand — to take any reasonable finesse which may result in profit if the cards lie favourably, but never to hold up a high card of his partner's suit when nothing can be gained by it, and when the only result of his so doing will be the complete mystification of his unfortunate partner. For instance, it is obviously useless to finesse ace, 9, and another, with the king or queen in dummy, as the dealer cannot hold either king, knave, or 10, or queen, knave, 10, and therefore one at least of those three cards is marked in the dealer's hand.

Certainly, a player should finesse more boldly as third hand in a No Trump game than at any other time, but even then his finesses should be tempered by judgment and by careful calculation of what high cards his partner may hold, and he will sometimes realise that he will render his partner more assistance by showing him at once the exact state of affairs than by taking a wild and generally useless finesse.

In this again, as in nearly every point during the temporary partnership at the Bridge tables,

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

the plainer and more straightforward the game is made, the better it will be for the interests of both partners.

Some players, holding ace and two small ones, will not put on the ace as third hand, if they see the king in the dummy, in the hope of catching the king on the second round of the suit. They will very likely succeed in so doing if there is a second round, but in the meantime they have allowed the dealer to win the first trick, and have wilfully deceived their partner by causing him to think that the ace is against him, with the result that he will be very likely to change his game altogether when he gets in again. It is far better to play the ace at once and to return the suit up to the king in dummy, so as to give the leader the chance of utilising his tenace if he has one, and also so as to leave him in no doubt as to the position of the ace. The one solitary instance in which it is right to hold up the ace is when the dummy puts down king, queen, 10, and the third hand holds ace and two small ones. The queen is certain to be put on second in hand, and if the third hand wins it with his ace, he leaves the king and

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

10 both good, and he is in the uncomfortable position of having either to return the suit up to the major tenace, or to open a fresh suit. If, on the other hand, he allows the queen to win the first trick, the dealer at once places the ace in the original leader's hand, and when the suit is led again the king is certain to be played and the suit is established, supposing, as is more than probable, that the original lead was from four or five, headed by the knave. Holding up the ace is the only possible way of preventing the dealer winning two tricks in the suit, and although it is true that the argument against deceiving one's partner applies here, in this particular instance it is the smaller of two evils.

It should be remembered that an application of the Eleven Rule will always tell the third player the exact number in the suit, higher than the one led, which are in the dealer's hand. When the dealer can be marked with two or more such cards, it is very unlikely that anything will be gained by finessing, but it is when he is marked with one higher card, and one only, that the opportunity for a useful finesse so often occurs. The third hand is

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

sometimes in a position to make a very shrewd guess at the value of that one high card, and when he can do this he ought to play as though he knew for a certainty that his guess was right. We will take a very simple instance of this — the dealer declares No Trumps, the 7 of hearts is led, the third hand holds king, 9, 5, and the dummy puts down queen, 4, 2, and also holds the ace and king of clubs. It is now very nearly a certainty that the dealer's one high card in hearts must be the ace, as he would not have declared No Trumps with the entire command of two suits against him, unless it was a one suit declaration, and even in that case the play of the king of hearts would not save the game, as the queen in dummy would win the third trick. If it was an ordinary sound declaration, the ace of hearts is practically marked in the dealer's hand, and the play of the king third hand will not only lose a trick, but also prevent the establishment of the suit.

There are players who finesse the ace, queen, on their partner's lead, and try to defend themselves by saying that it cannot matter as the king is bound to make if it is the dealer's hand. It may

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

matter a great deal, and that for two reasons. In the first place, it is quite possible that the king, in the dealer's hand, may be unguarded, and may fall to the ace, but a far more important consideration than this is that the play of the queen deceives the leader altogether as to the position of the ace, and he naturally marks it in the dealer's hand. There is one position, and one only, when it is right to finesse the ace, queen against one's partner, that is, when the knave and two others are in dummy. A minute's thought will show that in this one case nothing can be gained, and much may be lost by playing the ace and returning the queen, which would be the correct mode of play at any other time. If the leader has led from the king and others, it obviously makes no difference whether the third hand plays the ace or queen first, but if the king is in the dealer's hand, the play of ace followed by queen will leave both the king and knave good, and even if the king is unguarded and falls to the ace, the knave in dummy will still win a trick. It would be still worse to win with the ace and return the small one, as the original leader would then have to put on the king in order to beat

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

the knave in dummy, and the third hand would be obliged to block the suit with his queen on the next round.

One of the most heinous offences at Bridge is what is known as "finessing against one's partner," by which is meant finessing against a card which is not in dummy and which therefore must be either in the dealer's hand or in one's partner's. It is the old story, that nothing can be gained by it and something may be lost. The instance quoted above is the one single exception to this rule.

The finesse of ace, knave, and another, with the queen exposed in dummy, does not come under this head, because the finesse is against two cards, one of which is known to be in dummy, and the only chance of winning every trick is that the king should be in the leader's hand.

It behoves the third player to be very careful not to block his partner's suit when there are No Trumps. Holding ace and one other, the ace should always be played on the king led, unless three to the knave or four to the 10 are exposed in dummy, in either of which cases the ace is obliged to be held up in order to win every trick in the suit.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

Holding ace and two others, it is better to put the ace on the king at once, although it is not so imperative as with ace and one only. The lead of the king must be either from king, queen, knave, or from king, queen, 10, and nothing can be gained by holding up the ace when there is nothing of value in dummy. If the original leader holds king, queen, knave, he will continue with the queen, and his partner's ace will have to be put on the second round to avoid blocking the suit; if the lead was from king, queen, 10, there is a danger of the leader changing the suit for fear of finding the ace and knave in the dealer's hand, therefore the ace had better be put on the first trick, so as to leave no doubt.

Holding ace and one other, the ace should always be put on a queen led, unless the king singly guarded is in dummy. If the king and two others are in dummy, the result of passing the queen must inevitably be to block the suit. When the queen wins, the leader will continue with the knave, and even if the king is then put on, the suit is temporarily blocked, but if the king is not put on the second round the third hand has to play his

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

ace, and the suit is effectually blocked for all time. By far the better plan is to win the first trick with the ace, and return the suit at once up to the king, when the suit is bound to be cleared, and if the original leader has any card of re-entry he can bring his suit in.

Holding king and one other, the king should be played on an ace or a queen led. The lead of ace can only be from ace, queen, knave, and others, and the lead of queen is either from ace, queen, knave, or from queen, knave, 10, and in either case the king, singly guarded, can do nothing but harm in the third player's hand, therefore it should be got rid of as soon as possible. Holding king and two others, it is better to play the king at once on a queen led, not that the king will do any harm by blocking the suit if it is retained till the next round, but it can also do no good, so it is advisable to inform one's partner at once where it is situated.

Holding queen with either one or two others, the queen should be played on either king or knave lead, not for purposes of unblocking, as that could equally well be done on the next round, but

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

for the purpose of showing the leader where the queen lies. With neither of these leads will the queen be wanted to win a trick. The lead of king is probably from ace, king, knave, and the lead of knave is either from ace, knave, 10, or from king, knave, 10, or from knave, 10, 9, and in any of these cases the queen is better out of the way. If you have an intelligent partner, he will not be misled into thinking that your queen was single, he will only be grateful to you for showing him exactly how the cards lie.

We append a short table of these combinations:—

Holding	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ace and one other} \\ \text{ace and two others} \end{array} \right\}$	play ace on king led (unless knave to three, or 10 to four are in dummy).
"	ace and one other	play ace on queen led (unless king singly guarded is in dummy).
"	ace and two others	play ace on queen led (unless king is in dummy).
"	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{king and one other} \\ \text{king and two others} \end{array} \right\}$	play king on ace or queen led.
"	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{queen and one other} \\ \text{queen and two others} \end{array} \right\}$	play queen on ace or knave led.

The third hand should always be on the lookout to unblock in his partner's suit, and the only

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

certain means of doing so is to retain his smallest card. Suppose a small heart is led, the dummy (who has declared the No Trump) puts down king and one other, and the third hand holds queen, knave, 5, the king in dummy's hand is put on, and the third hand must play his knave under it, otherwise he is very likely to block the suit. Any partner of ordinary intelligence will recognise the situation, and will lead another small one when he gets in again. Similarly, with knave, 10, and a small one, the third hand should play his 10 to the first round, whatever is led, and whatever is put on from the dummy.

The same principle applies to discarding. When the third hand, having originally three of his partner's suit, is compelled to discard one of his remaining two cards, he should discard the higher and keep the lower one to return to his partner. Say that he held queen, 10, 3, with nothing of value in dummy, he plays his queen on the first round, which is won by the ace in the dealer's hand; if he has to discard from that suit he should discard the 10 and not the 3, so as to give his partner a chance of utilising a tenace.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

If his partner has both the king and knave it does not matter, but it is easy to see that if his partner has led from king, 9, and others, and the knave and another are in the dealer's hand, it will matter a great deal, and may make all the difference of saving or losing the game.

There is yet one other point in connection with this subject which is worthy of mention.

When the third player holds four of his partner's suit, and is able, from the original lead, to place his partner with only four, there is no necessity for him to get out of the way by unblocking. It then becomes a question of whether it will be more advantageous for himself or his partner to have the lead after the fourth round of the suit. This will generally depend upon whether the No Trump has been declared by the dealer or by the dummy, as it is obviously better to lead through the declaring hand rather than up to it. When the declaration has been made by the dealer, the third hand should retain a high card and return his lowest, at the same time showing four, if he is in a position to do so, by echoing in the suit. When, on the other hand, the dealer has passed and the

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

dummy has made the declaration, the third hand should part with his higher cards and retain the low one, so as to make sure of his partner winning the fourth round, and being in a position to lead through the strong hand exposed on the table.

Following the same line of argument, when the declaration has been made by the dealer, and the third hand has to lead, and has one card of his partner's suit, of which he knows that his partner has the winning card or even two winning cards, it is not advisable to continue that suit, unless that one or those two tricks will save the game. If the game can be saved for certain, by all means let him make sure of it, but if those one or two tricks will not save the game, he had far better lead a strengthening card through the strong hand, in preference to putting his partner in and forcing him to lead up to the strength at an obvious disadvantage.

In dealing with the question of the third hand finessing in his partner's suit, we omitted to point out that it is useless to finesse the ace, knave only, against the king doubly guarded in dummy. This proceeding can but result in blocking the suit.

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

With ace, knave only, the ace should be played on the first trick and the knave returning at once in the hope of drawing the king and clearing the suit, or the leader may hold the queen and 10, in which case he puts on the queen and clears it at once.

With ace, queen only, and the king doubly guarded in dummy, it is difficult to know what to do. If the third hand has at all a useful suit of his own, he should win with the queen and open his own suit; but if he has a bad hand with no suit that can be established, he had better win with the ace and return the queen, in the hope that the king may be put on the second round and the suit cleared with the loss of one trick. It is patent that he can make both the ace and queen, but having done so he has to open another suit at random, and his partner will require to have two cards of entry in order to bring in his original suit. If the king is not put on the queen, he is certainly left in the same position; but at least he has done no harm, as his ace and queen have both made.

The play of the third hand is a very important

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

factor in the No Trump game. The original leader has to open the game blindfolded, before seeing the dummy hand, and the duty of determining how the attack is to be continued devolves upon the third player, should he be able to win the first trick. The broad general principles upon which he should act are:—

Firstly and of supreme importance, always to return his partner's original lead, unless he has a much stronger or more easily established suit in his own hand, or, unless the cards exposed in dummy are such as to render the establishment of the original suit impossible or highly improbable. Do not let him be afraid of returning his partner's suit because the ace of it, or the king, doubly guarded, is in dummy. The ace, or the guarded king, is certain to make sooner or later, and the only effect of opening a fresh suit will be to take a very useful card of re-entry out of his partner's hand.

Secondly, to finesse boldly against any strength in dummy, but to finesse nothing against his partner. One writer on the game of Bridge (Hellepont) says that the third player should always

THIRD HAND IN A NO TRUMP GAME

finesse holding ace, queen, etc., or ace, queen, knave, etc.; but why this finesse more than any other? It is just one of those cases where nothing can be gained and something may be lost. With either of these combinations the third hand should play the ace to the first trick and return the queen, unless, holding ace and queen, he sees the knave, doubly guarded, in the dummy.

Thirdly, to pay particular attention to the value of the card led by his partner, always to apply the Eleven Rule when anything below an honour is led, and to be especially careful not to block his partner's long suit by retaining a high card of it.

Fourthly, when an honour is led, to make the game as easy as possible for his partner by parting at once with any high card, which cannot be wanted to win a trick, but the position of which will be doubtful to his partner if it does not come out on the first round, as, for instance, by playing the queen on a knave led. Any one who will bear in mind these simple principles will have no reason to blame himself if things go wrong.

CHAPTER XI

THE PLAY OF THE THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT DECLARATION

THE difference between the Suit game and the No Trump game is perhaps more strongly marked in the tactics of the third player than in any other instance. In the first place, the obligation to return his partner's original opening lead no longer exists. He must not now take it for granted that his partner has opened his numerically strongest suit; rather the reverse. The opening lead is probably from one of four combinations.

1. A high card from a suit headed by two or more honours.
2. The lowest of a suit of four or more.
3. The highest of a weak suit, possibly a singleton, or possibly a suit of two or even three.
4. A trump, when the declaration has been

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

made by the dummy, and the leader has a protected hand which he wants led up to.

The first consideration of the third player must be to form an opinion as to which of these combinations his partner has led from, and this should not be a difficult task when he has the cards in his own hand and in dummy to guide him. Having formed his opinion he should regulate his game accordingly. There is no need for him to unblock, with the strength in trumps declared against him, the sole exception being when he holds ace and knave only, and his partner leads the king. In this case it is right to put on the ace and return the knave, so that if his partner has the 10 in addition to the queen (which is marked in his hand), he can win the second trick with his queen and continue the suit, giving the third hand a discard which may be very useful.

The favourite opening lead with all Bridge players, against a suit declaration, is the lead of king from ace, king, or from ace, king, queen, and others. When a king is led the third player has no alternative but to follow suit with his lowest card, unless he has only two of the suit,

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

neither of them being an honour. In this case he should show his partner that he has only two, by playing the higher on the first round and the lower on the second. This is known as the "call for a ruff," and it is the most useful of all the signals at Bridge. It is quite as useful in its negative side as in its positive. When you are playing with a trustworthy partner, and he does not call in a suit of which you lead the king and ace, you can place him to a certainty with at least one more card of that suit. This signal should never be used when one of the two cards is an honour. If your partner leads a king and you play the knave on it, he naturally credits you with either the queen or no more, and, not wishing to part with the entire command of the suit, he will lead a small one, with the result that a very valuable trick is given away if you have another one. Also, the situation will be equally disclosed by the fall of your knave on the second round, if you play your small one on the first round. Some players use this signal equally when they hold queen and two others, with a view to showing that they can win the third round of the suit, but

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

this is not to be recommended, as it is quite possible that the leader may have had six of the suit originally, in which case, seeing only two in the dummy, he will continue with a third round, when one hand will discard and the other ruff, which is the worst evil that can happen to the defenders early in the game. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the third hand should not show two of a suit when he does not want to be forced, either because he is strong in trumps, or because he has only two and those winning ones, such as ace and queen with the king exposed in dummy.

When queen is led originally, and the king is not in dummy, the third hand should always win it with the ace. He can gain nothing by holding up his ace, therefore he should make it at once, and then consider what to do next.

When a knave is led, the ace should always be put on it, unless either the king or queen is in dummy. With either the king or queen in dummy, the knave should be passed, otherwise both the king and queen are left good, and two tricks in the suit are lost. It is, of course, possible that the knave may be a singleton, but this is a pos-

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

sibility not worth going for, unless there is such great strength in dummy that every trick is of paramount importance.

The lead of ace and another signifies one of two things, either a suit of four or five headed by the ace, or ace and one other only, and it should not be difficult for the third hand to determine which it is, when he has his own cards and the dummy's to guide him. If he has king and three others and the dummy puts down queen or knave and two others, his partner has led for a ruff and he can force him with safety, but if he holds king and two others only and the dummy has only three, the situation is very doubtful and he must be guided by the fall of the intermediate cards, always bearing in mind the fact that the dealer will play a false card if he can; still the queen against him will remain good, if his partner's lead was from a five-card suit, and the best chance is to have a third round and trust to the lead having been from a short suit.

This exhausts what may be called the strong opening leads, and we will proceed to deal with some of the other combinations mentioned above.

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

In judging of the import of the original lead the personal element counts for a good deal. Some players always open from their best suit, and others prefer opening a weak suit to leading from a guarded one. When the third player knows his partner's game, it is generally easy to determine what the lead means, but when playing with a stranger it is sometimes not so easy. With nothing else to guide him, the third player should construe the lead of a small card as being from a long suit, and he should play his highest, just as he would in whist, and use his own judgment as to returning the suit. The dummy hand being exposed, there is no finessing to be done, excepting when he holds ace, knave, and the king or queen is in dummy. In this position he must credit his partner with the other honour, and finesse the knave, unless he has so many of the suit that it is likely to be trumped on the next round, or unless he suspects his partner of having led a singleton.

When the opening lead is obviously the highest of a weak suit, there is no obligation on the third hand to play his highest card; he must be guided by what he sees in dummy. If he can win the

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

trick, either with the ace, or with the king when the ace is in dummy, he should always do so; but he should be very chary of parting with a high card, which is certain to be overtaken by the dealer. Suppose an 8 is led, the third hand holds king, 10, 7, 4, and the dummy puts down queen, 9, 5. The situation here is quite clear; the leader has opened the highest of a weak suit, and the leader holds the ace and knave. It would be very bad play for the third hand to put on his king; he should pass the first trick, or put on the 10 if the 8 is covered by dummy, so as not to clear the suit for the dealer, and also so as not to give the dummy a certain card of entry with the queen.

When the declaration has been made by dummy, and the leader opens with a trump, it does not at all follow that he wants the trump suit returned; very far from it. The lead of a trump probably means that he has a well-defended hand in the plain suits, and wishes to be led up to, rather than to have to open one of those suits blindfold. When the third hand gets in he should not think of returning a trump, but should lead his own best suit or a strengthening card up to weakness in dummy,

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

and if he gets in again he should rather open another suit than continue with the same, so as to give his partner every chance of making use of any tenaces which he may hold.

The typical sort of hand that a trump is led from is such a hand as —

Hearts — Ace, queen, 4.

Diamonds — 7, 2.

Clubs — Queen, 10, 7.

Spades — King, knave, 8, 3.

with diamonds declared by the dummy. With this hand there can be no possible doubt as to the 7 of diamonds (trumps) being the right lead, and there can also be no doubt that the more often the original leader's hand is led up to in different suits the better, the last thing that he wishes is to have to open any of the plain suits himself. This may seem to be rather an exceptionally strong hand, but it is given as an instance of the importance of being led up to, the strength of the hand being enormously reduced directly the lead has to come from it instead of up to it.

We wish to make it quite clear that an original lead of a trump through the declaring hand does

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

not indicate strength in trumps, but, on the contrary, it indicates some strength in the other suits, and a desire to be led up to in one or more of them, and it should be the business of the third hand to try to find out which suit his partner wants led.

It is not an uncommon occurrence to hear a good player remark to a less-experienced partner at the end of a hand, "The last thing that I wanted was the return of my lead." He has probably led something to try to put his partner in with the object of being led up to in another suit, and this object is entirely defeated by the prompt return of his own lead. Captain Beasley, in his recent book "London Bridge," says, "Before returning a lead which is going to put your partner in, consider carefully what he is going to lead next, and whether it would not be more advantageous to lead out that suit yourself."

The general principle for the third hand is to lead up to weakness in dummy, and, whenever it is possible, to lead a card higher than the best in dummy. Thus, if he is leading from a suit of king, 10, 7, 4 up to 9, 5, 3 in dummy, he should

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

lead the 10, so as to compel the dealer to cover with an honour. This lead is quite understood among good Bridge players, and there should be no danger of his partner assuming that the 10 is his best because he leads it up to the 9 exposed in dummy.

When there is no pronounced weak suit in dummy, an ace is by no means a bad card for the third hand to lead up to, unless he has the king himself.

The ace has to make a trick at some time, and by leading up to it the third hand will give his partner a chance of forcing it out as cheaply as possible. Holding knave, 10, and another, the knave is a fine card to lead up to an ace. If the king and queen are both in the dealer's hand there is no harm done, and if either or both of them are with the original leader it is clear that the lead of the knave must be a very assisting one.

When a suit declaration has been made by the dealer, and the third player is fortunate enough to win the first trick, it is often good policy for him to lead a trump through the declaring hand up to weakness on the table. When the dummy

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

puts down a short suit and two or three small trumps it is almost imperative to do so, with the view of preventing the dummy making his small trumps by ruffing.

Remember that, just as it is always good play to force the strong hand, so it is very bad play to allow the weak hand to get in a ruff, if it can possibly be avoided. If the dealer has had the lead, in either of his two hands, and has not led trumps, it is nearly always right for his opponents to lead them, as the dealer must clearly have some object in not taking the trumps out. Either he is trying to establish another suit before leading trumps, or he is playing for a ruff in the weak hand, and it should be his opponents' object to endeavour to thwart his amiable purpose.

A somewhat similar position is when the dealer declares a strong trump, and the dummy puts down a long, unestablished suit, with one other certain card of entry. The object of the defenders should be to get that card of entry out of the dummy hand before the trumps can be drawn. Suppose that the dealer declares hearts, the dummy puts down —

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

Hearts — 7, 5.

Diamonds — Knave, 6, 4.

Clubs — Ace, 9, 3.

Spades — Queen, knave, 10, 7, 4.

The 10 of diamonds is led, and the third player's hand is —

Hearts — 9, 3.

Diamonds — Ace, queen, 7, 5.

Clubs — Knave, 10, 6.

Spades — Ace, 8, 5, 3.

It requires very little reasoning power to infer that the dealer has a strong heart hand, with the king of diamonds (marked in his hand), and very likely the king of spades as well. The immediate object of the third hand, before thinking of anything else, should be to try to get rid of that ace of clubs before the spades can be established. He should at once lead the knave of clubs, so that, unless the king of clubs is also in the dealer's hands, the dummy hand is rendered absolutely powerless. If the dealer has everything, the situation is hopeless; but so long as that entry card remains in dummy there is always the danger of the long spade suit being brought in after the dealer has exhausted the trumps; therefore the entry card should be got rid of at any cost.

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

When his partner has doubled an original suit declaration made by the dealer, the third player should always lead his highest trump directly he gets it. If it should happen that he has an ace, king suit, and a second trump, he may lead the king first, so as to show his partner how to put him in again, and then his best trump; but it is highly improbable that he will have such strength as this when his partner has doubled.

When his partner doubles a declaration made by the dummy, he must be guided as to his lead by the strength exposed on the table. When it is a spade call which has been doubled, it is nearly always right to lead his best trump, unless, of course, he is leading up to a tenace in dummy.

When the third player holds king and one other only of a plain suit, that is, of a suit other than trumps, the king followed by the small one is a fine lead, if neither the ace nor the queen is in dummy. It can do no possible harm, as the king is hopelessly dead if both the ace and queen are in the dealer's hand; and if his partner has the ace, or still better the ace and knave, it becomes

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

a very good lead, and will often enable the third player to make a small trump.

It should not be difficult for the third player, after the first card is led and the dummy exposed, to form a pretty accurate estimate of the chances of the hand, having the light of twenty-seven cards to guide him. There are certain obvious inferences that he can draw. If the dealer has not declared No Trumps, and there is only one ace apparent in his own hand and the dummy's, his partner has certainly got one ace, and very probably two, and that represents one or two certain tricks. Somebody must have strength in hearts, and if the dealer has declared diamonds or has passed the call, and neither the third player nor the dummy has much in the heart suit, his partner is marked with at least two honours in hearts. If the dealer discloses considerable strength in two suits, it can safely be assumed that he has little or nothing in either of the other two, otherwise he would have declared No Trumps.

The first consideration of the third player should be to determine whether his partner has led from strength or weakness. If the opening lead is ob-

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

viously from weakness, it must by no means be taken for granted that the original leader has nothing of value. On the contrary, he very probably has one or more guarded suits which he did not wish to open, but preferred to have led up to him. A slavish adherence to the rule of returning one's partner's lead is a fatal mistake against a suit declaration. The third player has an absolutely free hand to return his partner's lead, or not to do so, as he thinks fit.

One of the most common mistakes at Bridge, and a mistake which sometimes proves very expensive, is for the third player to be in too great a hurry to lead out an ace, because there is only one card of the suit in dummy.

If there is any chance of dummy's singleton being discarded on another suit, the ace should be led at once, or it may never make a trick at all, but when dummy has three or four cards of each of the other plain suits, there can be no possible chance of his being able to discard his singleton, and it will not melt away into thin air.

By leading out his ace, the third player not only

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

parts voluntarily with a certain card of re-entry, but he also runs a considerable risk of clearing the suit for his adversary, the dealer. A hand which afforded a striking illustration of this danger occurred quite recently at a London Bridge club.

The four hands were as follows:—

Hearts — Queen, 8.

Diamonds — Ace, queen.

Clubs — Queen, knave, 10, 5, 2.

Spades — King, 7, 4, 3.

Hearts — Knave, 6, 2.

Diamonds — 8, 5.

Clubs — King, 6, 4.

Spades — Queen,
knave, 10, 8, 2.

	Y	
A		B
	(dummy)	
	Z	

Hearts — Ace, king,
10, 9, 3.

Diamonds — Knave,
9, 7, 4.

Clubs — 9, 7, 3.

Spades — 6.

Hearts — 7, 5, 4.

Diamonds — King, 10, 6, 3, 2.

Clubs — Ace, 8.

Spades — Ace, 9, 5.

The score was one game all, and A B 12, Y Z 24. A dealt and left it to B, who declared hearts. Y led the queen of clubs, which Z won with the ace. Instead of returning the 8 of clubs, Z first led out

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

the ace of spades, saying, as he did so, "We will secure that trick while there is yet time." He did secure it, but by so doing he gave away two tricks and lost the game and rubber.

He then led the 8 of clubs, which he should have done at first, and the dealer won the trick with the king. The dealer could now see that there was a possibility of winning the game, if the queen of trumps was singly guarded, so he went boldly for it and it came off. He first led the queen of spades, which Y was obliged to cover with his king, then led out the ace and king of trumps from dummy, and, the queen falling, he was able to put his own hand in again with the knave of trumps, and to make three tricks in spades, thus winning three by cards, the game, and rubber.

If the ace of spades had not been led out, the utmost that the dealer could hope for, even at doubly dummy, would have been to win the odd trick, and even that was by no means a certainty. In this case there was not the remotest possibility of B being able to discard his single spade, as Y had shown the club suit, and Z him-

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

self had the diamonds, therefore there was no danger, and Z could stop the spade suit at any time.

The man who made this *faux pas* was no beginner at the game, but a player of many years' experience, who fancies himself and his own methods considerably, and is rather fond of laying down the law to others. When the hand was over and the game lost, he remarked that it was a most unlucky lead, but there was no element of luck about it at all. It was sheer bad play, and nothing else.

When the third player returns his partner's lead he should observe the old whist rule of returning the higher of two remaining, or the lowest of three, unless he has the best card of the suit, in which case he should always lead that. In the No Trump game it is sometimes advisable to give away one trick in a suit in the hope of being able to make two or three tricks later on, but this must never be done against a strong suit declaration, as there is too great a danger of one's winning cards being trumped on the second or third round, and of never making them at all. Every certain trick

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

is now of vital importance, and should be made sure of without loss of time. Nothing is more annoying than to go to bed, as it is called, with one or two winning cards, simply because one would not make them when one had the chance.

One of the most important, and at the same time one of the most difficult, points in the play at Bridge is to be able to extract the greatest value out of a hand against a strong suit declaration. There are many players who can be trusted to extract the full value out of the two hands when they have the deal, but the players who can defend a hand really well, especially against a suit declaration, are few and far between. This is where the best American players are so much in front of our best English players. They can defend a hand very much better. Against a No Trump call the play is easier, as the opening leads are clearly defined and well known, and the attack is usually continued on the opening lines, but against a suit declaration a great deal depends upon the intelligence of the third player. The leading principles for him to go upon are: to give his partner every opportunity of making a ruff, to force the strong

PLAY OF THIRD HAND AGAINST A SUIT

hand as often as possible, to lead through strength and up to weakness, and, above all, always to make sure of saving the game as early in the hand as he can, before he allows himself to think about subsequent possibilities.

CHAPTER XII

THE DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND

"SECOND hand plays low" is almost as good a maxim at Bridge as it was at whist, but the fact that the dummy hand is exposed at Bridge gives the second player rather more opportunity of exercising his intelligence than he had at whist, when the other three hands were all unknown quantities. The second hand is the hand which is led through, whether the lead comes from the dealer or from the dummy. In speaking of the second hand it must be understood that we are referring only to the play of the defenders, not to the play of the dealer when his opponents have the lead.

Always to cover an honour led, if he has less than four of the suit, is an excellent general principle for the second player, but he must be guided a little by the cards exposed in dummy. When the dealer leads the queen of a suit, up to ace and

DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND

others in dummy, and the second hand has king with one or two others, he should always cover the queen. He can gain nothing by passing, as the ace will not be put on the queen, and his only chance of winning a trick in the suit lies in his partner holding the knave or 10. Some players cannot bear to sacrifice a high card in such a position, and many a trick is given away by the second hand refusing to cover an honour. In a No Trump game, if the second hand holds king and three others, he should not cover a queen led, when ace and two others are in dummy, as it is obvious that his king must become good on the fourth round, but against a suit declaration there is no fourth round, and the second player should always play his king on a queen led, however many he has. If he has four or five of the suit, and the dummy has three, either the dealer or his partner must be short in it, and the queen is very possibly a single card.

Holding king, queen, and one other, or queen, knave, and one other, the second hand should always "split his honours" and play one of them when a small card is led. It is one of the many positions at Bridge when he can lose nothing by so

DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND

doing, and may gain. If the ace is over his king and queen suit, the most that he can do is to win one trick in the suit, unless his partner holds the knave, in which case there is nothing lost by his putting on the queen second in hand.

When the dealer leads a knave up to ace, 10, and others in dummy, or a 10 up to ace, knave, and others, and the second hand has king or queen guarded, he should always cover with his high card. His partner is practically marked with the other honour, and will be able to win the first trick if the second hand passes it; but the remaining honour will then be hopelessly boxed in, and the only chance of winning two tricks in the suit is for his partner to hold the 9 in addition to his king or queen.

When the dealer leads up to ace, queen, 10 in dummy, or when he leads the 10 up to ace, queen and others, and the second hand holds king, knave and another, he should play the king and not the knave on the first round. If he plays the knave the dummy will win it with the queen, and the situation will be quite clear to the dealer, whereas if the second hand puts on the king, the ace will

DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND

have to take it and the dealer will be very liable to place the knave in the other hand. Just as it is desirable at all times to give information to one's partner, so it is equally undesirable to give unnecessary information to one's opponents, and this is just one of the occasions when it is possible to deceive an opponent without doing any harm to one's partner.

When the whole strength in a suit is marked against him it is useless for the second hand to cover an honour led. Thus, suppose the dealer leads the knave of a suit, of which the second hand holds king and two others, and the dummy has ace, queen, 10 to five, the second player can gain nothing by covering the knave, as, if the dealer has another one to lead, the fourth player can have only three, and every card in the suit is good against him; therefore he should pass the knave and pray that the dealer may not have another one to lead. Holding king and one other only, with the ace, queen, knave lying over him in dummy, the second hand should not play the king when the suit is first led through him, and then say that it did not matter as his king was dead

DEFENDER'S PLAY AS SECOND HAND

in any case. He must remember that the dealer is not to know that the king is singly guarded, and he will have to use an entry card to put his own hand in again in order to lead the suit a second time, and every entry card taken out of the dealer's hand is a distinct gain.

When the second hand, playing before dummy, can win the trick cheaply, as against dummy, he should always do so, in order to protect his partner's hand, but he should never put on an ace, second in hand, whatever is in dummy, unless it is very important for him to get the lead. A common instance of this is when the dealer leads a small card up to king, knave, and others in dummy, and the second hand has ace with one or two small ones. Unless one trick will save the game, or unless he particularly wants the lead, he should not put on his ace but should play a small one, so as to give his partner a chance of making the queen if the dealer finesses the king, knave. These are the general principles which should govern the play of the second hand.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DISCARD

WE now arrive at the rather vexed question of the correct discard. One of the most remarkable features in the history of the game of Bridge is the way in which this question has been magnified and exalted altogether out of its proper place, until it has assumed an importance which in no way rightly belongs to it. The probable explanation of this phenomenon is, that the subject is one which rather lends itself to theoretical vapourings, and there are certain writers on the game who are fond of arguing a question from every possible point of view, some of whom have published elaborate statistics as to what should be the correct discard under seven or eight differing conditions. Such statistics may possibly be interesting reading for people who have nothing else to do, but, as regards throwing any light on the

THE DISCARD

actual practice of the game, they are absolutely valueless and impossible. Then, again, some brilliant genius has evolved the idea of a "circular discard." This is an extraordinary contrivance by which a player is supposed to understand that, if his partner discards a diamond, he is strong in hearts, and that when he discards a heart he wants the spade suit led to him. We have no available information as to whether the game of Bridge is popular either at Colney Hatch or at Earlswood, but, if it is, we strongly recommend the "circular discard" to the serious attention of dwellers in those localities.

We do not say for a moment that the discard is of no importance in Bridge, but that it is a minor point, not to be compared in importance to several other points in the game, such as the original opening lead against a suit declaration, or the play of the third hand in a No Trump game. Occasionally the result of a hand will turn on information conveyed by a discard, but only very occasionally, and the experienced player attaches far less importance to the discard than the inexperienced player does, because he realises the fact

THE DISCARD

that it is often a forced one. For instance, holding queen, 5, 2 of clubs, and ace, 5, 2 of spades, it requires no great acumen, or scientific knowledge of Bridge, to see that the 2 of spades is a better discard than the 2 of clubs, but no inference can be drawn from this. The spade suit is undoubtedly the stronger of the two, but still the 2 of spades is the right discard, irrespective of any conventions. The real way to arrive at the meaning of a convention is to consider how it originated. Suppose that a player had to make two or three discards, simply on his own hand, with no knowledge of conventional methods of conveying information to his partner, what would he do? Would he not discard cards which could be of no possible use, either as trick-making factors in themselves or as guards to higher cards? Again, if great strength was declared against him, and he held one long suit which he could see no reasonable chance of bringing in, would he not throw away from that long suit in preference to unguarding a card of another suit, which might possibly save a trick at the finish, if it remained guarded? Hence arose the two conventions of

THE DISCARD

the discard from weakness and the discard from strength.

The principle was well illustrated by the remark of a level-headed north-country man who came out racing last year. One evening he was induced to make up a rubber of Bridge, and, when he was asked by his partner whether he discarded from strength or weakness, he replied, "I should be a dom'd fool to throw away my good cards when I had got bad ones, should n't I?" That was his natural way of looking at it, being entirely ignorant of any conventions on the subject. All these stereotyped conventions, from which so much information is supposed to be drawn, are really detrimental to the finer points of play. They are the refuge of the inefficient player, who is unable to draw his own conclusions.

The late Mr. Fred Lewis, one of the very finest whist players who ever lived, used to say that the introduction of the call for trumps robbed him of a great part of his scientific advantage in the play of the cards. Certainly, he had a marvellous, almost instinctive, knowledge of the right moment to lead trumps, but the so-called "peter" placed

THE DISCARD

any ordinary bungler, provided that he could see an obvious call for trumps, on the same level with himself, and thereby his advantage was to a great extent nullified. Precisely the same argument applies, only more strongly, to the discard at Bridge. The first-rate Bridge player is quite capable of gauging the possibilities of his partner's hand for himself, with the assistance of the exposed dummy, and of arriving at the signification of his partner's discards, but this puts the inferior player, who is not capable of so doing, at a manifest disadvantage; therefore, to protect the inferior player against superior skill, certain prearranged methods of play, called conventions, are agreed upon, with the result that many of the finer points of play are sacrificed thereby.

Having said so much about the general principle of the discard, we will proceed to discuss the two recognised systems, the discard from weakness, and the discard from strength — no other system is worth talking about.

There are two entirely different systems of discarding at Bridge — from weakness and from strength — and both systems apply equally to a

THE DISCARD

suit declaration and to the No Trump game. The discard from weakness means that a player's first discard is always from his weakest suit, and his second discard from the other suit, which he does not wish led to him, so that, by a simple process of deduction, his partner can arrive at a knowledge of what he does want.

The discard from strength is exactly the opposite. Under this system a player's first discard is always from the suit which he wishes led to him, so that the position is at once clearly defined. The system of the discard from weakness is not really a convention, or prearranged method of play; it simply resulted from the fact that a player would naturally discard cards which were of no use to him. It has obtained since the first introduction of Bridge into England, and it was universally adopted among English players until some four years ago, when the American system of discarding from strength was first introduced into this country.

This system, invented by American players, is an arbitrary convention, designed, like most other conventions, to render the game easier for the

THE DISCARD

unintelligent player. It is generally adopted in America, but not universally, some of the best players on the other side preferring our system of the discard from weakness. The proportion of American players who adopt the weak discard is about the same as the proportion of English players who adopt the other system at the present time.

Both systems have their advantages, and both have their disadvantages. The advantages of the strong discard over the weak one are (1) that only one discard instead of two is required to indicate a player's best suit, and (2) that the discard from the strong suit often enables a player to keep better guards in his weaker suits, which is sometimes of great importance. For instance, with such a hand as queen and two others in each of two suits, and king, queen to four or five in the third, the advocate of the weak discard is at a great disadvantage. He does not want to unguard either of his two queens, but if he discards from the third suit, he is at once giving false information to his partner. The disadvantages of the strong discard are also twofold: (1) a trick is

THE DISCARD

sometimes given away by discarding a card of the strong suit, which would eventually have won a trick if retained, and (2) the suit which a player wishes led to him may be one from which he cannot discard, except at a grave disadvantage, such a suit as ace, queen, knave only, or king, queen, 10 only, with the knave behind him. In either of these cases he, in his turn, is obliged to deceive his partner by discarding from a suit which he does not wish led.

A few weeks ago a letter appeared in the Bridge column of *Vanity Fair*, from an anonymous correspondent, throwing quite a new light upon the respective merits of the two systems. The writer advocated the discard from strength in preference to the discard from weakness, on the ground that, by discarding from strength, a player was able to indicate his best suit to his partner, leaving his opponent in doubt as to which was his weakest. On the other hand, the discard from weakness would at once inform his opponent which was his worst suit, but would leave his partner in doubt as to which was his best. This is a fresh view of the situation, which we have never heard of

THE DISCARD

before, and it seems to bear the brand of sound common sense, but it is not altogether convincing.

These are the two systems, with their respective advantages and disadvantages, and the balance of profit and loss appears fairly even between them. Probably the discard from strength is the stronger weapon of defence, especially in the No Trump game, but uniformity is the great object to aim at, and as the weak suit system is the established and general custom in England, it is better for English players to abide by that, rather than to complicate the game further. There are many good players in London who think that the discard from strength is the better of the two, but who do not adopt it, for the above reason, and the soundest advice that can be given to beginners is to follow the prevalent custom and to discard from the suits which they do not wish led to them. The matter is really of no great importance, as we have already said, but so much rubbish has been written about it that it is necessary to put the merits of both systems clearly before our readers.

We strongly caution inexperienced players against attaching too much importance to their

THE DISCARD

partner's discard. One sometimes hears a player say, after the hand is over, "I was obliged to lead you such and such a suit because you asked for it," when really he had a much better game of his own. Just as it is a fatal mistake to play entirely for one's own hand, so it is at times equally fatal to play entirely for one's partner's; a happy combination of the two hands is the object to strive for. Because a partner has indicated his best suit by his discard, it does not necessarily follow that he is very strong in that suit; it only shows that that suit is the best that he has, and it may be a very weak one. The strong player will not infrequently disregard his partner's discard altogether, either when he has a better game of his own or when he can see the saving of the game by playing differently. Much harm is often done, and many a game has been lost, by a slavish attention to a partner's discard. By all means watch his discard carefully, and lead him the indicated suit, if there is any doubt about what to lead, but do not run away with the idea that because your partner has discarded from two suits he is necessarily very strong in the third. The poor fellow has to discard

THE DISCARD

something, however impotent his hand may be, and the utmost that he can do for you is to show you where his greatest weakness lies; but that does not presuppose great or even moderate strength elsewhere.

The advocate of the weak suit discard is sometimes in a position to indicate his strong suit to his partner by the more simple process of discarding a high card from it. Thus, to take an extreme instance, holding ace, king, queen, knave, and others of a suit, he can safely discard the ace, without running any risk, and his partner will immediately place him with the entire command of that suit. Similarly, if he discards the king of a suit which has not been led, he is marked with queen, knave, and others, and so on. By a logical extension of this principle it has come to be understood that, whenever a player discards an unnecessarily high card, either against a suit declaration or in a No Trump game, he has considerable strength in that suit, and wishes it led to him. This is known as the "call for a suit," and it is a very useful convention, founded on the lines of the "peter," or call for trumps, at whist. Before making use of

THE DISCARD

this convention a player should be sure that he will have the opportunity of discarding twice, otherwise he may be deceiving his partner instead of giving him information. It has frequently happened that a player has commenced to call for a suit, but has not had the opportunity of completing his call before his partner has obtained the lead; and then, of course, instead of improving the situation, the attempted call will have upset it altogether, as the first discard, without the second one, will naturally be taken to indicate weakness instead of strength. For this reason, the first discard in a call should always be the highest card of the suit which can safely be spared, so that a clever partner may jump at the situation and understand that it is the beginning of a call, when a fairly high card, such as a 9 or a 10, is discarded. Supposing that a player wishes to call for a suit of which he holds ace, king, 10, 9, 5, 2, the 10, and not the 5, is the proper card to discard first, because the discard of the 5 would only indicate weakness, whereas the first discard of a 10 is something a little out of the common, and should at once set his partner thinking.

THE DISCARD

It is always bad to blank a suit altogether by discarding the last card of it, as the position will be at once disclosed on the first round, and the dealer can then place every card in that suit and finesse to any extent against the other partner. Also, it is bad play to unguard an ace, unless it can only be kept guarded at the expense of throwing away winning, or more useful cards.

The first discard should always be made with the object of giving information to one's partner. It is waste of an opportunity to discard from a suit which he knows one cannot want led. The following is an instance of this. The third player's hand is —

Hearts — Queen, 7, 6, 2.	Clubs — King, knave, 9, 3.
Diamonds — 8, 7.	Spades — 10, 7, 4.

The dummy, who has declared No Trumps, puts down —

Hearts — Ace, 10, 4.	Clubs — Ace, queen, 6.
Diamonds — Ace, king, queen, 9.	Spades — 9, 6, 3.

The leader opens with four winning spades, and the third hand has to discard on the fourth

THE DISCARD

round. His weak suit is diamonds, but the 7 of diamonds would be a very bad discard, as it would tell his partner nothing, and would leave him to guess between the other two suits. The proper discard is the 2 of hearts, so as to make it plain to his partner, who can see that the diamond suit is against them, that a club is the desired lead.

If a player discards a diamond in such a situation as this, it can only be taken to mean that it is immaterial to him which of the other two suits is led, and his partner must then play entirely for his own hand. Following out the same sequence of ideas, if the third player's hearts and clubs were of no value, he then ought to discard a diamond, so as to say to his partner, "You cannot help me by leading any suit; you must play for your own hand," and an intelligent partner would read it in that way, and would probably put the dummy in with a diamond so as to get his own hand led up to. This is an instance of what is meant by discarding with intelligence, as against discarding by fixed rule.

In the early stages of a hand the discard is fairly

THE DISCARD

simple, but towards the end of the hand, when there are only four or five cards left, it is often very difficult. As a general rule, a player should endeavour to keep a guard in the suit which his partner is discarding, and should not hesitate to unguard the suit which his partner is keeping, so as to divide the defence between the two hands. The dealer will lead out any winning cards which he has, so as to force discards from his opponents, and their aim must be to give him as little information as possible, and no inference can be drawn from these forced discards.

The state of the score affects the discard at the end of a hand very strongly. When a player can see that the game is lost unless a certain card is in his partner's hand, he should discard as though that card were marked there, and not think of keeping guards which might possibly save a trick but could not save the game. It is more than useless to throw away a possible winning card in order to keep the queen of another suit doubly guarded, when the game is obviously lost unless one's partner holds the ace or king of it, yet it is

THE DISCARD

constantly done, and then the offending player will say, "The game could have been saved, but I did not dare to unguard my queen." It was the only possible chance, but how often is that one chance missed.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

THE methods employed by the dealer in playing his cards should be quite different from those employed by his opponents. There is now no question of giving information to a partner; there are no conventional methods of play to be observed, no signals to be given or watched for, and no obligation to play the cards in any particular order. The dealer has an entirely free hand, unfettered by any conventions, and, so far from giving information, it should be his object to withhold it by every means in his power, and to deceive his opponents by playing false cards, or by any other artifice which may suggest itself to him. No formulated rules of play can be laid down for his guidance. All that can be done is to give a few hints, the result of long practice and experience, which may possibly be of use to the inexperienced player, by showing him how the strength of the

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

two hands which are temporarily under his charge can be combined to the greatest advantage. These hints can be better illustrated by examples than by explanations, therefore we propose to quote a few hands, and to play them out, card by card, giving the reasons for the methods of play adopted.

The first and most important point is to study carefully the two hands, directly the dummy is exposed, to note where they will combine to advantage and where the principal danger lies, and then and there to form a definite plan of campaign, either offensive or defensive, as the case may be. As soon as the first card is led, the dummy hand is exposed on the table, and if the dealer cannot form a fairly correct estimate of the probable result of the hand when he has twenty-seven cards to guide him, and has the manipulation of twenty-six of them, he ought not to play Bridge at all.

The dealer should always make this mental estimate at the beginning of every hand, whether there is a trump suit or whether there are No Trumps. It will be of the greatest use to him as a guide to his subsequent proceedings. He should first make a note in his own mind of how many

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

tricks he is bound to lose, and of how many more he may lose if the cards lie adversely for him, and then he will be able to realise the possibilities of the hand, given an ordinary distribution of the cards. If the cards are very unevenly divided, he will probably have to remodel his plan of campaign, or to abandon it altogether and form another, but the great point is that he should always have some definite plan in his head, and not drift on aimlessly, trusting to chance for something to turn up in his favour.

He should never be in a hurry to play from dummy's hand to the first trick, nor should he allow himself to be hustled by an irritable opponent saying, "Surely there cannot be any doubt which of those two cards to play." That is not the point. The dealer is not considering which of dummy's cards he shall play, but he is reviewing his forces, and forming his plan of campaign, and he is quite entitled to keep the game waiting for a few moments for that purpose.

The result of a No Trump game generally depends a great deal upon the suit originally opened. The exact value of the card led should be carefully

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

noted by the dealer and remembered. When the lowest card of a suit is led, the leader is marked with four exactly, but when a medium card, such as six or seven, is led, the lead is probably from five or more, and a fairly accurate opinion can be formed as to how many of that suit the leader's partner is likely to have. Also, the Eleven Rule can be applied by the dealer quite as well as by his opponents. The value of the card originally led will sometimes show him, thanks to the Eleven Rule, how he can win a trick cheaply in the dummy hand. For instance, an 8 is led, the dealer holds king and one other, and the dummy puts down ace, 10, and a small one. The 10 is a certain winning card, if it is played on the first round, and the dealer will win three tricks in the suit, whereas, if he passes the 8 and wins the first trick with the king, he will only win two. If a smaller card than the 8 were led, the 10 must not be played on the first round, in the hope that the third hand will play either the queen or the knave, leaving the major tenace in dummy.

When the dealer has good protection in the suit originally opened, that is, when he can stop it

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

twice, he is in a fine position to play boldly for a big game and to take doubtful finesses, but when it can only be stopped once there is considerable danger, and the dealer should hold up his one winning card as long as possible, until the original leader's partner is exhausted. When the dealer and his dummy are both very weak in the original suit, he must at once resign himself to lose four or five tricks in it, and he should then ask himself what the opponent's next lead is likely to be, after their own suit is finished, and should discard and regulate his game accordingly.

The following hand is a good illustration of the importance of forming a definite plan of campaign before playing to the first trick.

A B are partners against Y Z. Score, love all. A deals and declares No Trumps.

A's hand.	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — Ace, 3, 2.	Hearts — Queen, knave, 9.
Diamonds — Ace, 10, 6, 3.	Diamonds — Knave, 2.
Clubs — Queen, 5.	Clubs — King, knave, 10, 9, 4.
Spades — Ace, king, 5, 4.	Spades — 8, 7, 3.

Y leads the 6 of hearts. A at once reviews the situation, and can see a certainty of winning the

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

game, if he can bring in B's club suit; but to do this B must have a card of re-entry, as the adverse ace of clubs is certain to be held up until the second or third round. The only suit in which B can have a re-entry card is hearts, and then only if A's ace is played on the first round; therefore the 9, not the knave, should be played from B's hand, and the trick must be won with the ace, whether Z is able to beat the 9 or not. A then leads the queen of clubs followed by the 5 and the club suit is established, and B has a certain re-entry card in hearts to bring the clubs in with. If A does not part with his ace of hearts on the first trick, he will never be able to put B's hand in again, as the next two tricks in hearts will be won by the ace and king. This is quite a simple instance, but it is an opportunity which might easily be missed, if the dealer played too quickly and allowed his partner's knave or 9 to win the first trick.

Our next example is taken from the Illustrative Games in "Bridge Abridged."

Score, love all. A deals and declares No Trumps.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

A's hand.	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — 9, 4, 3.	Hearts — Ace, queen, 8, 5, 2.
Diamonds — King, 5.	Diamonds — 9, 6.
Clubs — Ace, king, queen, knave, 6, 5.	Clubs — 10, 3.
Spades — King, 2.	Spades — Knave, 9, 7, 6.

Y leads the 6 of hearts. A can see an absolute certainty of winning the odd trick and a strong probability of winning the game by putting the ace of hearts on at once. Z is marked with one heart, and one only, and that one is either the king, knave, or 10, as Y would have led an honour if he had held all three. A can make the ace of hearts and six clubs, which will give him the odd trick, and he will then put Y in with a heart and force him to lead up to one of his two guarded kings, and he will make one of his kings and at least one other heart, giving him the game. This hand occurred in actual play, and the dealer finessed the queen of hearts, found the king single over him, and lost two by cards instead of winning the game.

This disaster no doubt occurred through the dealer playing to the first trick too quickly, and taking the ordinary ace, queen finesse, without

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

giving himself time to study the possibilities of the two hands.

We will now take an instance of a plan of campaign with a suit declaration.

Score, love all. A deals and declares hearts.

A's hand.	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — Ace, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2.	Hearts — King, 3.
Diamonds — Queen, 4.	Diamonds — Ace, knave, 7, 3, 2.
Clubs — King, queen, 10, 3.	Clubs — Knave, 6, 5.
Spades — 6.	Spades — Queen, knave, 2.

Y leads ace of spades. A's review of the hands tells him that he must lose one trick in hearts (trumps), one in clubs, and one in spades, and there was a chance of losing one in diamonds if the king is in Z's hand; but Y's lead of the ace of spades has helped the dealer very much, and he can now see his way to the game. Y's next lead is a small diamond. A must on no account finesse, but must put on the ace at once, and lead the queen of spades. The king is marked in Z's hand and will be put on, A trumps it, then leads out his ace and another trump, putting B in, leads the knave of spades and discards his queen of diamonds, and the game is won, unless there are four trumps in

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

one hand, in which case it could never have been won.

Very simple — too simple, possibly some of our readers may say — but the opportunities for playing brilliant coups are few and far between, whereas the opportunity of making the most out of a hand is always there. It is not playing coups, it is never missing one of these simple opportunities that constitutes the first-class and successful Bridge player.

The first consideration of the dealer, after he has formed his plan of campaign, should be to block the suit originally opened by holding up a winning card of it, if possible, until the third hand is exhausted. Even when the dealer has two winning cards in the suit opened, it is generally the best policy to give away the first trick, unless he can see a certainty of winning the game, or unless there is imminent danger in the opening of a fresh suit by his opponents.

For example, suppose the dealer holds ace and two small ones, and the dummy puts down king and one small one, he should allow the third hand to win the first trick. The suit is certain to be re-

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

turned, and it is now effectually blocked, especially if, as is more than probable, the original lead was from a five-card suit. Most players will hold up one winning card, in order to block the suit originally led, but it does not seem to occur to them that it is better still to hold up two.

An excellent general rule for the guidance of the dealer is to go at once for the suit of which he has the greatest number in the two hands combined, but, given two suits of nearly equal length, he should always go first for the one in which dummy holds the strength, for the obvious reason that the opponents, seeing dummy's cards, are certain to keep any guards that they have in his strong suit, whereas they may discard from the dealer's long suit, which is not exposed, and by so doing make the establishment of it much more easy.

The dealer should play false cards from his own hand whenever he can, but he must do so with intelligence, otherwise he gives away information instead of withholding it. "Badsworth" very rightly says that some players seem to borrow their tactics from the ostrich, which believes that it can escape observation by burying its head in the sand.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

As an instance of this, he quotes the common error of a player, who holds ace and king of a suit of which the queen is led, winning the first trick with the ace instead of the king, under the impression that he is deceiving his adversaries. On the contrary, by so doing he tells the third player, as plainly as if he had shown him the card, that he holds the king in addition, as nobody would lead the queen from a suit headed by king, queen, whereas the lead of the queen is often from ace, queen, knave, and, when there is any chance of that combination, it is obligatory on the third hand to return the lead at once. It may be rather a revelation to some players to learn that the value of false-carding by the dealer is greater with small cards than with high ones. When playing family Bridge, against opponents who do not notice whether the dealer plays a 7 or a 2, as long as he does not win the trick, such refinements are altogether wasted; but, in these advanced times, the best players pay very careful attention to the fall of the low cards and draw deductions therefrom, and it should be the business of the dealer to cloud their conversation as much as possible — to quote

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

“Badsworth” again — by playing his small cards as much out of order as he can.

A ruse, which has often been brought off with success, is for the dealer to open a suit, directly he gets in, in which he is entirely undefended, with the object of keeping his opponents off it. It must be done at once, without a moment's hesitation, and even then experienced players will often see through it, but sometimes it is the only chance of winning a game. The following case, which occurred in actual play, is a good example of this. The third game of the rubber. Score, A B love, Y Z 24. A dealt and left it to B, who declared No Trumps.

A's hand.	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — 7, 3.	Hearts — Ace, queen, knave, 2.
Diamonds — King, 9, 6, 4.	Diamonds — Ace, 8, 5, 3.
Clubs — 8, 3.	Clubs — Knave, 10, 4.
Spades — Queen, knave, 10, 8, 2.	Spades — King, 5.

Y led the 6 of hearts. A reviewed the situation, and saw at once that, presuming the king of hearts to be in Y's hand, which it was, he must still lose the ace of spades and at least four clubs, so that the game could not be won, if once his opponents led the club suit, which they were certain to do

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

under ordinary circumstances. He won the first trick with the knave of hearts, and then, without hesitating a moment, led the knave of clubs from B's hand. The opponents' hands were: —

Y's hand.	Z's hand.
Hearts — King, 10, 9, 6, 4.	Hearts — 8, 5.
Diamonds — Knave, 7, 2.	Diamonds — Queen, 10.
Clubs — King, queen, 7.	Clubs — Ace, 9, 6, 5, 2.
Spades — 4, 3.	Spades — Ace, 9, 7, 6.

Z passed the knave of clubs, and Y played a silly false card, winning the trick with the king, thereby marking the queen, from his partner's point of view, in A's hand. Y then led the 4 of spades, B's king was put on, and Z won with the ace and returned the 6, and then the trouble began. A made his four remaining spades, discarding two diamonds and one club from B's hand. Y had also to make three discards. He was obliged to keep three hearts, so he discarded two diamonds and one heart, and A B won five by cards, instead of winning the odd trick only, as must have happened if A had attempted to clear his spade suit at trick 2, instead of taking the one chance that there was of winning the game.


The following is yet another illustration of the value of a carefully thought out plan of campaign

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

on the part of the dealer. Score, one game all; A B 6, Y Z 24. A deals and leaves it to B, who declares No Trumps.

A's hand.	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — Ace, 7, 5.	Hearts — King, knave, 4, 2.
Diamonds — Queen, 8, 3.	Diamonds — Knave, 6, 2.
Clubs — Knave, 6, 4.	Clubs — King, 7.
Spades — Queen, 7, 6, 3.	Spades — Ace, king, 10, 4.


Y leads 3 of hearts. A B require eight tricks to win the game. A can see a practical certainty of four tricks in spades, a certainty (provided he plays correctly) of three in hearts, and one in either diamonds or clubs, if either of these suits is opened by his adversaries — which adversary is immaterial. Therefore A's object is to induce his opponents to lead one of those suits.



THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

TRICK 1. — A might hold up the ace, but it is quite possible that Z may have ace and queen of clubs, in which case he would return the heart at once, in order to put his partner in to lead the clubs through B's king, and A would have to win the trick and would thus defeat his own object.

TRICK 2. — A must on no account finesse the knave from B's hand. He knows that Z has one heart only remaining, but that one may be the queen. By giving away the second trick he makes an absolute certainty of winning three tricks in the suit, however the cards lie, and his opponents are almost certain to branch to another suit.



TRICK 4. — Y's lead is the best chance of saving the game. Z must have both the ace of dia-

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

monds and the ace of clubs in order to do so, and he may have either the queen of diamonds or the knave of clubs in addition. If he has ace and queen of diamonds nothing is lost by putting him in with a club, but if he has ace, knave of clubs and not the queen of diamonds, the return of the diamond would lose the game. A now leads a heart, and makes two tricks in hearts and four in spades, and wins two by cards, and the game and rubber.

Y's hand.	Z's hand.
Hearts — 9, 8, 6, 3.	Hearts — Queen, 10.
Diamonds — King, 5, 4.	Diamonds — Ace, 10, 9, 7.
Clubs — Queen, 5, 2.	Clubs — Ace, 10, 9, 8, 3.
Spades — Knave, 9, 5.	Spades — 8, 2.

In a previous chapter we expatiated on the disadvantage of opening fresh suits in a No Trump game, and the above hand is a strong instance of this. If Y Z had gone on with their original heart suit, they would not have lost the game as the cards happened to lie.

It is worth remarking that the dealer has an absolute certainty of one trick in any suit of which he holds the king in one hand and the knave in the other, provided that one of the honours, no

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

matter which, is doubly guarded, and that the suit is opened by one of the adversaries. It is a common error for the king, singly guarded, to be put on second hand on the original lead when the dealer himself holds knave and two others. "The queen might be in the third hand," says the novice, "and would win the trick." No matter if it is; the knave is still good, after the king has fallen to the ace. It is easy to see that if the ace is in the third hand and the queen with the original leader, every trick in the suit will be lost by putting on the king second hand. Again, with the queen and two others in dummy, and ace and two others in the dealer's hand, it is a great mistake to put up the queen, second hand, on a small card led. Let the first trick come up to the ace, and the queen remains good, if the king is with the original leader. If the third hand holds the king, it may have to be put on the first round, and the ace will take it, or, even if the third hand is able to finesse, he cannot return the suit, when he gets in, without making dummy's queen good. If the queen, singly guarded, is in dummy, it must be put on at once, otherwise it is very unlikely to win a

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

trick, but if it is doubly guarded, it should only be put up second hand when it is of vital importance to secure two tricks in that suit at once. A similar error, also not uncommon, is to lead a queen from one hand up to an ace in the other, without the knave behind it. In these advanced days no decent Bridge player will hesitate to play his king on a queen led, and when the king has been slain by the ace, the knave remains good. With ace in one hand and queen in the other, the only chance of winning two tricks in the suit is to lead a small one from the hand containing the ace, in the hope of finding the king on the right side of the queen, that is to say, behind her.

Cards of re-entry are very important factors in the success or failure of a No Trump hand. In most No Trump games the weak hand will have one or, at most, two cards of entry, and the result of the game will often depend upon the judicious use made of those cards. This is a point which should be carefully considered at the beginning of the hand. Nothing is more annoying than to have established a suit and then to find that you have left yourself, owing to a want of foresight

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

at the commencement of the hand, with no card to bring it in with. The first, and even the second trick, must sometimes be given away in order to ensure the ultimate bringing in of a long suit. The commonest form of this is when the weak hand holds ace, king, to five of a suit, and there are two small ones only in the other hand. In this case it is absolutely necessary to allow the opponents to win the first trick, so that the weak hand can be put in again to make the remaining four tricks in the suit, if the cards lie evenly. When the weak hand has only one card of entry, the greatest care must be exercised to make the best use of that one entry.

It is useless to lead up to an ace, queen, knave tenace, when you can never get in again to repeat the performance. If the finesse succeeds you are no better off, as the lead will have to be continued from the strong hand and the adverse king will still make, unless it was originally singly guarded. In such a case it is much better to lead up to a king, knave suit, or to a suit headed by the king, on the chance of finding the ace on the right of the king. If you have to lead yourself from a

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

suit headed by the king, with nothing of value in dummy, there is no earthly chance of making your king good, whereas if you lead the suit from dummy, it is an even chance whether the ace is on your right or on your left. Another case is when you have a suit of queen, knave, 10, and others in dummy, and ace and one other in your own hand. It is a bad mistake to lead the queen from dummy and take the finesse; it can only result in blocking your own suit, whichever side the king is. Lead a small one from dummy and put on the ace, then return your small one and the suit is cleared. You should never mind giving away one trick, when it is a certain gain of two or more tricks by so doing. Supposing dummy has declared No Trumps, with three suits well protected and only one or two small cards in the fourth suit. You, as dealer, have ace, queen, and three others of the weak suit, and no card of entry. You should never touch that suit. Do not be tempted to lead it from dummy and finesse the ace and queen. Keep off it altogether — your opponents are sure to lead it when they see that the other three suits are protected by dummy's

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

hand, and you will then win two or three tricks in it.

A very useful feature in a No Trump game is four of the same suit, headed by high cards, in each hand. It has many advantages. Say that the cards are

Dealer's hand — Ace, 8, 6, 2.

Dummy hand — King, queen, 7, 4.

Here you have four practically certain tricks in the suit, and in addition to this, you have two certain cards of entry in either hand, to enable you to lead up to any strength that there may be in other suits. Also, if you have to make discards, you can discard twice from either hand without any chance of sacrificing a trick.

When opening a suit of which you have two high honours in one hand and one in the other, you should always play or lead an honour on the first round from the hand which has two, so as to guard against a possible unequal distribution of the cards. Take the following combination, for instance: —

Dealer's hand — King, queen, 9, 7, 4.

Dummy hand — Ace, 10, 5, 3.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

If the dealer leads a small one from his own hand, or leads the ace from dummy, he may find four to the knave over him, and he must lose a trick in the suit, whereas if he leads the king or queen from his own hand, he must win every trick in it against any possible combination of the cards. It should be always borne in mind that any combination of the cards, however improbable, is possible, and it should be the business of the dealer to guard himself against these improbable combinations — not to say afterwards, when his own want of forethought has brought about disaster: “How very unlucky! Who could have expected the cards to lie like that?”

As a general rule, the formation of the hands in each deal is very much the same. When the dealer and his dummy have level hands, that is to say, not more than four cards in any one suit, it is fairly safe to conclude that the formation of the opponents' hands will be the same; but when the hands of the dealer and his dummy are broken up into long and short suits, then let him look out for danger. It is almost a certainty that his op-

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

ponents' hands will be formed on the same lines, and he must prepare himself for a very uneven distribution of the cards, and must take no risks whatever.

A correspondent signing himself "Onlooker" challenged the accuracy of this deduction. He wrote: "If the number in any suit from both hands combined were much less than, or much in excess of, the average (which is between six and seven) then this irregularity would occur in the other hands. But if, for instance, the dealer had one of a suit and the dummy five or six, there is no reason why the other hands should be affected in the least." From a mathematical point of view he is quite right — there is no reason whatever. If the twenty-six cards belonging to the opponents were taken aside, thoroughly shuffled, and dealt into two packets, there would be no reason, mathematical or otherwise, why the distribution of the suits should not be quite normal. But the cards are not treated in this manner. The four hands are dealt out at the same time, from the same shuffle, and, when the suits are very unevenly divided in two of the four hands, even though the

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

combined number in those two may be about the average, both the doctrine of probabilities and experience of the game teach us to expect an uneven distribution in the other two hands. This is a well-known fact, and the methods employed by any of our best players in dealing with a much broken No Trump hand will be found to be very different from the methods they will employ in playing a level, evenly divided hand.

We often hear it said, "What an extraordinary combination of the cards!" when a hand is very unevenly divided, but the only extraordinary thing about it is that the cards have been unusually well shuffled. The reason that the hands are generally fairly even is that the cards have been picked up in tricks, after the last deal, and have not been thoroughly shuffled. If it were possible to have a shuffling machine, so that no two cards were left together as they have been played, any combination of the cards would be just as probable as any other. A player would be every bit as likely to pick up thirteen hearts as any other named combination. The number of combinations of fifty-two things, taken thirteen at a time, is

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

635,013,559,600, so that the odds against any given combination, whether it is thirteen hearts, or thirteen spades, or any thirteen named cards of mixed suits, is 635,013,559,599 to 1. The distribution of the cards among the four hands is simply a question of shuffling, nothing more.

In the old days of whist it used to be said that there were hundreds of men wandering about the Continent in a state of impecuniosity, because they would not lead trumps with five in their hand. The same argument applies to the policy of the dealer at Bridge. When either the dealer or the dummy has made an attacking suit declaration and the dealer sees that he has a majority of the trumps in his two hands combined, it is always right to have at least two rounds out, unless the weak hand has a short suit in which a trick or two can at once be made by ruffing.

The dealer should form his plan of campaign in a trump game just the same as in a No Trump game, before he plays a card. It is true that he knows nothing about the disposition of the other trumps, but if there has been no double, he is justified in concluding that they will lie fairly

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

evenly, and one round, or at most two, will show him how the opponents' trumps are placed. One of the commonest and worst faults of the Bridge neophyte is that he will not have two rounds of trumps when he holds five in his own hand and three in his dummy, leaving only five altogether against him. He will say, "I did not see any object in getting the trumps out, as I had no suit established." He does not recognise that two rounds of trumps will exhaust his opponents' small ones, and effectually prevent their making a ruff, while his own small ones will still remain to stop his adversaries' long suit. It is a fatal mistake to be in a hurry to make a small trump by ruffing when you hold, say ace, king, and three others. Those small trumps are bound to win tricks sooner or later, especially if you lead out the ace and king, and take four trumps away from your opponents. Just as it is the policy of the defenders to force the strong trump hand as often and as soon as they can, so it should be the policy of the dealer to husband his small trumps as much as possible, knowing that they will come in very useful towards the end of the hand.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

It is, naturally, better for the dealer that his opponents should lead trumps rather than that he should lead them, but as a general rule the opponents will not do so; sometimes, however, when there is a short suit in dummy, the dealer can induce his opponents to open trumps by leading the short suit from dummy. Suppose the dealer has declared hearts on king, knave, 10, 5, 4, and ace, queen, knave, and another club. The dummy puts down two small trumps and only one club. The dealer should get the lead in dummy's hand as soon as possible and lead the single club, playing his queen on it. If the fourth hand holds the king of clubs, he will win the trick and he is then very likely to dash out ace and another trump so as to prevent the dummy from ruffing a club, and this will be exactly what the dealer wants, as his king, knave, 10 of trumps will be led up to. If the queen of clubs wins, the dealer must not lead out the ace, but must lead a small one and ruff it in dummy, and then lead a trump up to his tenace, keeping the ace, knave of clubs still over the king.

The exception to leading trumps at once, with great strength in them, is when the weak hand has

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

a long unestablished suit with no card of entry except in trumps. Say that the dealer has declared hearts on ace, queen, knave, and two others, and dummy holds king and two other hearts, and king, queen, knave to five diamonds, of which suit the dealer has only one. In this case the diamond suit must be cleared first, and then, when the ace is gone, the dealer can lead out the ace and queen of trumps as soon as he gets in again, and put the dummy in with the king of trumps to make his diamonds.

When there is strength in trumps in both the dealer's hand and the dummy, a very important consideration is in which hand the lead will be wanted when the opponents' trumps are exhausted. The following hand was a typical instance of this: —

Dealer's hand.	Dummy's hand.
Hearts — Ace, knave, 10, 9, 8, 2.	Hearts — King, 6, 5, 3.
Diamonds — 4.	Diamonds — 9, 8, 5.
Clubs — 9, 8, 6.	Clubs — 10, 7, 4.
Spades — Ace, queen, knave.	Spades — 7, 6, 2.

The dealer was already 8 up, and he naturally declared hearts. The king of diamonds was led, followed by the queen. The dealer ruffed the

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

second diamond with his 2, led out the ace and another trump, winning the second round with dummy's king, and then led a small spade and took the finesse, which came off all right, but he could not put dummy in again to lead a second spade, and he had to lose three tricks in clubs and one in spades, and so missed the game. When it was over, he said, "It was bad luck not being able to put dummy in again to lead the spade through," but it was his own bad play. It was really so simple. He had only to ruff the diamond with the 8 instead of the 2 in order to make certain of being able to put dummy in twice in the trump suit, and this he ought to have seen from the beginning. Again and again does the winning or losing at Bridge turn on these little points of play.

A by no means uncommon occurrence, which all Bridge players will be familiar with, is when the dealer, either in a No Trump game or in a declared trump suit, has ten cards of the suit in his two hands combined, and is in doubt whether to finesse or to go for the drop of the king. One well-known writer on the game has laid it down

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

that it is always best to go for the drop, but he misses a very fine point in the situation. The dealer should note carefully the card played by the second hand, and should judge from the value of that card whether to finesse or not.

Say that the dealer has declared diamonds on queen, knave, 10, 7, 6, 2, and his dummy puts down ace, 8, 5, 3. He leads the queen from his own hand, and, if the king is not put on second hand, it is a very moot point whether he should finesse or whether he should try to catch the king. Let him first make sure of the exact value of the three cards which are against him. In this particular case they are the king, 9, and 4. If the second hand plays the 4, the position is no clearer, and the best policy is to put on the ace and to play for the drop, but if the second hand plays the 9, the finesse is obligatory. The 4 is now marked with the fourth player, so that there is no chance whatever of catching the king, and the only possibility of winning every trick in the suit is to find the king, as well as the 9, in the second player's hand. This is a nice point, which is very often missed. The dealer will say, "I thought

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

the best chance was to go for the drop," when he ought to have known, from the fall of the small cards, that there was no earthly chance of dropping the king. Of course, there is a remote possibility that the second player may have played a false card, but this possibility is very remote. Certain extra fine players have been known to recognise this particular combination and to play a false card, such as the 9 instead of the 4, holding only the two, with the object of inducing the dealer to finesse, but this is a refinement of play which we need not consider. The ordinary Bridge player never dreams of playing a false card with low cards. He will occasionally do so with high cards, generally with disastrous results, but the idea of playing a false low card which may deceive his adversary, but cannot hurt his partner, never enters into his head. The low card which he plays first can always be depended upon to be absolutely his lowest.

We have now nearly exhausted the hints that can be given for the guidance of the dealer in managing the two hands which are under his charge. They are little more than hints, because

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

each hand is so different, and the best methods to be employed vary so widely according to the placing of the cards, that it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules for the dealer to observe. As these hints, such as they are, have been spread over several articles, it will be well to summarise them before going any further.

Let us first consider the No Trump hands. When the dealer, or his dummy, has declared No Trumps, a great deal depends upon the suit originally opened, and upon the value of the card led. Is there any Bridge player who has not experienced a feeling of relief, when he has made a No Trump, possibly a rather light one, and he is not at once attacked in his weak suit? *A propos* of this point, one often hears a player say, when a No Trump has gone wrong, "It was bad luck being attacked in that suit," but what did he expect? One's adversaries are not in the habit of opening one's best suit, and when the dealer has declared No Trumps, with pronounced weakness in one suit, he must be quite prepared for that suit being opened originally. It is more than possible, it is probable. There is no bad luck

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

about it, it is quite a natural probability, and it is a contingency for which he should be thoroughly prepared.

Directly the first card is led, before playing a card from dummy, the dealer should spend a few moments considering his two hands, observing where they will dovetail, how they will combine with each other, how many tricks he can be certain of winning, and in which suit his principal danger lies, and he should, then and there, form a definite plan of campaign, offensive or defensive, as the case may be. That is the main point to be remembered, to form a definite plan of campaign and to stick to it, unless the placing of the cards forces him to alter it. At least half the mistakes which are made by the dealer in playing a No Trump are made by playing too quickly to the first trick, before he has properly realised the capabilities of the two hands.

He should note carefully the exact value of the card originally led, and should apply the Eleven Rule to it, so as to be able to form an estimate as to how the cards in that suit are divided. If he has a master card of it, he should not be in a hurry

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

to stop the suit, unless he is so strong that there is a chance of small or grand slam, but should rather allow the suit to be continued until the third player is exhausted and has no card of it left to return to his partner, then he can finesse to any extent in other suits against the original leader, knowing that the third hand will have to open a fresh suit when he gets in. Even with king and one small one in dummy, and ace and two small ones in his own hand, it is generally wise for the dealer to give away the first trick so as effectually to block the suit.

When the dealer can only stop the suit originally opened once, the game is very different from when he can stop it twice, or even more. In the latter case he can afford to take a doubtful finesse and to go for a big game, but in the former case he must go at once for his own strong suit, and try to win the game, or to get as near to it as possible, before the opponents have a chance of bringing in their suit.

As a general rule, the dealer should go at once for the suit in which he has the greatest numerical strength in his two hands combined, being careful

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

to lead as often as possible from weakness up to strength, so as to utilise any possible finesses, and he should finesse against the third player rather than against the first player, for the reason that the first player, being marked with four or five of the suit originally opened, is less likely to hold strength in other suits. A frequent combination, familiar to all Bridge players, is when the dealer holds ace, knave, 10, and others of a suit, and the dummy has king and two small ones. In this case the dealer should lead the knave from his own hand, and, if the queen is not put on second hand, he should win the trick with dummy's king and take the finesse the other way. Occasionally, with this lead, the second hand will hesitate for some time, obviously whether to cover the knave or not, and will not do so; when this occurs, the dealer is perfectly entitled to take advantage of the information vouchsafed to him, and to finesse the knave, although he had not intended to do so. It is utterly opposed to the etiquette of Bridge to take any advantage of information that one's partner may give one, however unintentionally such information may have been given, but there

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

is no reason why even the most scrupulous of Bridge players should not take every advantage of information given by an adversary, whether it is given by obvious hesitation, or by injudicious remarks, or in any other of the many ways in which it is, at times, volunteered. There are players who have pronounced mannerisms at the Bridge table, and to act on information derived from such mannerisms on the part of a partner amounts almost to dishonesty, but to refuse to make use of information derived from an opponent's mannerisms amounts quite to Quixotism.

The strongest weapon which the dealer possesses in a No Trump game is his power of making a long suit good by finessing, or by giving away the first trick in it. When he holds ace, king, and three others of a suit in one hand, and two small ones in the other, he should lead a small one from either hand and allow his opponents to win the trick. When he gets in again, in either hand, he will make four tricks in that suit if the cards lie evenly. This is very elementary, but some players are very loth to give

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

away a certain trick, even with the prospect of making two or three extra ones by so doing.

In most No Trump hands the dealer will have one strong hand and one weak one, and he must be very careful to utilise his card or cards of entry in the weak hand to the best advantage. It is no use to lead from the weak hand up to an ace, queen, knave suit without another card of entry. If the finesse succeeds, he is no better off as regards establishing the suit. In such a case the one entry card should be utilised for some other purpose, say to lead up to a guarded king, where it may do practical good. When leading from weakness up to an ace, queen, 10, suit, the double finesse should always be taken, unless two tricks in that suit are all that are required to win the game. If the queen is put on and the king wins it, another finesse has to be taken, and if the queen wins the trick, the king and knave both remain in, and one of them must make; if the 10 is put on the first round it may draw the king, in which case the suit is established, or it may happen that both the king and knave are to the right of the strong hand, in which case neither of them will make. If the king and

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

knave are both over the strong hand, they must both make.

Holding ace, queen, and small ones in one hand, and the knave in the other, or with ace, knave, and small ones in one hand, and the queen in the other, without the 10 or 9 behind it, it is a mistake, although a very common one, to lead the honour from the weak hand, as by so doing one trick in the suit must be lost, however the cards lie. A small one should be led from the weak hand, and the ace, queen, or ace, knave should be finessed in the strong hand. In this way if the king singly guarded is on the right side every trick in the suit can be won, and if the king is on the wrong side the weak hand is left with a very useful card of re-entry.

The leading a queen up to a suit headed by the ace, without holding the knave as well, comes under the same category, and is a still worse mistake. With ace, 8, 6, 2 in one hand, and queen, 7 in the other, the only possible chance of making two tricks in the suit is to lead a small one from the ace hand, in the hope of finding the king on the right of the queen.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

Another bad finesse is with queen, knave, 10, and others in one hand, and the ace singly guarded in the other. The only result of leading the queen and finessing will be effectually to block the suit four times out of five. It is much better to play the ace and a small one, allowing the king to make, and the suit is then established.

It is generally better to take a finesse on the second round of a suit rather than on the first. Thus, with ace, 7, 4 in one hand, and king, knave, 9, 2 in the other, it is better to lead the ace and then a small one up to the finesse of king, knave, rather than to lead a small one first and to take the finesse on the first round.

Entry cards in the weak hand are very important. The dealer should note carefully, at the beginning of the hand, how many possible or likely entries he has in his weak hand, and he must be careful not to waste them. Sometimes he can make an extra entry card in the weak hand by throwing away a high card from the other hand or by under-playing. Suppose the dealer has ace, queen, 9, 2 of diamonds, and his dummy has the knave and 3 only. If he is anxious to get his

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

dummy in he should lead a small diamond and trust to the king being on his left, in which case the knave must make. Again, if he has the same hand of diamonds and his dummy has knave and two small ones, he should lead the queen from his own hand, and then, if the king does not appear, he should continue with a small one. If he were to lead out his ace, and queen, the king would be certain to be held up and dummy's knave would have no possible chance of making.

It should always be borne in mind that the dealer has one certain trick in any suit of which he holds the knave in one hand, and either the king or queen in the other, provided that one of the honours, no matter which, is doubly guarded and that the suit is opened by his opponents and not by himself. If he holds queen, 2 in one hand, and knave, 4, 3 in the other, there is no combination of the cards which can prevent his winning one trick in the suit, provided that his opponents lead the first round of it.

It is a well-known axiom of Bridge that every fresh suit opened by the defenders in a No Trump game is a distinct advantage to the dealer; there-

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

fore the dealer should force them to open fresh suits whenever he can. The simplest instance of this is when he has one losing card of a suit left, and there is one in against him, it will often pay him better to put his opponent in with his losing card and force him to open a fresh suit, than to open another suit himself.

A little knowledge is a dangerous thing in Bridge quite as much as in other pursuits and occupations. In writing a series of articles such as these, treating on the various doubtful points of the game, it is necessary to lay down general rules — that it is best to do this, or that, or the other, under certain conditions — but such rules are all subject to variations in varying circumstances, and they should be regarded as general principles, not as immutable as the laws of the Medes and Persians. Take one simple instance: we have said that, in a No Trump game, when the dealer has one master card of the suit originally opened he should hold it up, if possible, until such time as the leader's partner is exhausted in that suit. This is a sound general principle, but there will occur many instances in which it will be, not only

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

right, but almost necessary, to win the first trick at once, either because there is a certainty of winning the game, or because there is great danger in an immediate change of suit, or for some other good reason.

The following hand, which occurred in a game quite recently, and which was wofully mismanaged, will illustrate this point. The score was 18 all in the last game of the rubber. A dealt, and left it to his partner B, who declared No Trumps.

A's hand (dealer).	B's hand (exposed).
Hearts — 9, 5, 3.	Hearts — Ace, 7, 2.
Diamonds — Ace, 6, 2.	Diamonds — 9.
Clubs — Ace, 10, 3.	Clubs — Queen, knave, 9, 5, 2.
Spades — 9, 6, 5, 3.	Spades — Ace, queen, 7, 4.

Y led the 6 of hearts. We will first consider how the hand was played, and then how it ought to have been played. As it was played, the dealer passed the first heart, Z won it with the knave, and immediately branched into the diamond suit. The dealer allowed the first two diamonds to win, and stopped the third round with his ace. He had now got the lead into the wrong hand, and was consequently unable to go for the finesse in clubs.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER


His best policy, even then, would have been to dash out his ace and 10 of clubs so as to clear the suit with the loss of one trick, but he did not even do this. He led a small spade and finessed the ace, queen in dummy's hand. Z, as it happened, held the king of spades single, and he got in and made his remaining diamonds, and the dealer lost two by cards, and the game and rubber, when he had an absolute certainty of the odd trick, if he had played correctly from the start.

Let us now consider how it should have been played.

Y led the 6 of hearts. If A had studied his two hands, he would have seen that, by putting on the ace of hearts, and leading the clubs at once, he had an absolute certainty of the game — four tricks in clubs, and the other three aces — unless Y had a very long suit of hearts. But Y's hearts could be counted. He could not have more than five of them. Is that clear? Do you see the reason that Y could not hold more than five hearts? By applying the Eleven Rule to Y's lead, A could see that Z must have two hearts higher than the 6. A and B had three each, and Z must have two at

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER


least, therefore Y could not possibly have more than five. That is quite an ordinary application of the Eleven Rule. The game proceeds thus:



TRICK 2. — A tries the finesse in clubs, as he can lose nothing by it. Mark Y's 7 of clubs — it is a very important card. If he has the 8 as well, the king in Z's hand must fall on the third round; but suppose he has not the 8? In that case Z will have (as he had) four to the king, and if A finesses again his ace will block the suit on the third round, and the game will not be won. At trick 3 he must lead the 2 from B's hand and put on his ace, so as to make a certainty of winning the game, even though he may lose a trick by so doing.


THE PLAY OF THE DEALER

TRICK 3.




Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 0.

TRICK 4.




Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 1.

TRICK 5.




Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 2.

TRICK 6.




Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 3.

TRICK 7.




Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 4.

TRICK 8.



Tricks : A B, 3 ; Y Z, 5.

THE PLAY OF THE DEALER



B makes his two remaining clubs and the queen of spades, and A B win two by cards and the game.

Y's hand.
 Hearts — King, 10, 8, 6, 4.
 Diamonds — 8, 5, 3.
 Clubs — 7.
 Spades — Knave, 10, 8, 2.

Z's hand.
 Hearts — Queen, knave.
 Diamonds — King, queen, knave, 10, 7, 4.
 Clubs — King, 8, 6, 4.
 Spades — King.

The player who made such a mess of the above hand was no beginner, but a Bridge player of some repute, only he fell into the common error of playing too quickly to the first trick, before he had properly gauged the capabilities of the two hands. He was the first to recognise his mistake when he had made it, but it was then too late, as it generally is.

CHAPTER XV

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

THE *contest* between theory and practice is very keen in the world of Bridge just now, particularly on the literary side of it. On the theoretical side we have "Hellespont," "Doe," and other anonymous and unknown authors, who, presumably, are in the habit of playing Bridge somewhere, but where and in what company we are not told — all of whom rely on figure statistics, and maintain that they will defeat practical experience. On the practical side are ranged "Badsworth" and the present writer, both members of well-known London clubs, where scientific Bridge is daily played, and Mr Elwell of New York, quite one of the best of the American players — all of whom write of the game as they know it and see it played by the best players. Then comes the natural question, "Who are these so-called best

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

players?" They are men of no mean intelligence in other walks of life, who have studied the game in all its bearings for the last ten or eleven years, and have brought all their brains to bear on it. They are in no way bigoted. They have no prejudices in favour of one mode of play rather than another, they back the one they find pays them best. They know all these theories of figure calculations and defensive declarations, etc.; but they find that their own practical experience pays them far better, so they elect to abide by it. There is as much difference between Bridge as these men know it and theoretical Bridge as there is between the play of the Australians and the cricket of some little provincial club.

A book on Bridge was published in 1905 by an anonymous author, who is evidently a theorist, *pur et simple*, and who adduces endless statistics and rows of figures in his endeavour to prove his view of the case. He asserts that all declarations, whether it be No Trumps or a suit declaration, should be merely a matter of calculation by figures, and he goes so far as to give fractional values to the cards held.

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

Poor unfortunate neophyte in Bridge! He is told that one card or combination of cards is worth $1\frac{1}{3}$ tricks, that another is worth $\frac{3}{4}$ of a trick, and yet another is worth $\frac{3}{5}$ of a trick, and he is expected to add all these together and to ascertain that they reach a certain value before he is justified in declaring No Trumps. To begin with, Bridge players are not all expert mathematicians, and many players would require to have a sheet of paper and a pencil by their side to reduce the different fractions to a common denominator before they could discover the value of their hand; and just fancy what delay and hesitation and improper information given to a partner this would entail! The author in question takes especial exception to the argument which has always been upheld in these articles, that the methods employed by the best players of the day are the surest guide to success at the Bridge table, and he supports his argument by saying that "Cavendish" never said such a thing in his book on Whist.

Certainly "Cavendish" never said such a thing, because in those days there was no need to say

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

so — it was universally understood. In the days of scientific whist there were no theoretical writers who published long statistics to prove that the accepted methods of play were all wrong; those methods were acknowledged to be the best. The late Mr. Henry Jones (Cavendish) was himself a first-class card player and he was accustomed to play whist every day of his life with some of the finest players who ever lived. He was very fond of conventions and stereotyped methods of play, and he introduced many such into the game of whist, but his most excellent book was not composed mainly of theories and statistics of his own invention; it was more a record of what he had observed and learnt from continual practice with the ablest exponents of the game. Speaking from a long personal acquaintance with Cavendish and his methods, we can confidently state that no man ever lived who attached more importance to constant practice with good players than he did, and any departure from the established methods of play was certain to meet with his disapproval.

In common with all the theoretical writers, this author is a strong advocate of an original

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

defensive declaration by the dealer; in fact on this point he out-Herods Herod, by saying that the dealer should always declare hearts or diamonds when he holds queen, 10, and three others, and nothing else of value, as a protective measure. Protective measure! One can understand a player protecting himself by declaring spades, so as to make the game as cheap as possible; but where does the protection come in when he gives the game an unnecessarily high value simply because he has a bad hand?

The keynote of the whole book is that theory is a better guide to success than practice and experience of what the author calls "the chance data of the card table"; and this is a proposition from which we dissent entirely. At the end of his book he gives sixteen illustrative hands, and, if the practice of the players with whom he is accustomed to play is correctly illustrated in these hands, it is not to be wondered at that he prefers theory to practice. In most of these hands the play of the cards is very much open to question, judged by the standard of our best-known English players. There is one hand in particular

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY.

in which the dealer is made to lose two by cards, when any average Bridge player, playing the two cards, could hardly fail to win the odd trick, if he were possessed of ordinary intelligence.

A fifth edition of "Hellespont on Bridge" was also published in 1905.

In an appendix to the original work the author propounds the theory that "it is in playing without trumps that a player's skill becomes of paramount importance. On one false step will often depend the winning or losing of the odd trick, or even sometimes of the game." Certainly it will; but does not this apply equally, or even more strongly, to the trump game? The real reason of indifferent players being so fond of declaring No Trumps is that they find the No Trump hands easier to play. It is when there is a suit declaration that the fine points of play present themselves, and it is then that the good player will sometimes convert into a victory what would have been a certain defeat in the hands of his weaker brother. Defending a No Trump game gives enormous opportunities for skill and combination, more so than any other phase of the game, but not

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

so the play of the two hands by the dealer. Occasionally one sees a very intricate No Trump hand, but the general run of them are cut and dried, so that the result of the game depends far more upon the tactics of the defenders than upon those of the dealer.

Having propounded the above theory, "Hellepont" proceeds to quote instances in illustration of it, and the first hand on his list is the following:—

Spades — Ace, king, queen,
 knave, 4, 3, 2.

Hearts — 10.

Diamonds — 9, 8, 7.

Clubs — 6, 5.

This is a hand on which he says that a strong player should declare No Trumps, but that "his weaker brother will do better to leave it." To begin with, the declaration of No Trumps on this hand is not Bridge at all, it is gambling pure and simple, like tossing for shillings, and to give this as an instance of a No Trump hand is to reduce Bridge to the level of baccarat, or blind hookey, or any other purely gambling game, and to eliminate from it every element of skill. Apart from this consideration, what possible opening for skill

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

can there be in the play of the above hand? It is a hand, if ever there was one, which the veriest neophyte could play every whit as well as the most learned professor of the game. The result entirely depends upon whether the dummy hand can win a trick — presuming that he has a spade to lead, which is by no means a certainty — and this again will depend, not in any way on the play of the dealer, but upon the placing of the cards, and upon the methods employed by the opponents. Any child of twelve years old, provided that he knew the value of the cards, could play this hand absolutely as well as “Hellespont” himself, yet this he quotes as his first instance of a hand in which “skill becomes of paramount importance.”

Spades — 10 (led).

Hearts — Ace, 10, 4.
 Diamonds — Ace, king,
 queen, knave, 3, 2.
 Clubs — 9, 8, 2.
 Spades — Queen.

	Y	
A		B
	(dummy)	
	Z	

Hearts — 6.
 Diamonds — Nil.
 Clubs — Ace, 5, 3.
 Spades — Ace, knave,
 9, 8, 7, 6, 4, 3, 2.

We give here a very curious hand which recently occurred in actual play, and which really does offer an opportunity for the exercise of

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

skill on the part of the dealer. It is a good instance of a hand on which a first-class player would, in all probability, win the game, while an indifferent player would be quite certain to fail to do so.

Score, love all. A dealt and declared diamonds. Y led the 10 of spades. The question is how should the dealer play the two hands so as to take the best chance of winning the game?

Directly the dummy hand is exposed, the king of spades is absolutely marked in Z's hand, and there is only one other spade, the 5, not accounted for. The ace of spades must be put on at once, and if Y's lead of the 10 was the higher of two spades, the king will fall, and the remainder is easy. A puts himself in with the ace of hearts, draws all the trumps, and puts his dummy in again with the ace of clubs to make the remaining spades.

If, however, as is probable, Y's 10 of spades was a singleton, the position is not so easy. It is imperative in order to win the game, that B's spades should be cleared before his only card of re-entry, the ace of clubs, is taken out of his hand,

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

and therefore the lead must on no account be parted with. A must lead another spade from B's hand, and trump it with his knave, so that he cannot be over-trumped. He is then left with five trumps and there are seven against him, so that it is a certainty that there must be four at least in one hand. If there are five in one hand the game cannot be won, but if the trumps are evenly divided, four and three, he can make sure of winning the small slam. He leads his three winning trumps, and if he finds them evenly divided, he then leads a losing trump, to take out the last one, and whatever is led, he wins all the remaining tricks, having the ace of clubs in B's hand to bring in the long spade suit. This is quite an instructive hand, and one which illustrates the advantage of reviewing the situation and forming a definite plan of campaign before commencing to play the hand.

The question of prearranged signals or codes of play between partners is rather a delicate one, but one which is well worthy of discussion. The first thing of the kind which was ever introduced was the call for trumps in the old whist days, and

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

there must be many whist players still alive who can remember the very heated arguments which this innovation gave rise to. A considerable section of whist players went so far as to say that it was cheating, and, for a time, they refused to play with men who used the call, but it had come to stay, and after a while they gave in, and tolerated the signal, even if they did not condescend to use it. A sort of tacit understanding was then arrived at, that a player was perfectly entitled to make use of any information which he could derive from the way in which his partner played his cards, but that it was not allowable to pre-arrange any signal or code. This arrangement was strictly adhered to at whist, and the practice of asking a partner whether he adopted the call for trumps was strongly discountenanced at the best clubs.

Bridge commenced life on the same lines, but there came a time when the parting of the ways between the heart convention and the short-suit convention, in answer to a double of No Trumps, was so strongly marked, and the consequences of not knowing to which school a partner belonged

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

were sometimes so disastrous, that it came to be understood that a player was entitled to ascertain his partner's views on this one point before commencing a rubber. If the matter had ended there, no great harm would have been done, but it has not ended there. There has lately been a growing tendency among certain Bridge players, chiefly indifferent ones, to put their partners through a sort of catechism before commencing to play. Not only do they inquire whether their partner wishes a heart or the short suit led to him when he doubles a No Trump call, but also whether he discards from strength or weakness, and even, in some cases, whether he leads from his longest suit or from a weak one against a suit declaration.

The principle is entirely wrong. When a player sits down to play with a strange partner it should be his business to ascertain for himself, from his partner's play of the cards, that partner's strength or weakness, and what methods he elects to employ for giving information as to his hand. It is entirely opposed to the spirit of the game to arrange an understanding on debatable points of play before starting. The principle could be so very

PRACTICE *VERSUS* THEORY

easily extended. If it is allowable to say to one's partner, "If I double No Trumps, I want a heart led," why should it not be allowable to say, "If I say, 'I double that,' I want a heart; if I say, 'I double No Trumps,' I want a diamond; if I say, 'I double,' I want a club led," and so on? The principle is just the same, only that the one method is recognised and countenanced and the other is not.

It is laid down by every one of the accepted authorities on Bridge, that a player is entitled, and ought to ascertain, his partner's views as to the lead in answer to a double of No Trumps; therefore, let us accept that as a Bridge postulate, but we are strongly opposed to carrying the principle any further. Every lover of Bridge, who wishes to maintain the game, as it is at present, the prince of all card games, ought resolutely to set his face against this modern Bridge catechism, and to refuse to answer any questions above and beyond the one accepted point of the lead to a double of No Trumps.

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A
LETTER

TO
or
T. W. COKE, Esq. M. P.

ON THE

**TENDENCY OF CERTAIN SPEECHES DELI-
VERED AT THE COUNTY MEETING, IN THE
SHIRE-HALL, NORWICH, ON SATURDAY,
APRIL 5, 1817.**

BY THE REV. GEORGE BURGESS, B. A.,
VICAR OF HALVERGATE AND OF MOULTON.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.

Norwich:

**PRINTED AND SOLD BY BURKS AND KINNEBROOK; AND MAY
BE HAD OF BALDWIN, CRADOCK, AND JOY, PATERNOSTER
ROW, LONDON.**

1817.

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ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.

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ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.

PREFACE.



A Second Edition of this Letter being called for, it becomes necessary to explain why it appears with so large additions. It was originally written with no view whatever to local circumstances; but the death of one of our late County Representatives calling forth a contested Election, I thought it might possibly be of some little service to what I considered a good cause, if I could get my Pamphlet out in time to aid that spirit of constitutional freedom which had gone abroad. This, however, I found from my Printer, could not be done, unless I materially curtailed the length of my Letter. I did so—much therefore of what now appears, made up a part of that which I was then compelled to keep back.

Imperfect as my Letter was, I declined reprinting it after the disposal of the copies of the first impression, though many solicitations were made to me for that purpose. A cheap, pirated Edition of it did, indeed, come forth during my absence from Norwich, but that I could not be responsible for. I

One only conditional promise did I make ; viz. that if no notice was taken by the opposite party of this Letter, here the business should rest with me ; but that if any Reply made its appearance, a “ second Edition, with Additions,” should follow it. Mr. Glover’s Pamphlet soon settled the point, and the fruits of this promise are now before the public.

I most sincerely regret, adopting the language of my adversary, that it has fallen to my lot to attack “ the dearest friend of my own Patron and Benefactor ;”* and I did some time since equally regret, that, for his sake, I felt compelled to enter the field, with very unequal powers, against such an opponent as Mr. Forby. But as, in my zeal and gratitude to the Bishop of Norwich, I considered not then who Mr. Forby was, (the supporter, with much sounder knowledge, of the same sentiments with myself,) so neither now can I consent to consider who Mr. Coke is. My conduct will, I trust, be found to be consistent in both cases ; honestly censuring, in each of these gentlemen, what I honestly deemed reprehensible. In my reply to Mr. Glover, I shall escape, at least, one mortification which I experienced in my Letter to the Rector of Fincham. I shall find myself opposed neither to abilities which I respect, nor to opinions which I revere.

* Answer to a Clergyman’s Letter. P. 1.

that I have made some few corrections too in the original Letter. My esteemed and valued friend, Mr. Borton, will discover, on turning to the forty-third page, that I have not been altogether inattentive to his advice ; but he must pardon me for adding, that, had I listened to all his suggestions in favour of Mr. Coke, the Printer should have had but short work of it ; for I verily believe, that, subject to the Blofield critical prunings, the second Edition of my Letter would have consisted of little more than one single paragraph.

Perhaps some apology may be thought due for the declamatory nature of the following pages. Of necessity this, in a good measure, must be the case, when it is recollected, that I am drawing conclusions from premises and proofs which I believe to have already been well made out by writers on our side of the question, and never yet satisfactorily confuted by any advocates against the measures of Government on theirs. We are not, I conceive, in the present state of things, so much called upon to bring forward new proofs, or to renew and insist upon old ones, as, taking the strong ground already chalked out, by a forcible appeal to the feelings and best passions of our countrymen, forcibly to cement and consolidate them.

Mr. Glover I see, in his " Answer to a Clergyman's Letter," charges me, and pretty roundly, with defamation of exalted characters. That which

To exalted characters we owe indeed respect, but it is only while they behave in an exalted manner. The established order of society is, I grant, inverted, when those are the subjects of our reproof who ought to be the patterns of our imitation. But if wealth and rank will descend from their high ground, there is no shielding them, that I am aware of, from insult. When exalted characters revere their duties, then, and not till then, they may repose on their priveleges.

Finally, I am accused too, and with no unsparing hand, of literary ignorance. I hear the accusation and wish I could altogether despise it. On this head I am compelled to take shame to myself, that, with opportunities not contemptible, my attainments have, I fear, been very inadequate; and I can assure Mr. Glover that in all altercations, bordering in the least on an erudite nature, I do not forget how poorly I am gifted, and how humble, therefore, in such matters it becomes me to be. At the same time, if he will promise to forgive me the seeming inconsistency, I will venture to add, that I still think myself fully competent to break a spear with a 'shallow, literary coxcomb, upon any subject of disquisition whatever. And with this assurance I bid him and the Public, for the present, Adieu.

NORWICH, AUGUST 31, 1817.

SIR,

THE incomparable Richard Hooker thus beginneth his great work *of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*.—"He that goeth about to perswade a multitude, that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every kind of regiment is subject; but the secret lets and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgement to consider. And because such as openly reprove supposed disorders of State, are taken for principal friends to the common benefit of all, and for men that carry singular freedom of mind: Under this fair and plausible colour, whatsoever they utter, passeth for good and current. That which wanteth in the weight of their speech, is supplied by the aptness of men's minds to accept and believe it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintain things that are established, we have not only to strive with a number of heavy prejudices, deeply rooted in the hearts of men, who think that herein we serve the time, and speak in favour of the present State, because thereby we either hold or seek preferment; but also to bear such exceptions as minds so averted before-hand, usually take against that which they are loth should be poured into them."—I beg that you and my readers would bear this judicious remark in mind. It elucidates, in no mean degree, the nature of our respective political endeavours, and points out the smoothness and asperities of the different roads we feel ourselves compelled to take.

B

MAY 17 1633

thoughts is one not unimportant at any time, but of very increased consideration at the present. It is connected with much that constitutes our domestic comfort, and with every thing that makes up our public security. I offer, therefore, no apology for addressing to you this "Letter on the tendency of certain Speeches delivered at the County Meeting, in the Shirehall, Norwich, on Saturday, April 5, 1817." In many, indeed in most of the reflections which it contains, it will be found, as I intended it should, almost equally to apply to those who stated their sentiments with you. It will be found to apply not to Mr. Coke alone, nor to Mr. Coke's party, but to all who, in various quarters of the kingdom, are labouring with a zeal too nearly accordant with their knowledge, to set the people against their rulers, and to bring Government into disrepute, at a season when, for the safety of the country, it is necessary they should possess its confidence. You have already had your own particular local triumph. It is fair that those locally connected with, but dissentient from your opinions, should be heard too. Many points may be carried by acclamation, which will not always stand the test of cooler and more sedate enquiry.

In trying circumstances we best discover what stuff men are made of. There are times to be silent, and there are times when silence becomes criminal. The Athenian legislator declared that man infamous who stood neuter in seasons of public calamity, and who aided not the common weal against those who were plotting its ruin. I do not therefore conceive myself altogether departing from the line of professional duty, in delivering my sentiments upon this occasion. Politics is not strictly indeed a clerical subject; but it unfortunately too closely connects itself with that which is. If it be worth while to preserve the church, (of which, by the bye, some may probably entertain

At all events, where it is a feather in the cap of one Clergyman to harangue mobs and abuse Ministers, it will hardly be thought peculiarly indecorous in another to attempt to rectify misguided zeal, and to rescue innocence from unfounded aspersion.

This Letter has been delayed, Sir, longer than was intended ; but perhaps I may spare my apologies upon that ground to you. It may still reach the hustings in time to be burnt by the hands of the common hangman. Let me, however, before I proceed, put in one claim upon your mercy. In whatever I may be tempted to advance in the following pages, I go not beyond the verge, so far as the County Meeting is concerned, of the immediate orators who addressed that meeting. Many gentlemen might sign the requisition, and be present at the debates, who perhaps neither fully entered into your political views, nor approved of your manner of laying them before the public. Their opinions I can have nothing to do with. I am only concerned with your's and your coadjutors', the Earl of Albermarle, Sigismund Trafford Southwell, Esq. and the Rev. George Glover. I beg it further to be recollected, that I acquit you of any intention, in the delivery of these speeches, to become the aiders and abettors of the present prevailing disaffection. Whatever may be the supposed errors of your judgment, the rootedness of your prejudices, the vanity of your ambition, or the persuasion of your minds, I leave you (and it is granting more perhaps than some people would grant) in full possession of integrity of motive.* You require not however to be told,

* Let me here mention, that if in any part of the following Letter I seem to forget this concession to the integrity of the County Orators, I beg it may be put down to any thing sooner than to the score of intention. I have endeavoured to avoid this inconsistency, but occasionally, perhaps, I may not altoge-

ther arising from false views or malevolent designs ; nor shall he be saddled with any light offence, who, in the furtherance of unjustifiable hostility, consents to adopt the very means by which popular opinion is conducted into those channels that usually lead on to rebellion and revolution.

Again, Sir, I take leave to say, that I must be understood, in these pages, to charge you with the responsibility, not only of your own, but of the sentiments delivered by my Lord Albermarle and Mr. Southwell, as it will be found they had your hearty concurrence and approbation. These gentlemen must, indeed, necessarily partake with you, and very largely, in the reproach which an honest mind may feel justified in casting upon the proceedings of that day. But my particular reason for addressing this Letter to you, rather than to them, is, not perhaps that I see in your speech more to condemn than in theirs, for, in some respects, it is less censurable, but that I consider you as the mover and machinator of the far greater part of that vexatious opposition which Ministers have long been in the habit of experiencing from the county of Norfolk. Besides, I take up your politics, Sir, in the general ; and may lawfully, I think, go beyond the mere bounds of a local meeting for my censure of your opinions. Though a stranger, I have not been unobservant of your line of conduct for some years past. Every where I find Mr. Coke, an opponent of the measures of Ministry ; and no man, as I think, can systematically be so found, without

ther have succeeded. I further declare, that, in detailing the opinions of others, I will only be made answerable for having accurately given them as publicly reported, the speeches of the Norwich County Meeting in the local papers excepted, where certainly (from the meagre manner in which they appear in their printed state) some degree of latitude is fairly allowable.

frequently sinking into a very low state among the
the best interests of his country.

Here, however, a difficulty opens upon us at the beginning. I have now before me the *Norwich Mercury*, the *Norfolk Chronicle*, and the *Times*. But from which of these Castalian founts I must draw that the streams of your eloquence may come to the lip most pure and palatable, I am sure I know not. Here we lose in manner what we gain in matter. There we find in caution what we miss in spirit; and in none of them what may be called "the raciness of the soil," is, I apprehend any longer discoverable. In short, we have little left us but "the ghosts of our departed joys." The poets have in all ages filled their pitchers at Homer's pump, which, like a mighty reservoir, they are constantly drawing off, and never lessening. I will not, however, answer for it, much as we may pant to refresh ourselves amid the heats of political contention, that we shall obtain altogether so comfortable a beverage from these leaden cisterns. For by some means or other the animated *Phillippics* have had "the genial current of their souls frozen." The thunder now reaches us at a distance. The inflammatory meteor is surrounded by a halo. Who hath done them this good turn I know not. Would they that have thus "shorn them of their glory," could have shorn them of their mischief too! But though the charmed locks are dissevered, Sampson has still, I fear, strength enough left to "make sport for the Philistines." The better way may be under this uncertainty to consult promiscuously each of these repositories of the golden treasure. Nor will you or your brother orators suffer by this promiscuous selection, as we shall thus more intimately preserve the identity of your views, and concentrate the fire of your genius.

The object of you and of your party in calling this County Meeting was, as we understood from the re-

escape from the late atrocious attack upon his person," and "to pray his Royal Highness to dismiss from his presence and councils those advisers, who, by their conduct, have proved themselves to be alike enemies to the throne and to the people."* The first part of the designed address, a mere *pro forma* business, was speedily disposed of. Indeed, had it not been a necessary sacrifice to decorum, I have some doubts whether it would have made up any portion of the loyal declamations that were delivered at all. The removal of his Majesty's Ministers I looked upon as the important hinge of the Meeting—the polar star to which, blow the wind from what quarter it might, your political compass, in sun-shine or in storm, invariably pointed—the *sine qua non* of your implied support of Government under the present pressure of our accumulated calamities—and, in short, the grand focus of the resolutions, the address, the debates, the hootings, hollowings, cock-crowings, and all the dignified proceedings of the day.

Before I advert to the charges brought against Ministers on this memorable occasion, in order to the insurance of their downfall, suffer me, Sir, to draw your attention to a minor consideration or two. And first, I beg leave to say a word on the *temper* of the County Meeting. I had attended it in the hope that, at so critical a period, full and fair ground would have been afforded to all parties for the delivery of their sentiments. Some decorum it might naturally be supposed would pervade an assembly "numerous beyond all former example," and "such an one as, in point of rank and respectability," you declared you "had never before seen collected together in the County."† But judge of my surprise

* See the Norwich Papers of April 5, 1817.

† Norwich Mercury, April 12.

tion were invited to the honors of the sitting; that they only were indulged with a hearing, and "took homage of the simple-minded throng." It was, in fact, soon discovered, that no man friendly to Ministers, who came unfurnished with a resolution to walk bare-foot over burning plough shares, had any business at such a meeting. Demosthenes, who inured himself to the vociferation of popular assemblies, by declaiming amid the roarings of the ocean, would have had his patience put to the test here. The lessons taught your admiring audience they were not dull at learning. Would they suffer a single gentleman to speak who ventured to support the measures of Government? * Would they permit a syllable to be uttered but what was fraught with the enticing philosophy, that Ministers were the enemies of the people, and, instead of protecting, ground them to powder? Seldom have I witnessed grosser behaviour than that exhibited, on this occasion, towards a respectable magistrate, whose perseverance amid insult, I feel far better able to commend than to imitate. It seems hardly possible to divine (for hearing was out of the question) what line of conduct in Mr. Harvey could have called forth such repeated coarseness of invective. I fear he was for moderating the inspirations of my Lord Albemarle's eloquence. If so, I give him up to his fate—for, in such a circle and at

* Mitford, in his *History of Greece*, observes, "In the sovereign assembly of Athens, as in democratical assemblies in England, a common hall of the city of London, or a *County Meeting for political purposes*, freedom of speech often was denied; the people would hear the orators only on one side." I have been given to understand, (but it may turn out one of those glozing tales conjured up to catch public curiosity) that Mr. Coke's tenantry were written to upon this important occasion, and, of course, were all present at the sovereign assembly of Athens.

of any greater crime than moderation. Alexander we know was roused by the strains of Timotheus, to fire the palace of Persepolis; and though the Noble Earl's vocal talent was not precisely of that exhilarating complexion, it had yet frightful notes enough about it to render it sufficiently alarming. I am inclined to believe, however, that a learned sergeant would a little have flattened the crest of his eloquence, had not their high mightinesses, the mob, wisely foreseeing that such a lawyer would serve their idol's cause quite as well with his mouth shut as open, imposed upon his tongue an obstinate silence. The only gentlemen on the side of Ministry that were at all listened to with any composure, were the Honourable Colonel Wodehouse and Mr. Edmond Wodehouse, and even they were compelled to witness "the drop of honey" instantly dispersed and annihilated in the "draught of gall."

Further, you represented yourselves, Sir, at this meeting, as speaking "the almost unanimous sentiments of the county."* Nay, you scrupled not to declare, that "the necessity of the present proceeding was made apparent by the voice of the whole kingdom."† The *Norfolk Declaration* will, I trust, convince you of the fallacy of the former assertion, and the good sense of the people of England of the hyperbolic absurdity of the latter. Again, my Lord Albemarle remarks, that however the requisition "may upon first view appear to embrace two distinct and different objects, it will, upon closer examination, be seen that those objects are inseparably connected."‡ Assertions now and then do the work of proofs. How this inseparable connection is to be

* Speech of Lord Albemarle, *Norwich Mercury*, April 12.

† Speech of the Rev. G. Glover. *Ib.*

‡ Speech of Lord Albemarle. *Ib.*

my own part, I am inclined to believe with Colonel Wodehouse, that "it will be difficult to quote an instance of a congratulatory address to the Throne on such an event, being coupled with a direct attack on the King's Ministers."* It is not only a novel, but a monstrous proceeding. It reminds us of the powerful argument used by the Barbarian, for the conversion of (if I mistake not) a neighbouring Potentate. "With this knife Abdulkader will condescend to shave the head of Damel, if Damel will embrace the Mahomedan faith; and with this other knife Abdulkader will cut the throat of Damel, if Damel refuses to embrace it."† The illustrious personage to whom this Janus-headed address, manufactured under your auspices,‡ was presented the other day, looked, we have been given to understand, rather askance upon it. And in good truth, well he might. He probably discovered in it an awkward lineament or two that bespoke a cloven-footed resemblance to the Poet's celebrated description of sin,

The one seem'd woman to the waist, and fair,
But ended foul in many a scaly fold,
Voluminous and vast;—*a serpent armed*
With mortal sting! ||

* Speech of the Hon. Col. Wodehouse, *Norfolk Chronicle*, April 12.

† Park's Travels in Africa.

‡ "It is currently reported, (says the Editor of the *Norwich Mercury*, May 24, 1817), that neither the *Resolutions* nor the *Address* were of Norfolk manufacture." So much the better. An idle notion is in circulation, that EARL GREY lent his assistance to the formation of this image of Nebuchadnezzar's, which was set up with the sound of "all kinds of music," and which the good people of the county were warmly invited to "fall down and worship." I confess I should not look for such a production from such a quarter. I should rather turn my eye upon a Spafelds Secretary, or a Shoreditch Committee.

|| *Paradise Lost*. Book II.

able Mover of the Resolutions might have spared his party the disgrace of enquiring, " why the loyalty of the County had been thus long disappointed" *—for, if this was the best sample of it they could bring to market, the disappointment would, I conceive, have been got over if it had never had the good luck to have reached the Throne at all. They, however, who wish for a dignified and satisfactory answer to this imprudent question, may consult the speech of Colonel Wodehouse, as given in the Norfolk Chronicle of the 12th ult.

The *County Address* and the *Norfolk Declaration* are now before the public †—twin stars in our political hemisphere—but as far removed from each other in all the requisites that constitute congeniality, " as from the centre thrice to th' utmost pole." Formed upon resolutions totally devoid of a fair representation of the state of the Nation, the *Address* breathes a spirit which they only can admire who care little about the grounds of complaint, but love the bold language of unauthenticated and unjustifiable rebuke. The *Declaration*, on the contrary, at once conciliating in its tone and constitutional in its principles, will be found to contain sentiments that every man may be proud to acknowledge, and that no man shall have cause to repent of, when the ebullitions of party zeal have passed away, and the understanding is left at leisure to moderate the excesses of the heart.

I come now, Sir, to the more immediate business

* Norwich Mercury, April 12.

† Of the arts that are said to have been used in procuring signatures to this Declaration, I am not competent to speak. I am a stranger here, and it came not within my province to search out the local politics of the neighbourhood. If the subject were worth investigation, it would probably be found, that the artifices alluded to were, for the most part, those of the intemperate advocates of the *Address*.

the nature of the charges which you affect to bring against Ministry. If I understand their drift, though I will not be certain that I shall give the condensed essence of all their constitutional beauties, it is this—
“That Ministers have converted an insane attack upon the Prince Regent, into an accusation of disloyalty and madness in the people of England, and that, under their influence, the Church has sanctioned the profaneness. That themselves first inventing plots and conspiracies, by setting one man against another, and afterwards packing a Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and furnishing them with false and frivolous evidence, have, upon the strength of the reports thus obtained, ventured to suspend the *Habeas Corpus Act*. That, in consequence hereof, every injustice towards the subject may, and probably will be committed with impunity, as the prevention of Public Meetings and of petitioning, the renewal of the Property Tax, the destruction of the liberty of the press, and the extermination of the freedom of the people.— And that, finally, unless the present Ministry, alike enemies to the throne and to the people, and the cause of all our unprecedented calamities, be instantly dismissed, there will be no security to the head of the Government, nor hardly any hope of preserving the Country from revolution.” *

These, it must be confessed, are accusations sufficiently formidable and sufficiently acrimonious. Indeed we hardly know by what terms properly to characterize them. There are flights of pitiable folly where men must be left to themselves. There are aggravations of presumed offences where it is, perhaps, better to let the calumny die by the force of its own

* See these Speeches of the 5th of April in the County Papers of the 12th.

which it might be dangerous, with less powers than those of an Attorney General about us, to attempt to answer as they deserve. These are charges, Sir, that must either consecrate, or confound your political hostility. If you make them good, Ministers are, I confess, lost for ever; but, failing to be supported by the most cogent demonstrations on your part, they must inevitably be met by the most indignant feelings on ours.

Let us begin then with the first of them, viz. "that Ministers have converted an insane attack upon the Prince Regent, into an accusation of disloyalty and madness in the people of England; and that, under their influence, the Church has sanctioned the profaneness." Now, in addition to all the other bad properties of this charge, it appears to me to have this, that it is perfectly without foundation. Neither have Ministers made such an accusation on such grounds, nor have they even made it at all. Are we not specifically told by Lord Sidmouth, that "though that atrocious outrage against the Royal dignity had not been committed, his Royal Highness's advisers, with the information in their possession, would have still felt it their indispensable duty to have brought forward this proceeding?"* To the same purport is it not observed by Lord Castlereagh, that when "the House was in possession of the proper information, it would feel satisfied that had that disgraceful scene of turbulence and depredation never existed, his Majesty's Government could not have avoided to advise the present Message, without an abandonment of those high duties that they owed the House and the Country."† Does not Lord Liverpool "deny that there

* Speech on the Prince Regent's Message, Feb. 4.

† Speech on the same occasion.

was any charge of disloyalty, or insurrection intimated, or insinuated in the Speech, or Message, against the general body of the Nation?"* Does he not further declare, "that a vast majority was no doubt sincerely attached to the laws and constitution, but that many, even of the well-disposed but misinformed, might be misled by the artful and designing, and more particularly in a season of general and severe pressure?"

I will not swell the bulk of these authorities as I easily might. The present are enough for the purpose, and afford, I trust, in the opinion of sober people, a sufficient refutation of so ill judged and not very inoffensive a charge; nor is there any means of evading such refutation but by the destruction of all confidence, and of all honourable dependence upon the solemn protestations of one man to another. And you will not, I think, venture upon so rash a conduct, inasmuch as you must thereby entirely cut away the integrity of your own opinions. If you believe not these declarations of Ministers, thus delivered at a most trying moment, and before so august an assembly, but call upon your fellow creatures to discredit and to revile them; who will believe your expressions of attachment to the Constitution, your pretensions of respect for your Constituents, or your earnest and repeated asseverations of Loyalty to your King, and Love for your Country? Positively there is no alternative. Either Ministers are sincere in these declarations, in which case your charge must fall to the ground, or you must be compelled to stand in the same predicament with them, and to be deemed unworthy of belief in a single syllable you utter.—The latter presumption is abhorrent to every man's feelings; every man must therefore rest in the former.

* Speech on the Prince Regent's Message, Feb. 4.

general body of the nation was sound, but that many, even of the well disposed, might be misled. They inevitably must be so, if they listen to such speeches as you and your coadjutors have here addressed to them—if they believe, as you tell them, “that his Majesty’s Ministers have converted the outrage on his Royal Highness’s person into an apology for the enactment of tyrannical laws,”* and that it was “no indication of disloyalty in the great body of the people, although Ministers had at first attempted so to construe it, and the Church was profaned by an open assertion that it was so.”† I sincerely agree with Mr. Edmund Wodehouse, “that the great mass of the people of this kingdom are not disaffected, but are powerfully sustained by moral principles.”‡ Never indeed was there a people more patient, more forbearing, more disposed to make the amplest sacrifices of their poor and lowly comforts to the overwhelming pressure of the times than the people of England. And never was a people so anxious to “fear God” and “honour the King,” more cruelly abused, more treacherously seduced, more shamefully gulled and imposed upon, by designing men, who would mix heaven and earth to ensure the success of their machinations for the demolition of both Church and State. These are the incendiaries that are now lighting up the flame of rebellion in every quarter of the kingdom—and these, I am sorry to add, are they whose purposes you are yourself seconding with might and main, at the very moment you may fancy you are actually employed in their frustration.

The poor in many, I may say in most places, are tranquil; and, if not worked upon, will continue so, until times come round and a better state of things

* Lord Albemarle, *Norfolk Chronicle*, April 12. † *Ib.*

‡ Speech of Mr. Wodehouse, *Norfolk Chronicle*, April 12.

They know the necessity and duty of obedience to "the powers that be"—they know the benevolence of the English nation, and it is infamous to put them upon those means of insane retaliation, that, left to themselves, they would revolt at. There is no higher character, under the awful gloom of the present moment, than the meek and patient sufferer who feels indeed the hardship, but not the hopelessness of his situation, and who depends upon that Providence which hath wounded, in his good time to heal—who perseveres in "a conscience void of offence towards God and towards man," though surrounded by so many (and some of them his superiors) that seem to care so little about the one or the other; and who girds up his mind to a passive acquiescence under temporary evil, and repositeth on the wisdom of his governors for the gradual mitigation of his wants. Such humble and virtuous characters (and blessed be God! they are yet to be found among us) who could have the heart to corrupt?

And the Church, says my Lord Albemarle, amid a thunder of applause, the Church was polluted by sanctifying the calumny of the State. No, Sir, the Church was not polluted by any such parasitical conduct. She was only polluted by his Lordship's ignorant reproach of her. You observed the general burst of indignation against her, the moment this absurd and insidious allusion was made.—You observed, and triumphed. We know to whom, and to what, we are indebted for this spirit of hostility. But let the abettors of injustice take heed that, on these "dark mountains," they stumble not. To stir up the people against the Clergy is in the power of any idiot who chuses to put his hand to the task; but as neither you, nor the Noble Earl, are, I conceive, cut out to "ride the whirlwind and direct the storm," you had better endeavour to govern the resentment of your

own feelings and his own impotent, be assured, to all purposes of good, and only efficacious where success is but another name for insanity.

The Church has, indeed, ever been a fertile theme of censure with those who sit loose to the welfare of her establishment ; and I do not wonder that, on an occasion like the present, it should have been brought forward as a test of Whig principles, and as a touchstone of popular feeling. Of popular feeling it is, I am sorry to say, through the practised arts of its adversaries, but too lamentable a touchstone. Wise and prudent men have ever thought that they could not be too delicate, whatever were their private sentiments, in any open reproach of the received devotional usages of their country. In this respect, the very polytheism of antiquity will put us to the blush. In earlier periods, with ignorant minds and barbarous manners, all would have gone to wreck if the most impressive imagery had not fenced in the popular devotion.—The shades of Delphi and of Dodona were not consecrated in vain. The laws of Lycurgus were not in vain strengthened by the sanction of an Oracle, nor in vain resorted they from all parts to the mysteries of Eleusis. The Romans, though they permitted the adoption of the religious tenets of the Countries they had conquered, yet suffered no encroachments upon the established sanctity of their own.* When Sue-

* It was Cicero's great praise, that he, for the most part, avoided any disturbance of the received religious opinions of his countrymen ; though Hume, with his usual feelings of incredulity, affects to consider it as his weakness. " If ever, says he, there was a nation, or a time, in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect that infidelity in Rome, during the Ciceronian age, would openly have erected its throne ; and that Cicero himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But it appears, that whatever sceptical liberties that great man might use in his

we are told, * by destroying their consecrated groves. Paganism, deep as were its superstitions, and abominable as were, on some occasions, its rites, had still a solemn line running across, which "divided the light from the darkness," and which, in the midst of its sacrifices, departed not entirely from mercy. It indeed committed, but it, at the same time, restrained many enormities. It softened many animosities. It touched the springs of the heart in that point from whence horror ran through the blood, and unbound many a seared conscience, which, without its alarming terrors, would have made sad havoc upon the social habits of life. And it did thereby, in a certain degree, insure, when probably all other expedients failed, the obedience of the subject and the security of the state. It could not indeed improve the morals, but it appalled the excesses of mankind. Where great good is accomplished, lesser evils may sometimes admit of pardon.

But while these Heathens thus exalted the sanctity of their devotions, we Christians delight in the defilement of ours. While they preserved the fires of Vesta, we extinguish the lamp of Christianity. While they, all wild and untutored as they were, worshipped before the altar of "the unknown God;" we, with philosophical dispositions and unbelieving hearts, subvert the temple of the true Divinity, and with "waste ground enough," are fain to "erase the holy sanctuary." Erostratus burnt the temple of Diana, at Ephesus, to get himself a name. Our Hampden friends to the Ecclesiastical Establishment, more fortunate, may eternize their memory by a less invi-

writings, or in philosophical conversation, he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of Deism and profaneness."—*Natural History of Religion*.

* Hume's History of England. Vol. 1.

of her worshippers." But let these *defenders of our excellent Liturgy* be reminded, that censure of the Church hath evermore been the precursor of censure of the State; that revolutions in the Church betoken revolutions in the State; that frauds upon the Church are bounties for depredations upon the State; that pillage of the Church is followed by plunder of the State; and, to give the picture its last miserable colouring, that the downfall of the Church has uniformly sealed, sanctioned, and ratified the destruction of the State!

I proceed, Sir, to the next charge brought by you and your colleagues against Ministers, viz. "that themselves first inventing plots and conspiracies by setting one man against another, and afterwards packing a committee of both Houses of Parliament, and furnishing them with false and frivolous evidence, have, upon the strength of the reports thus obtained, ventured to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act." This

* Mr. Beaufoy, in his speech in the Session of 1787, in favour of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, observed, that "whatever tended to the debasement of religion, diminished political authority, and weakened the sanctions of civil government." This is a most fatal truth. Much of slight allusions is lost, when the manner of *making* them is lost. I was present during the whole of the County Meeting upon the 5th of April, and was most forcibly struck by the insidious and pernicious tendency, as well as by the very striking effect of this part of my Lord Albemarle's Address. No jesuitism, no powers of assurance will ever, in my mind, be able to justify such an appeal as was then and there made, (and after the tumult had subsided, then and there repeated) to the worst passions and prejudices of his audience. And yet is it impudently attempted to be palmed upon us, that it was "to guard our venerable Church, not to destroy her," that his Lordship's eloquence was poured forth upon this occasion!—Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis, Tempus eget.

home to them, there is no man who will not petition with you not only for their immediate dismissal, but for their dismissal with every mark of public execration. The suspension of this Act is, it must be allowed, the temporary suspension of British liberty. It is the Roman dictatorial authority that supersedes the established constitution of the realm, and the established pride and feelings of the people. Temporary as this power is with which Ministers have been invested, and mild as hath hitherto been their use of it, it is still a tremendous power, which, at once, protects and disgraces, preserves and terrifies the community. And well, Sir, may you, well may we all deprecate so mournful a sacrifice of our constitutional rights, if the safety of that constitution be not the sole and solemn foundation for it.

Let us then enquire, in the first place, on what ground Government themselves inform us they have ventured to take so important a step. In consequence of an increasing disposition in the Metropolis, and in many parts of the country, to insubordination and riot, a message was, on the third of February last, received from the Prince Regent, recommending to the House of Commons to take certain papers, relative thereto and therewith sent, "into their immediate serious consideration." And Viscount Sidmouth, on the succeeding day, in the House of Lords, observes, "it might easily be believed that such a communication would not have been made without the strongest conviction of its urgent and indispensable necessity." In fact, the state of the country, prior to the receipt of this message, is pretty well known to us all, both from the public papers and from our own separate local experience. Few seemed surprized at this communication, and still fewer censured its necessity. "Ministers (you remark) said that they knew of conspiracies

that were hatching so early as the 2d of August last. Of the preparation of the public mind for conspiracy, they might have known, and probably did, much earlier. Be that, however, as it may, the message was taken into immediate consideration, and the appointment of a Secret Committee of both Houses was the consequence.

Now, in forming these Committees, it doth not appear that Ministers were actuated by selfish, or partial views. For, among the names of the Members in both Houses, will be found several of their warmest and most uniform opposers. The Reports of these Committees are in the hands of all; and reports more seriously and dreadfully alarming, never, I am persuaded, met the public eye before. What the materials of their information were we know not; but if they were of such a nature as to bear them out in such reports, they must have been of a daring complexion indeed. And that they were of such a nature is fairly inferible from the impolicy, the insanity, the wickedness of laying before a Committee of as wise and virtuous men as this nation can boast of, relations either forged, or false, or neglectfully examined, or preposterously exaggerated, or by any other means found to be totally insufficient to support such dreadful, and on the supposition of their inadmissibility, such diabolical charges. Exaggeration seems to be the only suspicion to which they are fairly liable—but this error such a Committee would easily discover, and would instantly remove by the rejection of the whole of such materials at once. The fact, however is, that they receive nearly every thing, and reject little or nothing.

Let us now turn to the Reports themselves. The Committee of the House of Lords inform us, that they

* Mr. Coke's Speech, Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

to them, "such evidence as leaves no doubt in their minds that a traitorous conspiracy has been formed in the metropolis for the purpose of overthrowing, by means of a general insurrection, the established government, laws, and constitution of this kingdom, and of effecting a general plunder and division of property." That "one of their chief objects appears to have been to take every opportunity of attempting to seduce from their allegiance the soldiers of the different guards and at the barracks." That "designs of this nature have not been confined to the capital, but have been extended, and are still extending, widely, in many other parts of Great Britain, particularly in some of the most populous manufacturing districts." That "their object is, by means of societies or clubs, established, or to be established, in all parts of Great Britain, under pretence of parliamentary reform, to infect the minds of all classes of the community, and particularly of those whose situation most exposes them to such impressions, with a spirit of discontent and disaffection, of insubordination, and contempt of all law, religion, and morality; and to hold out to them the plunder and division of all property, as the main object of their efforts."— That "many of these societies pass under the denomination of Hampden Clubs." That "others are called Union Clubs," and, "others have adopted the name of Spencean Philanthropists." That in these various associations, "oaths of secrecy have been frequently administered, some of which are of the most atrocious and dreadful import." That "at the ordinary meetings of these societies, which are often continued to a late hour, their time is principally employed in listening to speeches tending to the destruction of social order, recommending a general equalization of property, and at the same time endeavouring to corrupt the morals of the hearers, and to destroy

represented as a monster which must be hunted down, and the fundholder as a still greater evil ; and both have been described as rapacious creatures, who take from the people fifteen-pence out of every quartern loaf." That " these meetings are frequently terminated, particularly in London, by profane and seditious songs and parodies of parts of the liturgy, in which the responses are chaunted by the whole company." That " an unremitting activity has been employed throughout the kingdom in circulating, to an unprecedented extent, at the lowest prices or gratuitously, publications of the most seditious and inflammatory nature, marked with a peculiar character of irreligion and blasphemy, and tending not only to overturn the existing form of Government and order of society, but to root out those principles upon which alone any government or any society can be supported." That " it appears to be an essential part of the system to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by public meetings, convoked either by the leaders of these societies, or by others, in the metropolis, and in populous places and districts, to address the multitude in terms of unprecedented licence and violence,* amounting even in some instances to an open declaration that, in case of non-compliance with their petitions, the Sovereign will have forfeited his claim to their allegiance." And finally, that in their opinion, " such a state of things cannot be suffered to continue without hazarding the most imminent and dreadful evils." And that, therefore, " they feel it to be their duty to

* What do some of the speeches, delivered in the County Meeting, in the Shirehall, Norwich, on the fifth of April, fall short, in insinuation, of these very addresses of " unprecedented licence and violence?" What, I ask, do they fall short of them in inflammatory tendency, though delivered by men, who, from their rank and property, cannot certainly be suspected of intending to light up the torch of sedition?

are necessary for the preservation of the public peace, and for the protection of interests in which the happiness of every class of the community is deeply and equally involved."

The Report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons, is, in its more substantial bearings, much the same ; and it is not unworthy of remark, that both of them coincide in attributing to the clubs of Spencean Philanthropists the most serious danger. The Commons' Report observes, " that this system of general spoliation chiefly proceeded from the doctrines maintained by a number of societies distinguished by the title of " Spencean," whose tenets were principally drawn from the works of a visionary writer, published above twenty years ago ;" that " a plan was formed for the seduction of the soldiers, by raising hopes of promotion in the event of their joining in the approaching attempt;" that " a plan was also formed for the seduction of the sailors, by offering them additional pay under the new Government which was about to be established ;" that there is " a widely-diffused ramification of a system of clubs, associated professedly for the purpose of Parliamentary Reform, upon the most extended principle of universal suffrage and annual parliaments ; that, " whatever may be the real object of these clubs in general, your Committee have no hesitation in stating, from information on which they place full reliance, that in far the greater number of them, and particularly in those which are established in the great manufacturing districts of Lancashire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, and which are composed of the lower order of artizans, nothing short of a revolution is the object expected and avowed ;" that in these associations " a new order is declared to be the will of the people ; rebellion is justified by the assertion, that a nation cannot be a rebel ; and all

tion in answer to the question, 'would you live without Gods or Kings?' 'we abjure tyranny of every kind;' " and that "the confidence of the disaffected is such, that they represent the numbers enrolled as amounting to several hundred thousand, and that their societies are daily increasing; that in their lists they distinguish by particular marks those among their subscribers who are able-bodied men, and ready to act when required; and that they also keep a list of those who refuse to join them in what they call a 'Black Book,' and threaten vengeance against those persons when the general insurrection shall take place."

And now, Sir, what have the orators of the County Meeting to oppose to this mass of melancholy and appalling intelligence? What arguments bring you forward to invalidate this sad statement, or to prop and shore up your own accusations? Truly nothing in the shape of an argument! Assertions, bold and mischievous, constitute almost entirely the weapons of your warfare. With the exception of your detailed defence of Mr. Edward Taylor and the Norwich Union Society, in the House of Commons,* not a syllable of proof is insisted upon to substantiate any part of your charge. My Lord Albemarle indeed takes a somewhat wider range, and affects a more plausible manner—represents the disaffected spirit which now prevails as the croakings of alarmists, and the conspiracies against Government as mere bugbears of the imagination—flourishes a little about the Court of Star Chamber, and the writ of Habeas Corpus; and finishes his anathema against the measures of Ministry, by calling on the people of Norfolk to set a noble example, by coming into his sentiments,

* Mr. Coke's Speech, Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

tive.* Mr. Southwell rests his proofs of these daring insinuations on a puny vindication of the Hampden Club, so denominated out of "respect to the memory of a patriot hero who had died in resisting arbitrary exactions."† While Mr. Glover, launching out, with his usual volubility, into property tax, and malt tax, and military establishments, and English refugees in France, and Mr. Croker's job, and Mr. Canning's salary, and Sergeant Firth's lack of legal knowledge, (though I believe, by the bye, that deficiency came home to himself) leaves the proof of these charges as he found it, neither attempting to illustrate, nor to strengthen what had been advanced by any accessions of his wisdom, or his wit. ‡

I believe there is scarcely one proposition or opinion you have here insisted upon, the validity of which could be granted only abstractedly considered, and without any regard to its influential consequences. It is idle to suppose that such specimens of senatorial disquisition as you have obtruded upon the public could, for a moment, stand the test of rational investigation. Such investigation is indeed out of the question, where there is nothing that assumes to itself even the colour of argument. Dislocate and break the joints of these speeches—take the political puppet, the County Meeting *Androides* to pieces, and examine the construction; it will presently be found that the figures of wax and wood have little to do with intellect, but that strong asseveration and unsparing rebuke do the work of proof, of argument, of reason, of sense, of conviction, of every thing! These we could, assuredly, well afford to overlook, if they

* Norfolk Chronicle and Norwich Mercury, April 12.

† Norfolk Chronicle. Ib.

‡ Norfolk Chronicle and Norwich Mercury. Ib.

that seditions are made out of.

It is really painful to be obliged to notice such a farrago of unaccredited, idle contumelies, as you have contrived to scrape together against Ministry in these wild effusions. But what can be done where men permit themselves to be lulled into security, or roused into disaffection by the insane efforts of party hostility? I almost, however, wonder you should not have been above fathering the miserable offspring of other people; for, in these bastard slips of eloquence, you have not even the poor consolation of originality. Fie, fie—you should not serve up to such respectable company the hash of yesterday's broken meats.—When Lauder accused Milton of plagiarism, he still left him in possession of high claims upon genius, and acknowledged that he had converted his stolen dross into gold. But your pilferings, and your use of them, are both of a quite different stamp. Like city scavengers, you gather up the sweepings of both Houses of Parliament as a manure to the hostile sentiments of the people of Norfolk, and thus dexterously contrive to convert the poison of one set of men into the food of another. The Noble Earl's friends will hardly be sorry at this allusion to *his* plagiarisms, inasmuch as it affords a presumption that those sentiments, so justly obnoxious to calm and virtuous feelings, were not the natural product of his own heart. In an evil hour he has stolen his wit from the Duke of Sussex, and his malice from Sir Francis Burdett. Very censurable, in my mind, are many of the speeches reported to be delivered in the Commons' House of Parliament, though considered only as addressed to the House; but promulgated without those precincts, and divested of neither their sophistry, their misrepresentation, nor their hostility, and open to as many as chuse to hear or peruse them, “both bad and good;” they become, amid the general discontent and disaffection of the times,

degree.

As to the Norwich Union Club, it can no further be considered as an object of consequence than as it connects itself with the Report of the House of Lords. So far as it may be thought to implicate the correctness of that Report, it is certainly entitled to notice. Even allowing, however, that the information received by Ministers of the nature and tendency of their principles was inaccurate, it will, I conceive, but little affect the general authenticity of the Report. This association was but slightly alluded to by the Lords, and not at all by the Committee of the Commons. It is not Mr. Southwell's Hampden Club, or Mr. Taylor's Union Society—it is not any petty ramification of discontent—any clandestine traffic and barter on bordering shores between Whig principles and Westminster politics—it is “the great and wide sea” of disaffection that Government look to—of disaffection not so much originating in any impropriety of legislative or executive conduct, as in the arts of men ever active to fan the blaze of rising, and to revive the embers of expiring enmity. A grand jury hath lately pronounced the city of Norwich to be free from seditious meetings. We are happy to hear it—but a licentious and turbulent disposition, inflamed by unfounded, or exaggerated statements, may pervade the population of Norwich, and of many other places. And it is the danger rather of this spirit, which comes within the reprehension of no law but the law of conscience, that is to be apprehended, than of such meetings, as, if ill disposed may be regulated, or punished by the law of the land.

Still, perhaps, it were to be wished, under all circumstances, that Mr. Taylor could be prevailed upon to comply with the request that has lately been made for a statement of “the birth, parentage, and edu-

cation of this his favourite protégé. Such a proceeding would, at once, gratify its friends, and silence and confound its enemies. A fair and full exposure of its views, its motives, and its principles, would be the best answer to those who have suspected, and the highest compliment to those who have vindicated its innocence. He has not yet, however, it seems, made up his mind to let the bird out of the cage. From motives best known to himself, he still keeps it "prisoner in his twisted gyves," employed, as it is whispered, in trimming its wings, polishing up its plumage, and refining its notes. You, Sir, and our county orators have represented it as a singer of sweet strains.

* See Mr. Skipper's Letter in the *Norwich Mercury* of April 5. I am not inclined to enter upon any controversy on this subject; but circumstances have transpired since the first Edition of my Letter, which go near to convince me that the authenticity of the Report of the House of Lords, so far as it is connected with the Norwich Union Society, cannot be considered as materially impeached by the declaration of the Grand Jury of that city, at the Sessions held April 15, 1817. Mr. Edward Taylor positively indeed asserts the Report to be, to his knowledge, (*Norwich Mercury*, March 15,) "wholly devoid of truth." It may be so; but we must have additional proofs of the Society's innocence, before we can consent either to acquit it, or to condemn the Committee of the House of Lords. The request made by Mr. Skipper certainly deserves notice. A fair, open, manly vindication of the Society, under present existing circumstances, is called for. I hope those better acquainted with city politics than myself will investigate this subject with the attention it deserves. Earl Grey, and others, have already made too good a use of the official declaration of Mr. Steward Alderson. Indeed every declaimer has banded about this slur upon Ministerial integrity, to the great detriment of public order, and the great triumph of those who are adverse to such order and to the measures of Government. The members of the Norwich Union Society will, I trust, forgive me these few remarks, when I assure them that I feel not the most distant wish, in any thing I have said, to "circumscribe their growing virtues;" all I desire is, if possible, to "confine their faults."

brought up by some unlucky wight to vociferate knave, knave, whenever it spies a *purple and orange* man pass the doors of its dwelling.

The Manchester plot, among the rest, comes in for a share of your ridicule. Read the state of the Manchester district, and tell me if it will bear you out in your contempts. See the savage hostility of these deluded people, not quelled in the atrocity of their revolutionary proceedings by the discovery of their conspiracies—not softened by any lenity Government was disposed to exercise towards them—but brooding over their resentment, and priding themselves in their disaffection. Would you, Sir, make England a scene of slaughter by apologising for such a spirit as this? Would you join the already too numerous host of those who insidiously lull us into security, that they may betray us into destruction? Can we believe, for a moment, that your information on this head is superior in correctness to that of the Select Committee of both Houses? What is my Lord Fitzwilliam's opinion of the state of the Manchester district? Does he think the insurgents may be safely left to themselves? Or will you say that the Lord Lieutenant is ignorant of the state of his own district? Pray how long is it that you have deemed thus lightly of popular commotions? Did you find them quite such harmless things about two years ago, when you were glad to turn your back upon certain worthy gentry of the city of Norwich, and get out of their clutches as fast as you could, leaving corn laws, and whig principles, and agricultural improvements, and friends, and foes, and followers, to shift for themselves as well as they were able?

Recollect, Sir, the cases of high treason in the year 1794, and see how narrowly the greater part of these patriots of the Hampden school escaped a public execution. Short of the charge of treason, would

Yet was there then the same cry of no danger—the same ludicrous representation of the magnitude of the conspiracies—the same turning up the nose at legislative interference—and the same delusions practised upon the people to persuade them that these offenders were all innocent, and that the whole was nothing more than a machination of Ministers against the peace and freedom of the realm. Government in this case, as now, had patiently abided until further delay would have been unpardonable. The work of disaffection was then performed, (though not so adroitly, nor with so full a scope, as it is at present ;) by inflammatory appeals to the ignorance and to the pretended oppressions of the poor, ever the most effectual means for the overthrow of any government. Mr. Wilberforce, who voted for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act upon that occasion, voted also the following year against its repeal, from, as he expressed it, “a conviction that much danger and sedition yet existed in the country.”† But Mr. Wilberforce is an alarmist. And so is every one, in certain people’s opinion, who leaves the unhallowed standard of democracy to rally round the constitution and the throne.

* The acquittal of Watson, and of the rest of the persons implicated with him, is, I conceive, no proof that the state of society in this country is at all better than the Reports of the Secret Committees have represented it; for though their offences did not, in the opinion of the Jury, amount to the crime of high treason, they might yet, in certain instances, fall very little short of it, and, at any rate, were of a most darkly seditious nature. When we consider how such acquittals usually weigh with the popular mind in such seasons as the present, and how they operate upon the tempers of bold and bad men; we cannot but regret that it should be deemed necessary to prosecute upon charges of so heinous a nature. However, let the equity and mercy of our laws remain unimpeached, whatever may be the guilt of the accused, or the sufferings of society.

† See the Debates at that period.

are frequently obtained, and have been so probably in the present instance, from needy and profligate characters. I am not disposed to defend the system of spies and informers. They are hateful instruments, and only to be resorted to upon last and trying emergencies. But in proportion as society becomes corrupt, or the commonwealth endangered, such instruments unfortunately cannot be entirely dispensed with. How many offences against domestic peace must go undetected and unpunished, if temptations to disclosure were not held out to accomplices? Certainly there may be little in this of honourable proceeding, but it is never in such dark deeds that we can have much to do with honour. Seditions at home and dangers abroad are its proper field. Sir Francis Walsingham, we know, "did employ and instruct his spies, how to get him intelligence of the most secret affairs of Princes;" and the Lord Burleigh, for capacity, dexterity, and secrecy, was exceeded by few. These great statesmen might not, and probably in a moral view of the transaction, did not approve of such unworthy means; but they saw the necessity of their adoption, and that the good, if not the preservation of the kingdom, mainly depended upon it. And when we recollect how great were the dangers from which our Country was extricated by the politic measures which they pursued, we shall be less disposed, perhaps, to condemn a procedure running in the same line, and called forth by the same plea, too well founded in the present emergency, of state necessity.

I do really wonder how, in the face of such evidence as these documents of the reports of the two Houses afford, you should have the temerity to venture such crude assertions, independent of their noxious tendency, as these speeches are replete with.— You seem neither to have concern for the credit of your understandings, nor compunction for the harsh-

“were the people of England to be deprived of their liberties on the ground of these senseless ravings?”* But does he suspect that his own ravings are no less incoherent, and much more mischievous? It is well if the language used at the County Meeting to disprove the disaffected spirit of the times, afford not but too sad a demonstration of its actual existence before our eyes.† When you, Sir, remark, that “the just rights of the people are opposed to the divine rights of legitimacy”‡—that “Ministers wished to deceive the people into a foolish belief that plots and conspiracies existed”‡—and that, on this false ground, “they have laid the country under restrictive and arbitrary laws.”‡ When my Lord Albemarle declares, that “Ministry and the Church have conspired to fix the charge of disloyalty on the people of England”§—that “Ministers, being themselves engaged in plots and conspiracies, scrupled not to charge their own crimes upon those who were innocent”§—that “the Reports of the two Houses were the result of a packed committee, deliberating upon partial evidence”§—that “the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was the result of these Reports, fabricated, in fact, by Ministers themselves”§—that “now a man might be imprisoned for life upon the information of a spy, a neighbour, or

* Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

† Surely there must have been something more than commonly alarming in the spirit of this celebrated Meeting, when it is recollected what were the feelings of the county towards Mr. Coke before it took place, and how torpid was every notion of any thing like opposition to his interest. There was, in fact, nothing on the part of Mr. Coke to fear, nor any thing to hope for on the part of Mr. Wodhouse, or indeed of any other gentleman, on whom the sun of Holkham had declined to shed the cheerings of his superfluous beams.

‡ Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

§ Norfolk Chronicle and Norwich Mercury. Ib.

dissolution in parliament, men might be taken up as seditious if they voted for an opposition member, and the High Sheriff himself confined for making an unpalatable return."* When Mr. Southwell advises the County of Norfolk "to break through the trammels of the Court, and proclaim the words of truth in the ears of the Sovereign."* When he recommends them "to petition again and again, and, if necessary, to add remonstrance until their prayer was granted."*—When Mr. Glover asserts, that "a large share of the popular discontent was entirely to be attributed to the unfeeling disregard of Ministers to the complaints of the people"†—that "the poor labourer out of eighteen-pounds a year paid ten-pounds in taxes"†—and that "one hundred thousand of our fellow subjects were living in France, to save themselves from the exactions of tax-gatherers and the operation of the excise."†—When sentiments of this nature are propagated at a season when so many are every where ripe for revolution, and in the face of documents of assured authenticity that completely contradict all such fallacious and mischievous assumptions, who can be surprised at the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, or rather, who would not be surprised if Ministers were so lost to every sense of duty, as, under such circumstances, not to suspend it? They have done this; and they have done it prudently, seasonably, virtuously, and with, perhaps, as compleat a unanimity in both Houses of Parliament as ever was witnessed on any similar lamentable occasion.

I know not in what light others may regard these efforts to persuade the people of Norfolk that their rulers are not worth obeying, but I do really consider

* Norfolk Chronicle and Norwich Mercury, April 12.

† Norfolk Chronicle. Ib.

some parts of these speeches to be of a cast as inflammatory and as revolutionary (clear as you may stand in intention) as any that could have been delivered at Palace-yard, Westminster, where licentiousness lords it over liberty, and where all respect for the Constitution is forgotten in a total dereliction of respect for the constituted authorities. When my Lord Albemarle “calls on the people of Norfolk to set a noble example to other counties, in coming to a vote declaratory of principles that were essential, in his view, *to the future security of the head of the government, to the preservation of the constitution, to the extinction of discontent, and to the prevention of revolution,*”* what is this but telling them, and through them the people of England, that resistance and revolution are *expected to follow, and will, in fact, be defensible* if these principles be not adopted? What does it fall short of a threat to the Prince Regent that *his preservation will depend upon his acquiescence in such principles?* When, again, Mr. Southwell recommends “*to rescue the Sovereign, even against his will if necessary,* from the dangers with which he is surrounded, by the confidence he gives to weak and incapable Ministers”*—when he assures them, that they have “*the prospect of famine and despotism soon to follow*”*—when he “accuses Ministers of having been guilty of base and contemptible falsehoods”*—of having “attempted to set one man against another, and promoted dissensions among Englishmen by the propagation of insidious and groundless calumnies”*—what, in the name of goodness, do charges like these amount to? Has this Gentleman considered the dreadful force of such accusations—the wretched tendency of language thus unguarded, thus inflammatory, thus calculated to rouse and stir up all the

bad humours of our population? What are we to understand by *rescuing a Sovereign against his will*? If the insinuation means any thing, means it less than every thing? This prospect too *of famine and despotism soon to follow*, what sort of a picture to profane eyes and ears does it present—what provocations to resistance and revolution does it not hold out? Again, as to *setting one man against another*, have Ministers done this at any time they deserve the block; have they done it at such a season as your Resolutions and Address describe, when distress is “turning all faces pale,” and misery wreathing herself into a thousand agonizing folds, the block would be a pardon to them. The deepest execration ought to rest upon their memories. We should erase their houses and sow the foundation with salt, and add a modern *vicus sceleratus* to the ancient, solitary, and abhorred one of Rome. When finally you, Sir, profess to “*wish from the bottom of your heart that you could say with a celebrated poet, in speaking of his Royal Highness, that he was one who rules his people with a parent’s love,*”* do you not hereby affix the seal of your commanding influence to all the wretched calumnies that can be raked together against your Prince, and to all the measures that may be taken to root out of the hearts of the people every trace of respect for his character, of regard for his safety, or of submission to his authority? If this be a fair sample of the political cast of the *Norfolk Hampden Clubs*, I should expect any body to join them, sooner than those “well known to be attached to the principles of the Revolution of sixteen hundred and eighty-eight.”† They seem rather fitted, I suspect, to the revolutionary principles, in a neighbouring nation, of *seventeen hundred and eighty-eight*.

* Extracted ad litteram from the *Norwich Mercury* of April 12, 1817. † Mr. Coke’s Speech, *Norfolk Chronicle*. *Ib.*

As I have before intimated, I believe that your intentions are upright. But suffer me to ask, have you and your coadjutors, considered the tendency of such sentiments, delivered at such a season, so thoroughly as others will consider it for you? Do you not in these speeches confirm the poor in the insane and destructive opinion that all the distress they experience is the work of Ministers? Do you not teach them that these Ministers (their natural guardians and preservers,) neither consult their comforts, nor care about their sufferings? Do you not, in plain terms, tell them that even now they might go near to put an end to these sufferings if they would, but that the more the people are distressed the more Ministers flourish and the safer they feel themselves? And is not the conclusion "as broad and general as the casing air," that under such imputed oppressions, obedience can no longer be a duty and rebellion scarcely a crime? Either, Sir, come forward and prove that I am not warranted in these inductions, or be content to sit down with the reprobation attached to so desperate and disgraceful a conduct. Either shew that I have mis-stated your assertions, mis-understood your sentiments, or ignorantly, or maliciously put upon them such constructions as, in common acceptation, they will not, and ought not to bear; or, if you cannot do this, retire from the reproaches of an injured people, and learn the extent of your offence in the silent, solitary, unpitied weight of your sufferings.

No domestic virtues in those who deliver such sentiments can subduct from their pernicious, popular effect. We will not take from you your integrity of motive, but that is all we can leave you. In every other respect you must be content to stand bare and exposed to the common gaze. Mr. Southwell, indeed, makes a pretty forcible appeal in favour of *his* uprightness—he appeals to *himself*! "I know myself (says he) to be an honest man, and I trust you be-

lieve me to be so.”* We have certainly no objection to offer against his honesty, especially when it comes backed with such an overwhelming recommendation; but we confess we should have liked it quite as well had we found it in better company, and coupled with better sentiments. The Addresses at Norwich were not made exclusively to your constituents; perhaps they were not intended to be so made. You all knew where your strength lay, and you acted accordingly; teaching a two-fold lesson to a double set of hearers, and certainly no lesson to either of obedience “to the powers that be,” or of “submission to the ordinances of man for the Lord’s sake.” Whoever may act as the Pythia of your political Delphos, she preserves, at least, one part of her original character; she pours forth her oracular inspirations with her accustomed madness. If County eloquence be at so low an ebb, I should advise you to have your remonstrances manufactured by Messrs. Cobbet and Hunt, at once. They can stuff them with no greater absurdity and with hardly any grosser insults. Do your constituents wish the *Norfolk Address* to be classed with the five hundred and twenty-seven petitions brought up by Sir Francis Burdett, not one of which was deemed worthy of the honour of being laid upon the table?

Could we, indeed, filter from these wretched declamations, their mischief, and leave them only their folly, we might then content ourselves with packing off such orators, with their friends, the Spencean Philanthropists, “under the custody of a Keeper of Lunatics.” But whatever may be thought, Sir, of the potency of your reason, we cannot but be alarmed at the weight of your influence. When men of such respectability come forward with such charges, the

mischief does not rest where it seems to rest. Mr. Coke may be forgotten—the County Meeting may be forgotten—even the chastised and bashful eloquence of Mr. Glover may cease to be remembered ; but the effects on the untutored mind, then and there produced, will be neither obsolete nor inactive. It is not in the calm moments of retirement—it is not in the city of Norwich, or the county of Norfolk alone, that the force of your allusions will be felt, or the tendency of your sentiments will be cherished—no, Sir, these allusions, these sentiments will rest in comparative insignificance, until “the fulness of time is come.” When revolution bursts forth upon its prepared scale—when it pervades the whole united kingdom—when it carries with it, in its detested train, the plunder of our property and the assassination of our person—then will all these bold speeches, these daring and unholy imputations, cast upon the constituted authorities of the realm, do their work—then will murder and rapine lead the way with these pandects of disaffection, these incentives to sedition, these absolutions from treason in their hands—and then, may you and your coadjutors be made to feel the effects of your own counsels, and, like Procrustes, be the first to be stretched upon your own iron beds. He who furnishes, however unintentionally, the materials for rebellion, must not be intimidated if he behold his domains, at no very distant period, surrounded by revolutionary lamp posts.

We should suppose, Sir, that you had lived in another age, and that the origin, the growth, and the dreadful consequences of the French Revolution, had never been known to you ; or that, cast in a deep slumber, you had but just awoke when the fury was gone by. If the Reports of the Secret Committees be correct, (and he who sees and feels the state of society about him will be the last to suspect them,) you must observe the near and fearful approaches of

the similarity of our situations. You must see the bad part of our population on the same high road to disobedience with theirs—that like them we have our demagogues—our mob haranguers—our blasphemers of religion—our revilers of Government—our expositors of, what is termed, ministerial weakness and wickedness to the inflamed feelings and ardent gaze of the multitude; and that they only wait for a more compleat demoralization of society, to cover us with the same crimes, and remunerate us with the same cruelties. I have neither the time, nor the inclination, to trace out a comparison between the state of the public mind which took place in France, previously to the revolution, and that which seems now rapidly taking place in England. But there are not wanting those who watch the progress of disaffection in this country with an anxious eye, and who are, alas! but too well born out in their darkest forebodings by the complexion of our present proceedings.

Consider, I beseech you, Sir, before your enmity towards Ministry entirely overpower your judgment, consider the consequences of misleading the popular mind on so awful an emergency as the present. The very worst Governments it hath ever been the wisdom and policy of antiquity to support, in preference to taking the chance of changes, always tumultuous, and often unprofitable. Did not the Roman people bear with the greatest tyranny before they were aroused to banish their Kings? Did they not consent to experience the highest acts of injustice before they could be persuaded to do away with their Decemviri? Were not proscriptions and horrors of all kinds submitted to, before they settled themselves into an Imperial Government? And when they had done so, could they be persuaded to sacrifice those abhorred monsters, their Neros and Caligulas, to a just indignation, until they had stained their characters with the deepest crimes, and actually debased their human

nature below that of the brutes? And, to go to what some may, perhaps, deem a still greater length of popular patience and sufferance, was it not owing to the enormity of their despotism and cruelty alone that the Pisistratidæ were finally expelled at Athens from even an usurped throne? If modern examples of the same disposition in a people to put up with the worst of Governments, as long as possible, sooner than encounter the risk of change, be needed, we may find them in periods of our own history, and more particularly in the history of the late French revolution. In most kingdoms, indeed, the sober part of a population, left to themselves, and not spirited up by designing demagogues, would acquiesce in the imperfections incident to all human institutions, and would bear their lot accordingly. Nor do they herein act unreasonably; for hardly any of the changes in the ancient States, and very few too in more modern times, (our own excepted) were attended with any adequate advantages to them. All the benefit accrued to those who, from private motives of ambition, brought them about; who first inflamed the passions of the people against their rulers, and then sacrificed their interest. Only, as I before remarked, where the evil was gross and crying, did they seriously, and of their own accord, bring their hearts into the hazardous work of reform.

Upon principles thus founded on a policy sufficiently, I think, to be commended, it must ever happen, that revolutions in a State will be discountenanced as long as they prudently can. So jealous, indeed, were the Athenian people of innovation, that even Socrates himself, mild as was his manner, and cautious as he was of injuring the sanctity of received notions, especially in religious matters, did not escape censure for the imputation of “drawing the people over to opinions contrary to the laws.”* But you, and those

who think and act with you, refuse this support to your own Government, not only without proof of its being bad, but even with the far weightier proof against you, that it has acted wisely and virtuously, and, as Colonel Wodehouse declared, “is eminently deserving the gratitude of the Country.”* Nay you do more than refuse it your support; you even load its administrators with your reproaches and your scorn—you harass them in every way you can devise—you embody against them not only your own influence, but the alarming force of that most formidable, and but for the insidious arts inhumanly practised on them, that most virtuous part of our population, the middle and lower classes of society. And this you do, not at a season when, with better means, Government could better resist such dastardly attacks; but when misfortunes press them down on all sides—when your Country, resting from the noblest contention that ever graced her annals, is first feeling the severity of her wounds in the ingratitude of her children—when future security hath been obtained by present sacrifices—when the glory of our exertions is become the source of our privations—when Providence has thought fit to add to our calamities, by blasting our expectations—and when, according to your own concession, all around is one unbroken scene of distress, and difficulty, and consternation, and despair! This is Mr. Coke’s time, when every good man forgets his enmity, and every prudent man foregoes his opposition—*this alas! is Mr. Coke’s time for increased exertions and increased hostility!*

Take care, Sir, or you may change some of the most commanding features of your nature before you are aware of it. The County of Norfolk has hitherto thought Mr. Coke, not indeed at any period, a friend

to the Administration, but still, at no period, an enemy to the Constitution of his Country; not perhaps very violent in his attachment to the Clergy, but still no disliker of the Church; not altogether, it may be, so orthodox as we might wish him in every point of his religious creed, but still without the shadow of a leaning towards the disgusting absurdities of Sectarism. Alas! “how are the mighty *falling*!” Neither for the British Constitution, which, by disorganizing speeches, he disgraces; nor for the Established Church, which, through the sides of her Ministers, he undermines; nor for the distinguishing doctrines, rites and ceremonies of that Church, which, by his indirect fraternization with Dissenters, he discredits, does Mr. Coke appear to have that regard left which such a man, at such a period as the present, ought to manifest. Whatever degree of affection he might once entertain for them, the spell is beginning to break. An opposite interest seems to be rising in his heart; in that heart made bitter by offended pride, but still lingering on the confines of political liberality.

There is a point, in all concerns of vital importance, at which censure would do well, perhaps, to pause, and mercy too. God knows, with our many individual infirmities sticking close about us, there is little room for uncalled for severity one towards another. To errors of judgment we should be lenient—to confession of faults we should be liberal—to repentance of heart and reformation of conduct, we should manifest those feelings which characterize us as men, and give us a foretaste of that “joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth.” It is not the political speculations of the closet reasoner, always too refined for the grossness of social manners—it is not the wild and visionary dreams, the Utopias and Oceanas of well-meaning but mistaken enthusiasts—it is not even the glowing sentiments of

those who, in devotion to their opinions, are apt to confound liberty with licentiousness, and to cut up the root while they are admiring the luxuriance of the branch. It is none of these things that we are at present alarmed at. Such aberrations of the human mind have our pity and our pardon. But for those who, under the mask of freedom of sentiment, are introducing anarchy into the bosom of their country—for those who, in a season of unprecedented calamities, are watching their “hour of darkness” to increase those calamities—for those who, to bring about their nefarious projects, would tear up, at once, our civil and ecclesiastical foundations, strong, and broad, and deep as the wisdom of past ages has laid them; and, in the accomplishment thereof, would heap Pelion upon Ossa, and Ossa upon Olympus; and forgive me, Sir, if I am almost tempted to add, for those who with no badness, it may be, of heart, but with a most pitiable weakness of the head—by intemperate speeches at County Meetings—by inflammatory language against the measures of Government—by harrassing opposition to a Ministry that hath received the meed of praise from so large a portion of honourable minds, and is only reviled by the designing, or disappointed, who are working up the common mind to frenzy, and impressing upon it that very tone and temper which those most implacable in their hostilities wish to see impressed—for men of this description, seeking the gratification of their passions through channels, at once, so desperate and so dreadful, we have neither pity nor pardon!

Whatever might have been the leanings of your private sentiments at so awful a crisis, you should have felt the duty of keeping them to yourselves. There are periods indeed in every man's life, when he may feel the foundation of his earlier opinions shaken, and larger and sounder ideas rising up in

their room. It is the natural consequence of growing years and improving knowledge, and we ought not to think disparagingly of each other for it. But, with the consciousness you must possess of the passing course and current of events—of the present peculiar “distress of nations with perplexity,” and the present very alarming practices to obviate that distress—so alarming, that even some of the firmest friends of your own party, the Grenvilles, the Fitzwilliams, the Buckinghams, have deemed it expedient to strengthen the hands of Government for the tranquillization of the country—of the still more alarming system for corrupting society by the dispersion of blasphemous and seditious publications (so cheap that every body can buy them, and so enticing that nobody will fail to read them) and by the more plausible, though not less dangerous institution of political clubs, and debating societies, and associations of a still holier cast, that have torn three parts of the Bible out of their creed, and only reserve the remainder as a peg whereon to hang their profaneness—with such a consciousness of existing circumstances, does it become you, Sir, does it become any one whose regard for the Constitution in Church and State is not confined to his lips, but settles and fixes upon his heart, to increase those insanities of the popular mind which it is so much the interest of all parties to see quelled and annihilated?

Certainly not every man would dare, not every man would descend to the depths of crime. There are regular gradations in vice which even the darkest dispositions are backward to overleap. But the common mind may be so wrought upon, until some weaker, or more ferocious, or more enthusiastic than the rest, no longer “terrified (as Tacitus expresses it)*

by the mightiness of the iniquity," is found willing to lift up the dagger and let the destruction take its course. So it was in the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham—so it was in the murder of Charles I. so it probably may have been in the lamented death of the late Mr. Perceval, and so it infallibly, in all cases, will be, where men are seduced to believe that the perpetration of wickedness will promote the cause of virtue. Read, Sir, merely that single page of your own history with attention which sets before us the narrative of Wat Tyler's Rebellion. See how pardonably the first blow was struck, and how, without a claim to the remotest shadow of pardon, every other blow followed. Behold the devastation that preceded and brought up the rear of this demagogue.—See how, as he journeyed, he enlisted under his banners the dregs of society, and how eagerly, and in what terrific numbers, they flocked from all parts to his revolutionary standard: the choice spirits, the Hampden members and Spencean associates of those days, who fancied they could make a far better Government than that they found. Behold them urged on by the intemperate harangues of interested leaders, laying all before them with fire and sword. See the pillage of property—the violation of person—the execution of such of the nobility, magistracy, and gentry as happened to fall in their way. Look at the mob in the capital opening the gates upon their approach—the ravages, the burnings, the plunderings of the Houses of Lords and Commons that took place on this junction—their decapitation, in the Tower, of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord High Treasurer! Affords not this single picture (and we have too many such in the records of history),* a

* Almost all the rebellions in Ireland have been of this description. The Oak Boys, the Steel Boys, the White Boys, all

tolerable sample, a mournful criterion of the pulse of popular frenzy—of that pulse which, like ignorant physicians, you are constantly tampering with, and know not that the springiness of its beat betokens, alas! no sanative crisis, but must speedily lead on to dissolution and death?

I ask, Sir, ought such examples as these to be lost upon us in such times as these? Where is the buried wisdom of our ancestors? Have we no recollection of their perilous seasons, and of their conduct in the midst of such seasons? Will the grave give us back nothing of the experience deposited in its bosom? Our Burleighs, our Walsinghams, our Bacons, have they all lived, and acted, and written in vain; or are we so lost to their posthumous fame, or so wedded to our own opinions, that we will ask no advice from their ashes, nor reap any fruit from their instructions? When men are disposed to make holy vows at the altar of their country, they will seek counsel from all ages. When they wish to feel and find out their duty, they will consult all precedents. When the real flame of patriotism warms their hearts, the cast of soul, the thoughts, the policy of their forefathers in tried circumstances will become embodied before them, more venerable for their years, and more weighty for their experience. But every page of your own history, Sir, is a memento against the present line of your politics. In every page you may inform yourself that the strong, ungovernable passions of weak, or vicious minds, have never been raised without danger, or subdued without difficulty; that even in cases of imaginary distress, all inflammatory experiments are sufficiently obnoxious; but that

furnish us with sufficient proofs of the danger attending an insurrectionary spirit in minds uncivilized, and heated to madness by incendiary orators.

made upon minds soured by real hardships, however unavoidable, we increase, in no common degree, both the evil and the guilt.

That evil, and that guilt I fear you, and some of your party, have not been very sedulous to avoid the imputation of. Do I class Mr. Coke with the Cobbets and the Hunts, the inflammers of the popular disaffection, the disturbers of the public peace? I do. Nay, I go even further than this—I go so far as to contend, that with clearer motives and purer principles, your line of political conduct has a yet *more fatal tendency* than theirs. The common, violent demagogues of the day are, for the most part, upon enquiry, men who have forfeited much of their claims upon the respect of their fellow creatures; who have reduced themselves, by unwarrantable and extravagant courses, to such a state of desperation, that no changes in any Government can make their situation worse. With the ruin of worldly prospects, especially when brought about by our own evil instrumentality, the ruin of the heart and mind is but too often associated. When hope leaves our horizon, desperation soon covers up our sense of shame. Under such unhappy circumstances men bow before the Demon they have raised, and with all the forlorn feelings of a tortured spirit are ready to exclaim,

So farewell hope! and with hope, farewell fear!

Farewel remorse! all good to me is lost:

Evil, be thou my good! *

A commercial, speculating, free nation like ours, will ever have but too many malecontents of this description. We look for them—we know them—we prepare against them. But recollect, the higher and more illustrious classes of society, take higher and more commanding ground. Quid verum atque decens,

Curo et rogo. Theirs is "the pious awe," that not unfrequently "fears to offend." The sacredness of character—the dignity of rank—the pride of independence—the possession of wealth—the consciousness of influence—the resources of knowledge and literature—all these, Sir, in men like yourself, are stern and stubborn supporters of virtue; powerful nourishers of rectitude in private life, and no less incentive to that public support of Monarchical Government under which they can alone grow and flourish. But all these the vulgar demagogue is, for the most part, destitute of. For his conduct therefore, inflammatory as it may be, there is extenuation, there is apology, there is abatement of guilt. But what extenuation, what apology can there be for men who are in possession of all that should turn them to the strengthening the hands of Administration in troublous times, but who yet, in times the most troublous, are only more sedulous in their opposition, and more inveterate in their hostility.

You further see, Sir, the divisions at the present period not in the State alone, but in the Church. You see how split and divided we are in our religious opinions and professions; how this man is for Paul, and that for Apollos, and a third for Cephas. And you know that great Statesmen have ever considered this as a very dangerous symptom in the body politic; so dangerous indeed, that no men are less to be depended upon for patriotic feeling than those who dissent so widely from the Establishment, and from each other in their devotional creeds. Would prudent Senators then attempt to increase those divisions by sending forth idle, unaccredited censures? The vulgar demagogue does not see, or, if he does, can rarely bring himself impartially to consider the evil of such conduct. He therefore joins in the cry against all religion, because he cares for none. But if reproach of our Ecclesiastical Establishment works with no

mean effect, proceeding only from the mouths of coarse and common adversaries, who disdain her ceremonies and insult her doctrines ; with how much deeper mischief will these insinuations operate when thrown out, with a sufficiently sarcastic spirit, by those who are high in rank, high in landed possessions, ostensibly of her own communion, and professedly among the number of her friends ?

Nor is it an unimportant consideration, that the present season is exactly such a one as to render speeches of a disaffected tendency, from men of influence like yourself, doubly pernicious and doubly disgraceful. It hath usually been in unsettled times that unjust and designing men have made their way, through a host of improvident concessions, to inordinate attainments of power. Almost all the encroachments of the Church of Rome, in our own Country, have been effected in periods of commotion, and the heaviest blows have been struck when the State was least prepared to receive, and least able to repel them. If domestic distresses have been added to foreign perplexities, so much the better for their insidious views. The more complicated the troubles, the fairer the chances of success ; and I need not add, how frequently a disaffected spirit has been fomented in order to increase these probabilities. On this principle the Roman Catholics have usually acted ; on this principle the Dissenters from the Church of England have acted ; and on this principle all parties inimical to our Constitution, Civil and Ecclesiastical, are acting now—some on a larger and coarser, others on a more confined and purer, but not less noxious scale ; and the greater the cowardice and baseness of such behaviour, the more decisive the expected final result. But we shall never, I hope, live to see the period when the *Senatus Consultum* of a British Parliament shall be forced to yield to the *Plebiscitum* of a Norwich County Meeting, or the three estates of the realm be

merged into a decemvirate convocation at Palace-yard, Westminster.

Can any conduct, Sir, be more reprehensible than that which is founded on a systematic opposition to the measures of Government, at all times, and almost under all circumstances; and can any thing equal such an opposition in its mischievous consequences, which comes, not from the common demagogue, whose defect in rank and character is usually our best security against his evil designs, but from such men as Mr. Coke, Mr. Southwell, and my Lord Albemarle? Men who, in a season like the present, locking up their prejudices, ought to lead the popular feeling of their County to more chastised views, and to implant in the minds of the people more patient and submissive sentiments; submissive, not slavish. They are widely different in their nature, and as different in their fruits. But what is the conduct of the Holkham Cabinet on the present emergency? They pretend that worse will befall us if we do not come into their Measures, adopt their Resolutions, and join in their Address. I should be glad to know what they mean by worse. What can be worse than to encourage a disposition to impute to the bad counsels of those who have the rule over us, what a transition from war to peace, what a depressed commerce, what accident, what glory, what the visitations of Providence itself have produced? What can be worse than to persuade a people, labouring under severe pressure, and ever prone to dark credulities, that their condition is desperate, and is likely to continue so? What can be worse than thus arousing them to expect the greatest of evils, to prepare them for the commission of the greatest of crimes? "Let a Prince (says Montesquieu) not be afraid; he cannot imagine how natural it is for his people to love him." What then, Sir, can be worse than to loosen the strong hold which a Sovereign has upon the affections of his subjects, and by an

unholiness of conduct (I know not of what cast, or character,) to run the hazard of cancelling affection where the absence of affection must be death? Are you not called upon to pause before you thus breathe unto a populace, ripe, by your own acknowledgments, for revolution, a spirit that, carried to the exterminating point, must overwhelm, at once, both the Government and yourselves? “When discords, (says my Lord Bacon) and quarrels, and factions are carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of Government is lost;” and his Lordship might have added that, when that is the case, the comfort and happiness of the people are lost also.

I leave, Sir, to both people and populace, (who though often confounded, are not precisely the same); I leave to both those of your own, and those of opposite political persuasions, a dispassionate consideration of *the Report of the two Houses of Parliament, and of the County Commentaries* upon them. Let them fairly compare these opposite documents. Let them remember that the one are the deductions of a sacred and legislative body, from evidence, probably as strong and as calamitous as ever was submitted to a British House of Parliament—the other an ebullition of party zeal, worked up beyond its safe and useful level, and bursting upon an astonished, rather than, I am inclined to believe, an approving audience with all the virulence of wild and exasperated feeling. After due examination, they must inevitably rest in this conclusion—that if the statements of our County orators be correct, Ministers are not only the *vilest calumniators*, the *most inveterate enemies* of that nation which they have been called upon to protect, but they are absolutely the *greatest idiots* that ever administered the government of a kingdom, and more fit for a lunatic asylum than the very Spenceans themselves. But if, on the other hand, the Committees of the two Houses shall be found to possess so much common

sense and common honesty as to make correct deductions from safe and sufficient premises, and to give a faithful report of the present deplorable state of the country, I should be glad to know, in that case, *where common sense and common honesty would seem to be miserably deficient.*

Of one thing we may rest assured, that the suspension of this Act can do no harm to those who think well and behave well. Indeed, if they were not told of it; if it were not made the stalking horse of designing demagogues and angry declaimers, the people of England would probably never know, from its operation upon their domestic comforts, that it was suspended at all. These comforts, indeed, may be said rather to be secured and increased thereby. It is not likely that Ministers will drive this accession of power to any extremity. If, as Sergeant Firth intimated, a Noble Earl could indulge with impunity in such sentiments as he delivered the other day, there was "but little evil to be apprehended from the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act."*

* The second Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Lords, on the subject of traitorous practices, is now before the public. It by no means invalidates, but rather, I think, adds strength to the correctness of the former Reports. It confesses, indeed, the insufficiency of some of their sources of information, and the little dependence, in consequence, to be placed thereupon. But it adds, that "allowing for these circumstances, the Committee are still of opinion, that the statement which they proceed to give is by no means exaggerated, but perfectly warranted by the papers submitted to their inspection." And we leave it with the judgment of every cool and dispassionate mind, whether this statement be not such as to bear the Committee out in their conclusion, that "after an examination of the papers referred to them, they feel it their painful duty to declare, that they see but too many proofs of a traitorous conspiracy to overthrow the Government and the Constitution, and to subvert the existing order of society." The Report further furnishes us with reason to believe, that much of our increased tranquillity is owing to the beneficial effects of the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. This is the opinion of those Magis-

Your third charge against Ministers, to which I am now arrived, sets forth that, "in consequence of this suspension, every injustice towards the subject may, and probably will be committed with impunity, as the prevention of public meetings and of petitioning, the renewal of the property tax, the destruction of the liberty of the press, and the extermination of the freedom of the people." This is a tolerable load of tyrannies, it must be confessed. A little time, however, will either fulfil, or blast these direful forebodings—these "high strains of divination," which, I trust, will hardly be found to proceed, like Cassandra's, from lips moistened by the tongue of Apollo, though I make no doubt of their retaining one feature of her prophetic spirit—to be delivered to every body and believed by nobody. You contend that it is the wish of Ministers to enslave the country; but you take care, at the same time, to put a pretty stout spoke into their wheel, by declaring "that you are the same tyrant-hater as ever, and that all their gagging bills shall not stop your mouth."* Truly, unless your mouth speaketh wiser things, there may be no need of a gag. It is not these oratorical flourishings that we are alarmed at, which, invested only with their own natural force, would gently die away like a wave upon the shore; it is the influence they may carry with them, the counsels they may draw after them.

The right of meeting and of petitioning has never, that I know of, been denied, nor have any meetings been discountenanced that were decorously conducted, nor any petitions rejected that deserved to be re-

trates in the disturbed districts, who have had the best opportunities of witnessing the actual operation of such suspension. To this description of Gentlemen the Country is, at the present moment, highly indebted. Their services are invaluable.

* Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

ceived. But if men will make the exercise of this right a channel for the relinquishment of their duties—if, under the plea of addressing, they vilify those who have the “rule over them”—if, instead of a calm, chastised, equitable representation of grievances which they may believe unnecessarily and unconstitutionally exist, they substitute defamatory declamations replete with hardships, that, if real, cannot probably be avoided, but which for the more part exist only in their own jaundiced views, or hostile and bitter spirits—who can wonder that, with any sense of the dignity of a British House of Parliament left, such pestiferous schedules should be rejected with the scorn they merit. Almost all our present petitions cry out for annual parliaments and universal suffrage. Such a request cannot be granted, neither constitutionally, as some affirm, nor conveniently, as most allow, unless we consent, for “chaos to come again,” and for discord, and riot, and rebellion to lord it over the realm. I am glad, Sir, that in this respect you have the honour to be classed with Mr. Hunt’s “puny reformers and milk-sop patriots.”

Any thing approaching to universal suffrage, must inevitably end in universal corruption and confusion. History falls, with her full weight of evidence, in support of this assertion. While the freedom of Rome was confined to Roman citizens, all went on well; but when this privilege was indulged to their allies in Italy, and, in process of time, to other nations, a woful alteration, we know took place. Divisions without end; machinations in proportion to those divisions; corruptions in proportion to those machinations, and a final erasement of all that was Roman in the spirit, the patriotism, and the glory of the people. How nearly we are ourselves approximating to this state of things, I leave those to consider who are aware of the similarity of our proceedings with those at Rome in the above period; of the identity of our

wishes as to the extension of the elective franchise, and of the spirit of some of our public meetings for the purport of addresses to Parliament, and which, like their Roman prototypes, are many of them little better than petitioning conspiracies against Government. And what ground have these complainants for the exercise of such liberties—liberties which our constitution knows nothing of—which honest-meaning men would never take, and which designing men will, I trust, ever take to no purpose. Do not these insulting petitions render necessary the very restraints against which they declaim? Do they not afford, in their own principles, a justification of the proceedings they affect to deprecate? Do they not stamp the conduct of Ministers with the seal of wisdom, and in legible characters demonstrate to the whole kingdom, that the suspension of which they so loudly complain is only a prudent curb upon the spirit of the bad, and a necessary precaution for the security of the quiet, virtuous part of the community?

Freedom of speech, and the liberty of the press will, I conceive, neither of them be much injured by the temporary suspension of this Act. The liberty of the press is the grand palladium and last refuge of oppressed and insulted virtue; nor can it, perhaps, be materially curtailed without subjecting society to nearly as great evils as would result from its most inveterate abuse. You do well, Sir, and we shall all do well, to stand up against its unnecessary violation. A free press is the only solid security of our national grandeur and happiness. From this source flow much of the knowledge and much of the virtue of man; nor must we consent to behold its operations clogged for slight and unavoidable defects. The scorching rays of the sun amid the torrid zone will not warrant us in the wish that the light of heaven could be dispensed with. No where does the inexplicable plan of Providence thicken upon us more than in this instance,

where the evil is so blended with the good that we cannot tell how to separate them. But though restrictions of the press, in a free country, will ever be attended with vast unpopularity and some danger, it is, alas! a danger that must be encountered where the state of society is become so thoroughly depraved as to demand it. We must cut off a limb to preserve a life. Yet most cautiously and tenderly must the operation be performed; nor should opinions be punished before we are persuaded that they tend to the thorough disorganization of society. To drag those to the stake who soberly think for themselves (however differently they may think to what we could wish them), and there shew them their want of belief by our want of mercy, is an injustice that no Christian community is, I trust, again likely to be guilty of. It is not the exercise of reason that we have any cause to dread—it is the abuse of that godlike power—the sophistry and licentiousness of evil disposed men, grafted on that divine faculty which we are so justly alarmed at. When the freedom of the press is converted into the corruption of the people, the fruit of such a tree of liberty is only bitterness and ashes.

The art of printing has usually been reckoned among the primary causes of all revolutions and reformations that have taken place since that important discovery. It has certainly multiplied the inlets to information in a very wonderful degree. But has not licentiousness, too, from the same source gained much additional spread and power, and do not all improvements in knowledge, resulting from this art, go hand in hand with abuses that are constantly drawing us back to depraved manners? That the press is, at present, dreadfully licentious, no one will deny; and though it be the firmest security of our rights, and the strongest guard of our constitution, yet constantly is it mixing its dearest gifts with its cruellest perversions. Its light is indeed immortal, and, like a wondrous

building of divine masonry, it "reacheth even unto the heavens," but there is a "blackness of darkness" that still hovers and settles about its base. I speak this with great humility, for I know the blessings of a free press too well ever to deem lightly of them : but I speak it with, alas ! more assurance of its justice than I could wish for.

It was once indeed the fashion of the day—the pitiful expedient of weak and interested minds, to stamp all political and religious disquisitions with the seal of infamy ; and Roman Catholic infallibility and Roman Catholic cruelty, went hand in hand, like giants travelling the vale of desolation. But, thank God, we have got rid of the monsters, and may the liberality of modern legislation never be imposed upon to suffer such abhorred shades to darken the land more ! Implicit confidence, in matters either ecclesiastical or civil, is not needed, is not desired. The right of free discussion, not indeed pushed, as now, to "folly and madness," but sanctioned and ratified by the voice of reason, will be consecrated by the approbation of the wise and good. It is a miserable state of society where Government is obliged to put a *veto* upon the sentiments of its members. But who are we to thank for it ? Not the dispassionate enquirer after truth, but the impudent perverter of virtue.

And here, Sir, I must beg leave, while we are upon the subject of freedom of sentiment, to offer a few words in my own vindication. Mr. Glover, in his late pamphlet, which I might be well justified, perhaps, in despising for its coarseness, and in neglecting for its irrelevancy, has been pleased to make pretty broad and frequent allusions to what he considers as my sycophancy and apostacy. What meaning these terms may have in the Hampden Court Calendar I know not ; but, taken in their honest, fair acceptance, I feel no alarm at the imputation. Of sycophancy my very enemies, if they knew me, would

probably feel disposed to acquit me. To the charge of apostacy, with due deference to the public, but with no deference to the malice of my accuser, I plead most conscientiously, not guilty. Changes in my political opinions, and considerable ones, there certainly have been; and God forbid there should not. I shall, however, say but little upon this subject at present; and that little is extorted from me by a sense of duty which I owe to those who are inclined to think favourably of my labours. To Mr. Glover I owe nothing but my most perfect scorn and contempt.—They who are disposed to listen to, I hope, no very intrusive claim upon their candour, will do me the honour of perusing this slight deviation from my subject. They who are otherwise disposed, will do me the greater honour of passing it over.

Far be it from me to charge any man with relaxation of principle, because I discover in him a change of sentiment. These harsh accusations, I should hope, are much more frequently made than merited; harsh, because when we take away a man's integrity, what, I would be glad to know, do we leave him? Man at his first setting out on his earthly pilgrimage, is, as his Creator intended he should be, an admirer of virtue. All his inclinations—all his propensities—all his bestirring powers inlist themselves in her train. His soul is then fresh and new—his feelings ardent and in their first bloom; before the winds of spring have swept over their cradle, or dispoiled them of any portion of their delicacy. But, at this early period, he makes a poor casuist on the perfectibility of human nature, or of such institutions as are the work of human beings. Those delightful mental visions that present themselves in the morning of life we err, not in warmly admiring, not in even hastily adopting, but in believing they will stand the test of future and fuller experience; in forgetting that human passions, and of the worst cast, will mix with

generous sentiments ; and, alas ! soon dispel the seductions of a too refined philosophy and of a too sanguine morality ! Long, long has probably faded away with most of us the sweet and solemn imagery in which we had invested our earlier notions ! Like scenes of infancy which we revisit after the lapse of years, we may still preserve for them a fondness of recollection, but the charm that gave them their enchantment is no more ! We must distinguish, if we wish not to charge one another foolishly, between change of sentiment with, and without relaxation of principle. Change of sentiment, without relaxation of principle, may take place with the full accordance of virtue ; nay, it may even happen that virtue would be very justly offended by the omission of such change.* But when our former opinions, neither superficially formed, nor unheedfully entertained, are relinquished, not because our judgment of men and things can be fairly presumed to be altered ; not because we cease to think and feel as we have evermore thought and felt on the great points of religion, or policy, but merely because we suffer selfish motives and interested views to guide us ; merely because

* Mr. Burke, in his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," wherein he endeavoured to remove the charges of inconsistency brought against him in his "Reflections on the French Revolution," observes, "it is not so much that he is wrong in his book, as that he has therein belied his whole life. I believe, if he could venture to value himself upon any thing, it is upon the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most. Strip him of this, and you leave him naked indeed." P. 30. Mr. Burke was, at this period, loaded with the grossest charges and abuse, from all quarters, on his presumed political delinquencies. He then proceeds to shew, in various instances, where he was reproached with changing his sentiments and acting inconsistently, that he was (and at the time was considered as being) perfectly consistent ; and adds, "people could then distinguish between a difference in conduct under a variation of circumstances, and an inconsistency in principle." Ib. 34.

we have taken possession, it may be, of a higher and more commanding ground, and can better see from what quarter the wind blows, or the sun shines : such an abandonment of our principles has certainly little to do with integrity, nor any thing to expect from candour.

If opinions have been taken up with any solidity of judgment, any staidness of mind, and there has been no change of times and circumstances, no disturbance of that balance of political power, by which, in our temporal relations, we may be said "to live, move, and have our being," there seems but very narrow ground for change of political sentiment. But when no period can be pointed out in any records, ancient or modern, where an alteration so total has taken place in every thing associated with the political destiny of this kingdom and of Europe as in the last thirty years, it is impossible a thinking mind should have stood still in this incessant revolution of order and anarchy, this reiterated violation by bad men of all that constituted the pride and security of the good. It is the part, I conceive, of such a mind not to lie dormant while all is in commotion about it ; not to fix and settle in sentiments (however abstractedly just, or pleasing) the solidity of which time has crumbled to pieces the moment they came into collision with experience ; but to go on "from strength to strength ;" to be constantly adding to its present stores ; constantly reviewing and recasting its knowledge ; correcting what is erroneous in its judgment ; examining what is doubtful in its propensities ; discarding what is delusive in its theory ; and extirpating what is deleterious, or even only hazardous in its practice. The shame is not, I conceive, in entertaining error in early life, but in persisting therein when increasing years discover it to be error. It is surely no reproach to trace back the steps that have conducted us to wrong notions, and that would, if pursued and acted upon, have led us

on to improper conduct ; and again, before our sun declines and we lose ourselves in darkness, to fall in with that road on which we left, and still meet with, the sober, the decent, the virtuous part of the community all travelling, and who, recollecting perhaps the sincerity of our hearts and the fervour of our feelings, are few of them disposed to recriminate upon us the futility of our deviation. Nor is it, possibly, any material disadvantage we may have sustained, when we return more staid for our errors ; more awed by our rashness ; more improved by our researches, and more convinced, by the experience which time and reflection have brought with them, that the support of regular government, temperately administered, is the support of public order and happiness, and systematic opposition to such government, the utter and compleat plague and disturbance of both.

But no charges of apostacy shall ever weigh with my mind, that, in this instance, feels its own innocence, to desert that line of political conduct, which, after the best exercise of my reflection, I may feel it my duty to adopt.* I will acknowledge the right of petitioning, while petitions are couched in decorous language and contain constitutional sentiments ; but where the turbulent demagogue puts his soul into every sentence, and insolently vilifies the very authorities to which he appeals, I will dare to say, that the sooner such rights are taken away from such abusers of them the better. I will contend for freedom of

* Lord Erskine, a name deservedly dear in the annals of English freedom, is stated to have observed, some time back, on the third reading of the Seditious Meetings Bill, that " he did not now hold the opinions which he did, when he formerly signed a paper upon the subject of Parliamentary Reform ; he did not now hold these opinions to the same extent ; and to those who said he ought to be consistent, he would say, he was bound to nothing but a faithful discharge of his duties as a Member of Parliament."

sentiment, so long as freedom of sentiment is contained within proper bounds ; but the moment those bounds are so grossly violated as to convert it into a wanton, and often wicked defamation of all that we have been accustomed to revere, I will turn from it as I would from a fury. I will speak up for the liberty of the press, so long as that liberty is made subservient, in my estimation, to the ends of good government and sound religion ; but when it is surfeited and choked by licentiousness—when it becomes the pander of hypocrisy and the handmaid of revolution, mighty as have been its services, and dreadful as would be its extinction, I shudder to be an advocate for such liberty any longer. I will venture still to think, that the abettors of unjust and unnecessary wars will have a dreadful account to settle hereafter with the “ King of Kings and Lord of Lords ;” but when these wars are, though it may be in their remoter consequences, strictly defensive ; when they have insured our salvation at home, and struck a wholesome terror into our insulting enemies abroad ; much as I may deplore the devastation, I must admit the necessity, the policy, the very righteousness of them. I once thought differently. I would to God that it were permitted me, with a good conscience, to think differently now, for every heart must rejoice to be on the side of mercy. But that benevolent delusion is gone by ; and while I feel it right to acknowledge my error, I grieve that it should turn out to have been an error !

Taking the course of events from the commencement of the French Revolution down to the present time, I ask, Sir, what prudent man would be justified in retaining the same opinions throughout the various stages of that eventful and unparalleled period?—Youth must have allowances made for its enthusiasm ; manhood for its sternness of character, fostered by hard experience ; old age for its increasing super-

stitutions and its increasing timidity: but neither youth, nor manhood, nor old age, can deserve apology for reposing in the sentiments of other days, when other days are passed away like a vision of the night. What is reason given us for but constantly to exercise, and thereby constantly to improve; to be always upon the wing, and watchful of the passing current of events, and shaping her course accordingly? With the best exercise of this faculty, we, alas! but too often and too lamentably err; nor can any man review the tenor of his past moral, or political life, without regret for the rashness of many of his sentiments, and for the impropriety of much of his conduct. The present is a state of most severe probation. We are easily deluded into wrong feelings and propensities before our judgment is matured; before commerce with the world convinces us that the world is not made for refined speculations. Time, however, rolls on, and as reflection is enabled to select better materials, she casts behind her the worthless treasures of her youth. But he who in early life takes up his prejudices and prepossessions, and is unwilling to lay them down even as old age approaches; who, once an espouser of erroneous opinions, is always an espouser of them; once an enemy to the executive government of his country, is always an enemy; turns surely his experience to little account, and suffers time, and reason, and reflection all to grow old in vain! Allow the possibility of any man who thinks for himself, to think, and to speak, and to write at this moment, as he had thought, and spoken, and written, five and twenty, or thirty years ago—what sort of a figure would such a person cut now? A very sorry one truly, let him be possessed of what integrity he may; a very dangerous and desperate one without integrity: an absolute traitor to his king and country in the latter case, and not very much unlike our modern Whig-principled and Union Society opponents of the measures of Ministry

in the former.—I have done—I now resume my subject.

Did I not fear to meet a mighty master in the science of finance upon his own ground, I should be almost tempted to deny what you, Sir, and your party so strenuously insist upon, both the probability of Ministers renewing the property tax (in consequence of this suspension), and the sad effects of such a tax, even if it were saddled upon the nation again. “I am no orator as Brutus is,” and can therefore only plainly declare, that, of all modes of taxation hitherto devised, it seemed to me to bear most equitably upon the various ranks of the community, and allowing that tolerably upright returns were made, to provide for the wants of the Government in the least oppressive manner to the great mass of the people. My authorities, indeed, may not be drawn from so rich a source as the property-tax lucubrations of this learned Gentleman; but I have still thought some dependance might be placed upon them, and considered maturely, they have approved themselves to my reason, though I dare say they may turn out the mere deductions of infants and idiots, when exposed to the fiery ordeal of his. However, I will for once play a desperate game. I will, *meo periculo*, back Mr. Vansittart’s finance abilities against Mr. Glover’s; and till I find better proofs to the contrary than his pamphlet has furnished me with, (not at the same time, Sir, wishing to deny that it may be, as you represent it, one of the seven wonders of the world) I will venture to conclude with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the property-tax “was, in fact, the cheapest tax that could be levied”—that “it did not affect the manufacturer, either in his raw materials or intermediate profits”—that “it was equally favourable to the agricultural class, as comparatively few of that number paid it”—that “if it was rejected, the poor must obviously be losers, as taxes of a more immediate

pressure must be levied on them in its stead"—and "that he could view the present bustle making against it, as little else than a conspiracy of the rich against the poor."* There was another good point in this tax which we may in vain look for in any other, and which I am sure will approve itself to *mobility*, whatever it may do as to *nobility* feelings. "It reached (as an Hon. Member observed) those wealthy men who lived like beggars, and made them pay like princes."†

As to our military establishment, which you represent as so enormous and as fraught with so much danger to the liberties of the people, I cannot, I confess, see it in the formidable light in which you have drawn it. I should feel much greater cause for fear in any further reductions in that branch of our expenditure than have already taken place. France, at an early period of her revolution, laid the foundation of that military government, which, of necessity, other states were obliged to adopt, and which the present policy of the times will, in some measure, force upon us a continuance in. Fifty years back, and what were the greatest military establishments on the Continent? A mere shadow of their present gigantic form and features. Is the first empire of the world to be confined to the pettyest establishment? Are we to palsy the glory and wither the strength of Eng-

* Debate in the Commons, March 12, 1817, during the presentation of Petitions against the Income Tax.

† Mr. Lushington, in the Commons, March 1, 1817. Mr. Coke, on this occasion, is reported, I think, to have said, that "while the tax continued, we did not possess a free Constitution." In this Gentleman's opinion we probably never shall. A *free* Constitution knows little of taxes, and nothing at all of tests or tithes—out of the hands of a lay impropriator. A *free* Constitution should make us free of all such oppressions. A *free* Constitution should be bottomed upon a trans-atlantic foundation, a becoming corner stone to which might possibly be obtained by turning the "house of prayer" into "a den of thieves."

land at the moment that strength has preserved and that glory has astonished the nations of the earth? Will there be no future calls upon us for exertion? Is *Austria* reposing after her fatigues? Is *Prussia* living upon the recollection of her past heroism? Is *Russia* melting down her enormous powers in the arts of peace, and making her holy alliance the bond of future security to all around her? Is your favorite *trans-atlantic republic* tired of war's alarms, and creeping into her den to deliberate upon plans for the amelioration of the morals of her people? Why then should *Great Britain* rest upon her laurels? Why should she alone be inert and languid, when every kingdom around her is casing itself in steel? When France is bitter against her—when America is bitter against her—and when all envy her (in the midst of their acknowledgments) as the heart and soul of that confederacy which has broken the chains of Europe, and given life once more to the vanquished and almost despairing nations of the world? And yet you County orators must come forward and bolt out your assurances that England will be ruined by her enormous military establishment! Surely Mr. Harvey's charge of hypocrisy might almost be deemed to stand good against you here!

I will not further attempt to controvert your idle position that Ministers are employing a useless force on the borders of France. Others, and of, at least, as great depth of judgment as yourselves, seem disposed to think differently, and believe that they could not be withdrawn without injury to the common cause.*

* Mr. Brougham, in his late motion on the state of the nation, made it, I think, one of his arguments against the measures of Government, that the grand powers of Europe were not altogether so peaceably disposed as many were inclined to imagine, and that even alarming symptoms prevailed in some quarters. If this be so, it would seem that our military force on the Conti-

The expence of our military establishment is despicable compared with its utility. If you take it in the other light, and insist upon its being dangerous to our liberties,* I answer, no—it is only dangerous to our licentiousness—it is only dangerous to factious demagogues—to restless revolutionists—to inflammatory County declaimers—to a deluded and unhappy populace who are tempted to open their ears to such absurd harangues, and to look upon them as true bills found against their rulers and governors. Even in a mere debtor and creditor view of the transaction—and you seem to have no souls for any other view of it—there is little, perhaps, to censure in this disposal of our military force. For what could we do with such a mass of idle hands at home! They may

ment is not unnecessary. The fact, however, probably is, as Lord Castlereagh in the above debate represented it, “that this corps being annexed with the Allies, had greatly tended to conciliate the French people, and to remove from their minds all idea of conquest, or dominion on the part of this Country.”

* I beg leave here to quote a remark from an authority to which my Lord Albemarle and Mr. Coke, with all of their school, will probably be inclined to bow with greater readiness, when it is recollected on how many occasions that authority chimes in with their own views and sentiments. It is not necessary to determine how far such an opinion may be warranted; I am only concerned to give it as I find it. “To a Sovereign who feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the Country, but by a well regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon, or neglect them, and his consciousness of his superiority naturally disposes him to do so. *That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in Countries where the Sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army.*”

Adam Smith on the Wealth of Nations, vol. II. p. 313.

It does not appear that a standing army was contemplated by this writer in so dangerous a light as it is viewed by some; and he pretty plainly, I think, evinces that, in a corrupt state of society, something beyond the common usual power of the law may, at times, be necessary to preserve the public tranquillity.

abroad, indeed, be maintained at a greater expence, but they are, at the same time, better fed, better *taught*, in a state of preparation, and awing those into an obedience to regular Government and a fulfilment of regular treaties, whom experience has instructed us to place no confidence in where we have no authority.

In purer periods than ours, and in the most ancient common-wealths, the proportion of military, as you must be aware, was much greater, compared with the existing population, than it is at present. This was eminently the case in the states of Greece, at their earliest periods, when men were soldiers from necessity, and at the time of the Persian invasion. The Romans also, though it consorted not with their policy to permit their armies to approach too near the capital, had yet numerous forces dispersed throughout the different provinces, and which, combined, would have constituted an immense military mass. We cannot afford to let our soldiers enervate themselves. Rome did not dare to do it, either in the dawn of her republican, or in the zenith of her imperial glory. Her legions were incessantly engaged, and sometimes even in unneeded labours, sooner than she would run the danger of suffering them to live without employment. "Publius Nasica (observes Montesquieu) made the Romans build a fleet of ships at a time when they had no occasion for such a force: these people dreaded idleness more than an enemy."* Tacitus, speaking of Caius Cassius, governor of Syria, remarks, "that he sedulously exercised the legions, carefully revived the ancient discipline, as far as without the assistance of a war the same could be revived, and acted with the same care and circumspection as if a formidable enemy had been at hand."† By only a short recess

* Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire.

† Annals. Book XII.

from their accustomed discipline, and by listening to mutinous discourses, were the three legions of Blesus spirited up to sedition upon the accession of Tiberius.* And let our veterans but now revisit their native soil, and they shall not want their Percenniuses to arouse them to a like forgetfulness of their gallantry and their duty. Believe me they are much safer abroad, than to return home and be disbanded among a populace so discontented and mutinous as inflammatory spirits and inflammatory speeches are every day making them.

In descanting upon this part of the subject, Sir, you strike out into ground which was prudently avoided by your precursors, and which but to evince the extent of your rancour against all Ministerial measures, right or wrong, I see not any necessity for your having occupied at all. Here, therefore you must be considered as standing alone, and consequently to you alone will the remarks in this part of my letter be applicable. You begin with a profession of your “attachment to the principles of the Revolution of 1688,”† and assure us, that “with respect to the present state of Parliamentary representation, you are decidedly a reformist,”† but that you still think “annual parliaments would be annual riots, and universal suffrage universal confusion.”† Their present duration, however, you consider “as too extended.” So far, so well; nor will the best friends of freedom, perhaps, materially differ from you in these cool and qualified positions. That septennial and triennial parliaments would probably be found much alike as to their bearings on the liberty, or slavery, on the misfortunes, or prosperity of the country, is an opinion very generally, and, I think, very justly entertained. Still, reflecting men may be permitted to differ on a point so dubious,

* Annals. Book I.

† Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

without the least impeachment of their political sagacity, or their political integrity, But when you proceed to canvass “the commencement of that system in which Ministers had been engaged to overturn the liberties of the country”^{*}—when you trace, what you are pleased to term, “their weakness and their treachery during the periods of the American and French Revolutions”^{*}—when you tell us that the Government of Ireland is, at this moment, “little better than a compleat military despotism”^{*}—you lose the clue of your political sagacity, and shew yourself in, by no means, such a light as a popular representative would wish to be viewed by his affectionate constituents.

The American war is not, I think, a subject for declamation with those who soberly consider whence that war originated, how it was conducted, and to what results it led. I believe we may thank certain patriots, bearing a pretty near resemblance to Mr. Coke and his associates, for both its disaffected causes and its disastrous consequences. The easiness of Administration, at that period, towards a celebrated demagogue, who defied their authority and insulted their decrees, very materially, it was thought, tended to encourage the Americans in their opposition to the regular enactments of Parliament, though certainly the ground work (sufficiently inadequate) had been laid some time before. The measures of Government, as is well known, were, in the course of the contest, most unfortunate. But it was not Ministers that lost us America, and that, by losing it, effected the separation of Ireland, in her legislative capacity, from Great Britain, paved the way to the horrors of the French Revolution, and to every contempt of established Government and established Religion, to which that Revolution has given rise. No, Sir, it was not the British Ministry that accomplished all these cala-

^{*} Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

mities, that opened all these sluices, and let in the flood of sedition and profaneness, which, from that moment up to the present time, has deluged the land—it was the Hampden patriots—the Whig-principled politicians—the abominable and rancourous spirit of PARTY, that tore this jewel from the crown of England and left us the scorn and derision of the world. All our measures went out of our hands ready palsied, and nearly as well known to the American Congress as to the British Parliament, and all, of consequence, was failure and disgrace. But what was the destruction of national honour to men who proved, by their conduct, how little they knew, or cared about honour? In all instances, indeed, of inveterate political contention, it cannot be but that a nation must suffer. This was notoriously the case with Carthage when she had to contend against her powerful rival for her existence. War was declared without vigour, and peace came without profit. This, in some measure, has been the case too with England in her late tremendous efforts, and would have been still more so, had she unfortunately lost any of those battles she so gloriously won. Nothing has kept down the seditious tendency of the base part of her population, but the invincible and crowning fortune of her resistance.

Mr. Belsham, a name dear to the Dissenters, but worthless, and, I trust, ever so to continue with every man in this kingdom, who is not a Dissenter; Mr. Belsham, in drawing the character of his present Majesty, has scrupled not to observe, “Never was it suspected that the contest by which an empire was rent asunder; by which every political, civil and social tie was dissolved that can unite and endear nation to nation, or man to man, cost this Monarch a sigh or a tear.”* Such is the cold-blooded deduction

* History of Great Britain. Vol. VII.

of this amiable Sectarist. I envy not the mind that can feel any admiration for such an historian, or any respect for such a calumniator of his Sovereign. His history, like his religion, is adapted to unhappy times, when men remember, indeed, that they have rulers, but forget that they owe them submission; when they acknowledge they have an established Religion and an established Government, but feel so little veneration for the one, and so little pride in the other, as calmly to see them insulted by every pestiferous writer that chuses to give them up to the Ostracism.

We should condemn no man by implication. And yet, the conclusions from premises may occasionally be so barefaced, as hardly to admit a possibility of entirely getting rid of them. When you exclaim, “and why were the Americans to be involved in destruction? Because, forsooth, they oppose taxation without representation;—and this was pretty much what our Parliament was now” *—who can forbear the inference, that, if you advocated the American war upon this principle, and rejoiced in their resistance, though carried to the extent of rebellion and revolution, you would not censure the same resistance at home, under the same circumstances, and even though it might lead to the same unfortunate results? †

You have lived however, Sir, to see this people emerge from *slavery* and become an independent

* Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

† On nearly the same principle that the Americans resisted taxation, many of the most populous districts of England might resist it now. If I mistake not, some of the loyal Freeholders of the County of Middlesex did, at that period, manifest a disposition of this kind; and no wonder, when, in the earlier part of the present reign, they actually elected their representative with an outlawry hanging over his head. The Whig notions of those days, (by no means diabolised in our own) taught men to believe, that “taxation no tyranny,” was best answered by “resistance no rebellion.”

nation. And what, let me ask, with many exceptions indeed of private worth and virtue, what has the American Revolution produced after a period of forty years?—A horde of disaffected subjects from every civilized State in Europe! A collection of the dregs of society from every climate on the surface of the globe! A union of all the unprincipled, the discontented, and the seditious, that can be blown together from the four winds of heaven!—all combining in one heterogeneous mass, with no principle of honour towards foreign nations, and with as little towards each other! Discarding with disdain that only cement of regular society, an established religion, and introducing, in lieu thereof, as many faiths as there are complexions of character, and scarcely one that will serve any other purpose than to make them fit for “murders, stratagems, and spoils!” Such, Sir, is that celebrated Republic, for whose exemption from British taxation you so earnestly contended, and in whose deliverance from British oppression you so sincerely rejoiced. In these sentiments I feel myself born out by all I have seen, read, and heard; and in these sentiments I will therefore rest, let them be in consonance or dissonance with friend or foe.

In adverting to the French revolution, you express your approbation of it at its commencement, because you thought it would put an end to Gallic despotism. Sir, many persons, of all parties, at that early period, indulged, I believe, in the same sentiments and feelings. “The French revolution (says a great and celebrated character, whom I feel proud to quote,) in its earlier stages was looked upon with a favourable eye by the people of this country. We all regarded it as the virtuous effort of a great nation to correct the abuses of its Government; as the friends of liberty we looked upon it with an indulgent eye; and although we saw things which we could not approve,

we were willing to hope that the evil would be transitory and the good permanent."* Too soon, however, were the most enthusiastic among us compelled to exchange congratulation for abhorrence. The mournful records of that "field of blood," glaring with crime, and deterring the philosopher from all speculations upon the perfectibility of national governments and the reformation of national abuses, are before the public. Your view of their proceedings must, I am sure, be in unison with that of every friend to humanity. But when, Sir, in the exuberance of your zeal, or the plenitude of your resentment, you go so far as to declare, that "the Bourbons were, are, and always will be the most despotic tyrants in the world," and that "the present King of France is notoriously a Usurper;" what is this but defamation run mad—a contradiction to the universally allowed legitimacy of this restoration,† and a ridiculous attempt

* Mr. Windham's Speech on the Address to his Majesty, December 30, 1794.

† Mr. Coke, upon another late ominous County Meeting occasion, had remarked (Norwich Mercury, March 30, 1816,) that "he had always considered the late American war and the one now closed with France, as unjust and unprincipled wars. He asked, in what situation are we now left? Why, the war against France has left us saddled with a debt of £800,000,000. And what was the object of that war? To set up an usurper in France, in the room of him who filled the Throne *at the voice of the People.*" Can any inference be more unjust, more inflammatory, more faithless to the glory of the English arms? Well might Mr. Edmond Wodehouse, at this early period, declare, that "the effects of such Meetings as these were intended to bring aristocracy and royalty into disrepute." *Ib.* Lord Grenville, in the debate (Feb. 19,) on the subject of the treaties concluded with Foreign Powers, observed, that "he approved of the measures which had been taken to re-establish the legitimate Government in France—not mere legitimacy of birth, but, in the true understanding of the word, that legitimacy which was founded upon the principles of the Constitution, upon the condition of the people, and upon a due regard to the various ranks and divisions of society." The Marquis of Buckingham also, at

to “look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not?” When you triumphantly ask, “where would Louis XVIII. be if we took away the thirty thousand English bayonets by which his usurpation is supported?” I, Sir, in return will ask you, if we reduced our military establishment within the bounds you would have us, where, upon your own wretched principles, and with those seditious practices to which they must lead—where would the Prince Regent be? Where would be our national glory and our national credit? Where would be the security of our constitution, civil and ecclesiastical? Where would be the revenues of the clergy? Where would be the landed estates, the parks and palaces, the “purple and fine linen,” the splendid tables and *dii penates* of the Nobility and Gentry of the realm? Where, in short, would HOLKHAM and all its princely domains be half a dozen years hence? But, fortunately, these questions are now at rest. Louis XVIII. is safe upon his throne. Long may he there continue; while the *real Usurper* remains chained, like Prometheus, to his rock, with the vulture gnawing at his heart—a heart too closely “wrapt up in triple brass” to be tortured by any reflections but those upon his own sufferings!

I see, Sir, in this part of your speech, where all things seem equally out of their proper order, an awkward intimation *that men can have no political opinions of their own without they have property*. A strange doctrine this upon the eve of a County Election, and surely no very decent reflection at any time upon the dignity of the human mind. What

the same time, declared, that “he felt great satisfaction in the restoration of the Bourbons.” But what weight can such an opinion have when it is known that the Marquis’s *Chaplain* feels no satisfaction in it at all!!

will some of your constituents think of a reproach of this kind? Are they likely to be rendered warmer in your interest by the tacit suggestion that they *dare not depart from it*? At Holkham indeed, where I am willing to believe you rule as much by affection as by power, your authority may be paramount to all considerations. When Achilles buckles on his armour, he may make sure of his myrmidons. But when you come forth into the world—when you mix with those who, though inferior in possessions are as independent in principles as yourself, you find that you are a mere man among men—that you can command only by your virtues, and that, whatever may be your private, your political virtues are not always, alas! of the most engaging nature. Men of unwieldy possessions sometimes indulge in unreasonable expectations; but they should recollect (or they may find it to their cost when they least wish for it,) that the poor in purse are frequently rich in spirit, and that there are “other passports to men’s minds” besides “Exchequer bills in the hands.”

But, Sir, though you can thus let out harsh allusions while your eye of fire is upon Ministers, there are moments, when it suits your purpose, that you can relax into courtlier habits and flatter with as large a want of grace as the best of them. Though we naturally expect a harvest of civility upon the heel of a County struggle, yet there is such a thing as being over civil. The High Sheriff, at the late meeting, had luckily escaped the odium of undue commendation from those who preceded you in the debate. From some motives, which it becomes not common understandings to affect to fathom, they had declined to occupy this Arabian ground. Its gales were, it seems, to be wafted from another quarter. The *great gun*, loaded with incense and sweet spices, was reserved to be fired off by *the County Member himself*. But, alas! like my Lord Ad-

vocate's of Scotland, as the Honourable Mover of the Resolutions facetiously observed, it unluckily *flashed in the pan*! Mr. Burroughes, pressed, and, as I think somewhat indelicately pressed, to a confession of his sentiments, firmly and honourably declared that neither the Resolutions nor the proceedings met with his concurrence, deeming the measures therein recommended as by no means calculated to relieve the prevailing distresses. Whether, after such an explicit avowal, Mr. Coke will continue to consider him "as a young man that thoroughly knew the principles of our constitution, and as a High Sheriff who is an honour to his situation, an honour to the County of Norfolk, and an honour to the kingdom of England,"* must be left to wiser heads than mine to determine. That he did not think the complexion of the meeting any very especial honour to him, is pretty evident from his thus wisely at once washing his hands of their proceedings

But I come now, Sir, to a part of your rhetorical exercise, wherein you have committed yourself still more grossly. Upon what principles of political arithmetic do you calculate, when you hazard your hopes with posterity, and indulge in reflections which come home indeed to every man's bosom, but in a very different manner to what you seem to suspect? To add weight to the County Address, or to elucidate the necessity of adopting it, was it incumbent to go back to the administration of Mr. Pitt, and to bring his presumed errors of judgment and corruptions before the tribunal of the public? Sir, there has never been but one opinion, among honourable minds, as to violations

* This part of Mr. Coke's Speech I quote from memory, and I think I may venture to add, accurately. Like many other of these choice portions of eloquence, its place is no where to be found in either the Norfolk Chronicle, or the Norwich Mercury rolls of fame.

of this nature. I know not how it is, but a solemn shade appears to spread itself over the reputation of our departed fellow creatures. They are cast, as it were, in their last, awful mould for eternity, and every aspiration of the feeling soul seems only to breathe forth a “*de mortuis nil nisi bonum!*” It looks as if, having done with the world, the world had a right to have done with them. Plutarch observes, (and recollect, he delivers herein a universal language,) “that law of Solon is also justly commended which forbids men to speak ill of the dead. For piety requires us to consider the deceased as sacred; justice calls upon us to spare those that are not in being, and good policy to prevent the perpetuation of hatred.*” What sentiments can be more equitable, more exalted, more beautifully adapted to the infirmities of our common nature than these? But what conduct more opposite to such benevolent feelings than yours? Never, never did you stand in a less dignified situation before your numerous and intelligent constituents than at this unhappy moment, when you were raking the ashes of the dead for food for the disaffection of the living. Your very best friends must here have blushed for you and sunk into the number of your silent censurers.

————— Diram qui contudit Hydram,
Notaque fatali portenta labore subegit,
Comperit *invidiam* supremo fine domari.

But your resentment, Sir, hath survived the date of that illustrious Statesman’s career. Your heart still beats with indignant feelings, when his, alas! is cold!

Why thus at once discredit the generous propensities of our nature, and the solemn consolations of our religion? There is a submission to public opinion which it is wise to adopt. There is an awe of

* Life of Solon.

public reprobation which it is virtuous to cherish. There is a sacrifice to public decorum which it is often reasonable to expect, and always prudent to make. But you, Sir, alike regardless of all these powerful incentives to a more chastised demeanour, violate, with impunity, the last sanctuary of human sorrows and human sufferings; and, like the unhappy Monarch of Israel, call up the ghost of the departed Prophet only to pronounce your own confusion and disgrace.

Besides, Sir, to speak a language which you will find very general throughout the kingdom of England, and I should think not entirely disclaimed in the County of Norfolk, you may be said to be indebted to the very man whose memory you thus vilify, for the enjoyment of all you possess at the present moment. Mr. Edmond Wodehouse will have been found not very erroneously to have affirmed, "that the measures of Mr. Pitt's administration were justified, at the time, by nearly nine-tenths of the kingdom."* Had that great Statesman not taken within his giant

* As Mr. Wodehouse, however, is, I dare say, but very meagre authority with Mr. Coke, I will open to him a richer source of intelligence, and give him the confessions of a man after his own heart. "The Pitt system (says Mr. Pitchford, *Norwich Mercury*, Oct. 19, 1816) has had a very fair trial, both before and since the death of its author. The King eminently favoured it. The Regent, ever since his accession to power, has, with the zeal of a new convert, supported it as decidedly as his Royal Father. A succession of Parliaments has backed, by never-failing majorities, all his measures—and, owing to the fatal delusion and alarm of the French revolution, *this Pitt system was supported by a great portion of the people themselves.*" Here, I hope, Mr. Coke will allow is "confirmation strong as proof from holy writ," for the accuracy of Mr. Wodehouse's opinion, and of the opinion of all who have adopted his line of politics. Mr. Pitchford, indeed, brings these items forward for a very different purpose; but luckily, as is often the case, they serve more purposes than they were originally intended to serve.

grasp the "signs of the times," and compared them with the principles by which empires are best consolidated and preserved, and provided accordingly—had he thought as lightly of the convulsions of society as you seem to think—had he treated with scorn the disorganizing principles which then prevailed, and suffered himself to be lulled by protestations of innocence, while guilt, and of the deepest die, pervaded every inflammatory meeting, and every reforming society—this Country might by now have been erased from the map of Europe, and the loyal domains of Holkham a splendid hereditament of the jacobins of France.

It is one of the infelicities of revolving years, that they steal from us all proper recollection of past dangers and deliverances. But no time, no circumstances, should be suffered to erase from British bosoms the blessings which Mr. Pitt's administration showered down upon his Country, at that dismal period when only hope was left to those who sustained, and when despair overwhelmed those who fell before the powerful arm of the French Revolution. You think Mr. Pitt should not have interfered in the war with France. I once thought so too—many thought so. But our eyes have been long open to the error of our judgments. All can now clearly see, looking back upon those dark scenes of contention, that England never could have stood her ground, had she, at that distressing period, rested upon her arms, and suffered such a revulsion of all that constituted the sanctities of civilized society to sweep along unresisted. It was necessary that the chain which bound the kingdoms of the earth to this "Great Babylon," should be broken. Age may, and I trust, will increase in us an indifference to the things of this world; but still, while this world must be the theatre of human conduct, the stage of human probation, it cannot be a concern of no moment whether we are to live in a

state of anarchy, or of regular government ; whether the period of our existence is to be marked by “ pure and undefiled religion,” or by blasphemous and philosophical infidelity.

The French revolution will ever remain a monument of the insanity of corrupting the popular mind. We have seen how their philosophers, their Voltaires, their Rousseaus, their Helvetius's, their Diderots, and a host of inferior, but hardly less pernicious literati prepared the way, by their specious and blasphemous writings, for the unsettling of every opinion which time had sanctified, and reason had approved. We have seen too how their demagogues, seconding these principles by a correspondent practice, worked upon the people and harrowed up their souls until they had succeeded in compleatly brutalizing them ; and when they were compleatly brutalized, we witnessed the blood, the sacrilege, the horror, the mighty and perfect desolation that followed ! The throne and the altar, the lives and the property of peaceable subjects, all sank together ; and it is in every man's recollection, what monsters of government, what abortions of religion arose from their ashes, palsyng all power of resistance by their frightful forms and abhorred gesticulations. I see Marius amid the ruins of Carthage, stern, indignant, unsubdued, dreadful—the picture of a great, bad mind shattered to atoms, yet without remorse ; and would the Republic had then been well rid of him ! But Marius, Sir, shrouded in all his horrors, was an angel of light to some of the wretches of the “ Revolutionary Tribunal” who glutted that unhappy country with human butcheries, and who, with more than his ferocity, had not a spark of his greatness of soul.

This was surely not a season for the acerbity of party spirit. For a time it annihilated party spirit. All ranks and degrees, with any remains of a virtuous consideration left in them, clung to their last, forlorn

hope. The nobility and gentry of the realm, bidding adieu to all narrow oppositions, only opposed themselves to the designs of incendiaries and the infatuation of the multitude. Looking to the abomination on the other side of the water, did they see, did they hear, did they feel any thing like complaint, or grievance on this? No—they only saw that murder was stalking in the face of open day—they only heard that proscription was entering the dwellings of parents, sent by their own children—they only felt that the destruction was compleat in France, and would very shortly be as compleat in England, if they did not instantly turn from domestic feuds, and case themselves up in the iron armour of unanimity. They clung, therefore, to their King, their Constitution, their Ecclesiastical Establishment, as their sacred refuge, “until this tyranny was over past;” and on these solemn foundations, led by the commanding genius of that departed Statesman whom you ridicule and defame, they built over “the fountains of the great deep,” now “broken up,” a bulwark of union, which, at once, blessed be God! braving the power, the perfidy, the abhorred principles of the Regicide Republic, left us what we are at this moment—the first of people and the noblest of Empires!

But Mr. Pitt, Sir, is not the only great man to whom his Country owes eternal obligations. Another no less illustrious character, now gone down to the dust, must share with him in the prayers and gratitude of posterity. At the first breaking out of this revolution, and e’er the golden fruit that turned to ashes had been touched or tasted, his prophetic glance discovered the rudiments of all the wild uproar, the “confusion worse confounded” that was soon to follow. The plagues, afterwards let loose upon mankind, had not yet aroused themselves. The furies had not started from their couch of blood; but Orestes beheld them in the temple, and felt that horror and

desperation must attend their waking. A fearful, momentary suspension remained. The spear of Ithuriel was applied, and instantly they sprang up in their native hideousness, with shapes so ghastly and unmortal, as to appal even the parents of the monstrous Titan brood. All was presently one dark scene of desolation. The "man's hand" became "a cloud of fire." Still, the kingdoms of the earth reposed—reposed and trembled!

At this awful juncture it was, that, binding up his soul to the severity of the trial, he prepared himself for a noble sacrifice to his duty. Renouncing his former friends, and almost seeming to renounce his former principles, he wandered forth, like the faithful patriarch, into an unknown land, "not knowing whether he went;" not knowing, or caring what was to "befal him in the way;" whether glory might follow on his track, or he might carry his reproach with him to his grave. Against every calumny he "set his face like a flint." He regarded no personal dangers. He only saw the perils to which his country was exposed; the solid foundations of her Civil and Ecclesiastical Establishments reeling to and fro. He summoned, therefore, to his aid all the great and eloquent powers of a mind, the recollection of whose grandeur is never to be effaced. Those powers, in the contemplation of the tremendousness of the coming conflict, he wound up to the very height; and, though he worked in darkness and solitude of thought, amid scorn, and insult, and ignominy, and reprobation, he yet wrought with so marvellous effect as to make "the curtains of Midian tremble," and became the immoveable barrier of the ancient institutions of the world, against the rage of those modern Attilas who sought to level all institutions, however sacred, with the dust!—But the mould of that mighty genius is broken! We have seen him in "the last of his fields!" Long has the music of his harp been silent;

and though, in the lonely hour, we still fancy we hear its enchanting tones, *sonantes inter aquas, nemonumque noctem*, it is but, alas! “the memory of former times!”—No hand shall ever more awake its solemn minstrelsy!

The French revolution, therefore, Sir, you, and all like you, must be admonished to behold and tremble—the incitements to that revolution you must be reminded to consider and avoid—the consequences of that revolution you must be compelled, daily and hourly, to contemplate, lest the demoralizers of British liberty and British happiness should discover the ominous race of *Egalités* in France, revived in any of the great landed proprietors of *Hampden celebrity* in England. So long as the preservation of our Church and State—of our Laws and Constitution—of our Morals and Manners—of our National Glory and Prosperity, make up any part of the pride and gratitude of the British Nation—so long will every patriotic bosom continue to venerate THE IMMORTAL MEMORY OF MR. PITT; but without forgetting, at the same time, *how much of all that is noble and excellent in human nature was due to MR. BURKE.*

There is, however, nothing so wretchedly out of season but what may admit of apology, if men have but the effrontery to attempt it. Mr. Glover, in extenuation of this “deed” of yours, which ought to be “without a name,” observes, that Mr. Edmond Wodehouse “had accused their beloved representative with disturbing the ashes of the dead, yet another gentleman had not scrupled to disturb the ashes of the late Mr. Windham.” The insanity of this replication ought to shelter it from chastisement; for really it is so preposterously ridiculous as almost to render any notice of it disgraceful. Because Colonel Wodehouse had ventured to suggest, that, if Mr. Windham were now alive, he would probably have seen the necessity of aiding the measures of Government; Mr. Glover

on this ground, smit by the genius of absurdity, fancies that the *Pitt Episode* of his Great Mæcenas may very fairly be defended. As well might we attempt to remove a charge of treason from one man, by alledging that another was caught saying his prayers at church. Sir, Colonel Wodehouse had declared, what probably a large portion of your own Constituents then present might be disposed to think, that if that illustrious character were now alive—if he witnessed the portentous appearances that now present themselves—if he saw demagogues in all quarters working up the people, through the medium of distress, into the most desperate measures—he would not only have been among the first to shrink back with horror at such detested sacrifices to Moloch, but would probably have thrown into the scale of Administration all the eminent talents of his mind and all the noble virtues of his heart. This was the cypress wreath which Colonel Wodehouse had entwined around the tomb of Mr. Windham; but which a palsied, officious hand was for tearing away to cover the nakedness of a heart, that, but in this instance, I trust, was found to be a stranger to humanity.

Amid the confusion of a popular assembly I could not exactly hear all that was said, nor indeed understand all that I heard. But I think, (for our oracles, the newspapers, are here dumb,) it was you, Sir, that triumphantly addressing yourself to your constituents, declared, they had now an opportunity of learning Colonel Wodehouse's sentiments, should he offer himself to their notice at a future vacancy for the county. A future vacancy was not then in your contemplation; but it is suddenly arrived, and may bring with it other consequences than you either foresaw or deemed possible. Yes, Sir, we do know Colonel Wodehouse's sentiments, and we rejoice to know them. They are the sentiments of a mind of large bearing and honourable views—sentiments not stolen from the port-folio

of a Westminster demagogue—not produced, ready cut and dried, for the entertainment of a populace; but addressed to the calm, deliberate reflection of free and independent Englishmen, and coming home to English bosoms at all times, and especially in times of tribulation—sentiments emanating from the pure soul of our Constitution, when liberty was in her full health, and before she was debauched by revolutionary practices—when she flourished with Astræa in her golden age, and e'er that brazen age arose by which she has been supplanted to make room for Hampden Clubs, and Union Societies, and Spencean Philanthropy, and Whig Principles nearly worn out, and manufactured afresh upon the scale of Bolingbroke's Philosophy and Belsham's Divinity.*

I grant, Sir, that you saw in this meeting much, probably, that you liked. But you also saw something that you did not like. You saw that you could no longer dictate to the county of Norfolk what political opinions they should entertain. Though your retainers were loud in your praise—though your Stenorian Chaplain “in the honied phrase of adulation” reminded them of their “*beloved* representative”—though the rude congratulations of the populace were music in your ears, and every word from you was re-echoed by a thunder of applause from them—yet were

* On the nature of the Whig principles which, at present, appear to obtain in this quarter of the Kingdom, I cannot but entertain the sentiments, and will therefore adopt the language of the Chairman (C. Harvey, Esq. M. P.) at the late dinner of the Norwich and Norfolk Pitt Club. “I perfectly coincide in what my Hon. Friend (Col. Wodehouse) has said concerning Whigs and Tories. And I have no hesitation in giving it as my opinion, that if some of those persons now denominating themselves friends of the Revolution of 1688 had lived in that age, and held the language we have lately heard from them, in presence of such men as the great Lord Somers and his coadjutors, *they would have been black-balled from their society.*”

Norfolk Chronicle, May 31, 1817.

there those then present who beheld and pitied your situation—who perceived that you were losing ground with the sober part of your constituents, in proportion as you seemed to be gaining it with the violent ; and that while, to common eyes, you appeared in the midst of your friends, surrounded by numbers and supported by confidence, to a keener vision you were observed to walk “darkling and alone,” and to “eat your own heart” in silence.

I cannot suppose that it was your intention to afford Colonel Wodehouse any ground for triumph upon such an occasion, when you had assembled before you not only your own tenantry and dependents, but so large a portion of the freeholders of the County. I cannot suppose that it came at all within your estimate of liberality to divide the suffrages of such an assembly with such an opponent.—And yet, I much mistake if your conduct on that day did not wean some from the regard they had hitherto entertained for you. Whatever may be the feelings of the County towards Colonel Wodehouse and his family after this disclosure of *his* sentiments, I shall really be astonished, if, under such an exposure of your feelings—such implacable animosity towards both the living and the dead, you keep together at a future election all those whom you have been able to command at former ones. I am conscious of your powers of persuasion, and I know, too, some of the means of your success.—But, in my mind, no means will restore to you that respect you have studied to forfeit—no persuasion will revive those claims upon the affection of the sober and feeling part of your constituents, which, by an insane line of politics, you have so justly deserved to lose. Where is the honour, when the *loyalty* of the County Address shall hereafter be spoken of, that the names of Albemarle, and Southwell, and Coke, will be in the cups of those who drink confusion to a reigning Ministry ?

I wish, Sir, we all knew our strong ground, and could better turn our best virtues to account than we do. Your strong ground is where, I would to God, every man's was—*at home*. There you are unassailable—there you are intrenched so powerfully, that you may laugh to scorn all the malice and machinations of your enemies—there you may defy even the parasite himself to do you injury. I cannot help picturing to myself those hospitalities to which you are indebted for much of that popularity you possess—to a purer source of popularity it is scarcely in any man's power to be indebted. I see you surrounded by your friends—rejoicing in their joy—sharing in their misfortunes—and identifying yourself with their best feelings and in their happiest hours, by a thousand good offices, for which language has no name, but which are stamped in eternal characters upon a grateful heart. I know the princely demeanour you have long been in the habit of preserving towards all your connections. Every thing about you associated with home is one strong circle of enchantment. There you are the mighty magician that can call up visions of delight to the way-faring man, and spread before him Elysian prospects at your pleasure. Your festivities have been without pomp and your kindnesses without restraint. You have tempted to your table, with a sweet seduccment, the great and the learned, the lowly and the good. In your society, the industrious farmer and the useful mechanic have forgot their littleness, and domesticated themselves with your splendor, without losing their respect for your rank.

At such a board every man has been proud to sit. And there, too, in better days, sat *one* of whom even such a board might, in return, be proud! Often have you been gratified by his keen political remark, running sometimes, it may be, in impure channels, but still flowing over beds of gold. Often have you witnessed his polished diction, his exquisite imagery, his

fine gradations of thought, poured from a clear, full, fertilizing urn. Often have you travelled with him through the records of generations past and forgotten, and feasted on his recondite researches, freely spread forth, like the light of heaven, to all around him. But when, with a fascination hardly to be conceived, he struck into new paths, which he trod without leaving a trace behind, and introduced his auditors to grand and solemn scenery—when he led them to fresh fountains, and unlocked the springs of ancient lore, and displayed the rich materials of an imagination crowded with “thoughts that breathe and words that burn”—when, finally, with a conscious, daring hand, he snatched the pencil of genius, and presented his delineation of *character*, where the figure starts from the canvass and becomes “a living soul”—I behold attention absorbt in wonder, and admiration converted into idolatry.

Nec tantum Phæbo gaudet Parnassia rupes ;
Nec tantum Rhodope miratur et Ismarus Orphea.

But these Athenian hours are, alas! no more! The eagle hath deserted his ancient aerie, and birds of feebler pinion twitter in his place. Dr. PARR *was* the classic soul of the Holkham hospitalities. It is suicide to recollect *who is*!

But I return to our more immediate subject, from which, following the thread of your deviations, I have been tempted to deviate myself. After having pretty well, as you and your brother orators suppose, proved your various accusations against Ministers, viz. that they had charged the people of England with disloyalty and madness—that, upon false and frivolous grounds, they had suspended the Habeas Corpus Act—that, in consequence hereof, every act of injustice would be committed with impunity against the subject, so far as they dare to do it—that public meetings would probably be prevented, the property tax renewed, and the liberty of the press destroyed; and

that our enormous military establishment, at once unnecessary and unconstitutional, would tend both to beggar and to enslave the country. After vomiting forth this huge mass of unauthenticated and disgusting matter, you hasten to your concluding proposition, that grand "consummation so devoutly to be wished" on your part, and so seriously to be deprecated on ours, that unless the present Ministry, "alike enemies to the throne and to the people, and the cause of all our unprecedented calamities, be instantly dismissed, there will be no security to the head of the Government, nor hardly any hope of preserving the Country from revolution."

It does not appear to me, Sir, that you are entitled to take such bold ground as you have here ventured upon; nor are the delinquencies of our present Administration of so black a cast, or their infatuation of so gross a complexion, or the Country so uneasy under their rule, as to warrant the presumption of such a charge, or the severity of such a chastisement. In a mixed Government like ours, there will always be much to overlook in the boldness of public animadversions upon public men and measures, and to a just spirit of liberty we are always inclined to forgive much. But we will not suffer a turbulent and inflammatory spirit to call itself by that injured name; a narrow, frightful oligarchy disposition that feeds on its own spleen, and fattens on its own resentment, and touches no subject of an Englishman's freedom that it does not instantly convert into an Englishman's loathing; like the harpies of the Strophades,* which devoured all they found and defiled all they left behind. Neither you, nor any of your patriotic associates, are, I conceive, at all qualified for the task you have undertaken. Where is your own innocence of political

* Virg. *Æneid*. Lib. III.

offence that should justify you in so deeply probing the offences of others? In virtue of what presumptions upon the sins of Government, of what inward feelings of imputed righteousness in yourselves, do you raise up a nation's vengeance against the rulers of that nation? You must make out a strong case before either the law of honour, or the law of conscience will consent to acquit you. The remark of a modern historian on this subject may not be inapplicable. "It is certain that no dissatisfaction with the laws and Government of his Country, whilst administered according to the spirit of the institution, can authorize an individual to plot innovations, ever pregnant with danger to the whole community; and *that the necessity must be very obvious and pressing, and the authority of very many must assent, to make any plea for commotion expedient, or just.*"* It is an unhappy thing for the propriety of the realm, that Mr. Coke cannot confine himself to his "farm at Tibur," but must be constantly hankering after "the forum of Rome."

That the present Ministers, or indeed that any Ministers are enemies to the throne and to the people, I would never consent either lightly to advance, or readily to believe. It is so much the interest of all Administrations to consult, as far as the complexion of the times will permit, the honour of the Sovereign and the happiness of the nation—it is so bounden a duty upon them to connect, by every possible tie, the glory of the State with the comfort of the people; and I have seen so few well substantiated instances upon modern record in this Country where they have not done so, that I must declare it as an act of my creed, that his Majesty's Ministers are hostile intentionally to neither the throne, nor the people. Errors

* Young's History of Athens. P. 73.

of judgment, like other human beings, they are indeed liable to ; but knowingly, and with design, to do an injury of this aggravated nature, is an unwarrantable assertion that can only excite indignation. How can an honest mind persuade itself that with so many, and so powerful reasons for consulting the happiness of those over whom we have the rule, the inclination is not at all times present? The policy of every State and kingdom requires that the people should as little feel the pressure of adverse circumstances as possible. And to make them as contented in their stations as the necessities of the times will permit, and to encourage them in the hope of better times and better prospects, if it were not a needful sacrifice to charity, would yet be a wholesome maxim from which no Administration, without the extremest reluctance, would suffer themselves to depart. Epimetheus, we are told, “when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid and kept hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly the politic and artificial nourishing and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison of discontentments.”*

It hath, for the most part, been considered as mutually beneficial for a Government to think well of the people, and for the people to think well of their Government; the one not venturing to suppose that greater disaffection exists than they have the firmest proofs of, the other disdaining to imagine that national evils flow from the neglect, the impotency, or the iniquity of their rulers, so long as a possibility exists of referring them to any other more probable cause. Yet here is an instance where all this mutual amity and forbearance are violated—where the people, inflamed by designing men and misled by those of

* Bacon's Essays, XV. of Seditions and Troubles.

influence and property, are setting down their distresses to the weakness and wickedness of their rulers; and where, in return, a Government not naturally harsh; not naturally suspicious; not naturally averse to the utmost exercise of forbearance and lenity, and perfectly aware of the reprobation that must follow such a line of conduct, is yet compelled, in the very teeth of this reproach, and against its own feelings and interest, to prefer a bill of indictment against, it is to be feared, too large a portion of the indifferent part of its population. Can any argument weigh more powerfully with reasonable and unprejudiced men to believe that Ministers are not the enemies of the people, that the dangers of the Country are not exaggerated to serve political purposes, but are, on the contrary, of too mournful and really alarming a nature for any thing, short of the measures they have resorted to, effectually to confine and put down.— Either you do, or you do not, Sir, know that the majority of the nation have never considered them in the abominable light in which you and your associates unblushingly represent them. If you do not know this, you are shamefully ignorant of the unbiassed, impartial, and general state of public opinion at the present moment, and deserve the severest censure for indulging in such unnecessary and licentious revilings. If you do know this (though God forbid, for the credit of your hearts, that there should be an atom of credit due to the soundness of your understandings) and still persist in advancing such accusations; never more can you appeal to the freeholders of the County of Norfolk—never more to the great body of the people of England, for either the integrity of your means, or the honour and patriotism of your ends!

Your assertion, that the present calamities of the Country must be imputed to the bad conduct of Ministers, requires only to be mentioned in order to be confuted. In such a general “distress of nations with

perplexity" unprecedented, it must be confessed, in this kingdom, and almost equally so in every other—at the end of such a war as England hath been engaged, and, at length, blessed be God, hath gloriously succeeded in—with a harvest so unfavourable both at home and in foreign countries—with such a depreciation of labour—such a stagnation of trade—such a contraction of commerce—such an overflowing and still increasing population—such an extension of our poor's rates, as at once encourages the idleness and profligacy of one part of the community, and saps the means, and palsies the industry of the other—with such a frightful list of bankrupts, occasioned by unprincipled speculators, who create confusion wherever they can meet with credit—with these and many other powerful causes of our calamities, that are directly before our eyes and meet us at every turn, who in their senses would charge upon Administration what, it is plain, unless endowed with more than mortal powers, Administration can have no possible controul over? It is neither triennial, biennial, nor annual Parliaments, that could here relieve us. The state of the country would be still the same, whatever might be the state of our representation. The hand of Providence hath indeed so clearly been perceived to be at work, that even the most systematic opposers of Government have rested upon their arms and moderated their resentment. Could Ministers remedy this general distress of nations? Could they avoid uncommon sacrifices, when called upon by the three estates of the kingdom, for uncommon exertions? Could they cause the sun to shine and the earth to yield her increase, in accommodation to their desires, or in proportion to our necessities? Could they create labour where there were no means, or encourage trade where there was neither market nor money? Could they remedy, in short, any of those inevitable consequences to which society, in its natu-

ral progress, is liable to be exposed?—They could not—they could only fearfully look on, and observe what direction the storm was taking, and provide accordingly. They could not resist—they could only appease the calamity, and evince, that though the distresses of the Country might be out of their power to remove, it was never for a moment out of their recollection to soften.

And this they have done, and are doing, not to the extent that some, with upright motives but necessarily confined views, would perhaps advise; nor to the fifth part of the extent that others, more designing, affect to recommend; but to such an extent as the wisdom of Parliament think proper to adopt, and as the people on their part should find and feel it their duty patiently to acquiesce in. Administration, in fact, are making large sacrifices; reducing Government offices, and retrenching sinecure salaries, as far as circumstances will permit. The “Select Committee of Finance,” whatever may be your opinion of its proceedings, is, I believe, answering the expectations of all reasonable men. There are always topics of popular complaint which unsteady minds will lay hold of; but let us fairly make the comparison between what Government is doing for the relief of the country, and what it has to do with, and we shall probably rest in the conclusion (however we may lament it) that more cannot safely be required than they are at this moment performing.*

* Retrenchment, it has been frequently observed, is by no means an unmixed good; and this Government ought to, and do consider while they are employing themselves in the reductions that can prudently be made in the public expenditure. Many of the charges of Opposition against Ministers have apparently been brought forward on very insufficient foundations. The debate on the Embassy to Lisbon, (May 6, 1817) is a proof with how little skill, and with how much assurance these kind of attacks are conducted. Mr. Canning's salary has been pretty

Besides, it is a lamentable truth that, in times of public distress, the impositions practised upon society, and especially upon the humbler parts of it, become more numerous and less open, perhaps, to punishment—so that a bad state of things shall never want those who will, by injustice, make them worse. The poor man, it is true, feels the taxation of Government, but he more feels the imposition of his neighbours. And in a nation like ours, where principles of loss and gain are so fast incroaching, I am afraid, upon our proud and ancient feelings of honour, this evil of imposition will be found, in seasons like the present, fearfully to increase in extent and enormity with the increase of our calamities. For this there is no adequate remedy. The magistracy of this kingdom, ever active and attentive to the calls of duty, can with no activity rid society of this monster. If the law of conscience will not restrain men from secret acts of injustice—if *thou God seest me* be insufficient to check the thought and suspend the arm of iniquity, it is but few instances of this aggravated enormity that the law of the land can fairly reach in its chastisements.

Nor ought it to be forgotten, that we are possibly arrived at that state of civilization where nothing continues long stationary—that as arts and sciences become progressive, and population increases, they beget new desires, new discontents, new manners, and a new world, as it were, rising up from the inefficient and decaying materials of the old. We, in this country, partake in these changes in a more especial degree; for the very freedom of our Constitution, while it is no mean incentive to the perfection of our pursuits, is,

well banded about as a subject of offence in all quarters. The friends of truth and of public order will not be sorry to learn that this gentleman upon that occasion, “closed, amidst loud and repeated cheers, one of the most eloquent and convincing speeches ever delivered in Parliament.”

alas! with unstable minds, but too powerful a provocative to the licentiousness of our demands. In cases, therefore, of unprecedented distress, surely something should be allowed for unprecedented situations.--- There is a degree of liberty which men will bear and thrive under, but, beyond which, their virtue too often suffers shipwreck. That society is, of late years, much changed for the better in this kingdom, few of the good old school will be very forward to affirm. And though I would by no means make this an argument for the inutility of National Education, or of such plans for the amelioration of general morals as the wisdom of modern times has benevolently adopted, yet I do make it a very strong argument against many sources of corruption that are still open around us, and that even these legislative provisions are not able to counteract. The fact is, honesty seems no longer regarded by us as the best policy. We are becoming so entirely a commercial people that we turn every thing into trafic. All our goods are carried to market for sale. Speculation fills up our narrow souls; and we can calculate to a nicety how much, considered in a mercantile point of view, we shall produce by our faith, and how much more by our lack of faith. There was a miserable time in this kingdom when we really knew nothing. There is now a more miserable time when we affect to know every thing, and when all feeling of integrity goes near to be absorbed in a commutation of honour for interest. If, in addition hereto, we consider that the population of England and Wales is, as some have conjectured, nearly doubled the last hundred years, this must necessarily increase the difficulties of subsistence, and, by consequence, the discontents of the people and the cares of Government. And tenfold, Sir, must these cares be enlarged, if all the pains taken and all the plans formed to relieve the distresses of the people and to make them more satisfied and obedient, be

rendered fruitless by the counteracting efforts of you and of your friends to make them dissatisfied and disobedient. Be assured, you are pulling the string quite as tight as it will bear. When your mad ambition has once over-loaded the safety-valve, we know what will become of the vessel.

Let it be further considered, though it may not, perhaps, be thought particularly complimentary to political consistency, that we have rarely found one Administration, taking the common run of them, much purer, or better than another. We want not, I am sure, for experience in these matters, especially of late years, the beginning of the present reign having abundantly furnished us with it. To the Grenville Administration succeeded the Administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, which was speedily supplanted by that under the Duke of Grafton, yielding, in its turn, to Lord North's. Nay, previously to the period of Mr. Pitt's being made Prime Minister, the Nation had witnessed no less than four Administrations in the space of little more than two years; but I perceive not, I confess, that they were either materially benefited or materially injured by any of those rapid changes, few of them rectifying the faults of their predecessors without falling into errors as great, though it may be of a different complexion, themselves.* In all of them I see nearly the very same means used in power that were scouted and held up to public reprobation out of power—the same professions for the interests of the people at the bottom of the state ladder, and the same forgetfulness of those professions when

* Quere—which of our Administrations was it, that, after many mighty boastings of economy, the moment they jumped into office set about cleansing the Augean stable of discontents, by actually doubling the income-tax? Have “all the talents” any recollection of this new mode of lightening the public burthens?

they had reached the top—the same necessary accommodation to the established formulas of the executive parts of a mixed government like ours, whatever might be the order of the day, or whoever might be the Ministers.

When the celebrated coalition took place between Lord North and Mr Fox, at the time of Lord Shelburn's Administration, there surely must have been some inherent powers in our mixed government of union and accommodation, which were able to effect a miracle of this astonishing nature; to settle the heterogeneous materials of two such powerful and dissentient minds into any thing like a shape and form of consistency, and to impart the capacity of concerted action where there was hardly a possibility of the existence of any common principles, or feelings between them. True, the partnership was speedily dissolved; but under scarcely any Government, save that which requires a firm, systematic adherence to established rules and practices, could such a partnership probably for a moment have been thought of. I must, upon the whole, rest in the conclusion, that changes of Ministry in this Country, with a few very brilliant exceptions, are, for the most part and almost inevitably, a mere change of men and not of measures. And were you and your associates, Sir, to come into office to-morrow (a case within the verge of possibility, but, let us hope, only within that verge,) and the present Administration to depart; the same distresses would prevail—the same discontent and disaffection would exist—the same corruptions would be festering at the heart—the same inflammatory spirit burning upon the tongue—and, in spite of your Hampden patriotism, your Sydney politics, your new Whig principles, and "all the talents" you might bring with you to the great and goodly work of reformation, the very same means must, in the end, be resorted to for the checking the disorders, and the relieving the distresses of

the people. In fact, we should merely put fresh wheels on the state carriage, which would deviate scarcely a hair's breadth from its accustomed track, but continue to jog on with its new drivers (the wit and skill pre-supposed of keeping it on the high road) pretty much after the same rate it did before with its old ones.

From your own poison, indeed, had you been skillful chymists, you might have extracted a tolerable antidote to all such vain expectations. Mr. Pitt, you remarked, "although the professed friend to a Reform in Parliament and the repeal of the Test Act, no sooner became the Minister of the Crown than he laid the liberties of the Country at his feet."* Conceding this opinion for the sake of the argument, what does it amount to?—A very strong presumption that even the brightest characters, when they put on their robes of state, may find it convenient to drop their garments of popularity. If Mr. Pitt was so different a person in these different situations, who will say that, similarly circumstanced, even the flaming patriotism of my Lord Albemarle and of Mr. Coke might not have received a wrench. I have certainly no wish to insinuate that your "great abilities" are, like his, "united with all the insincerity that can attach to a man's heart."* I merely profess my doubts, whether that established system of Government, which, perhaps, cannot be materially departed from, let the reins be held by whom they may, and which, as you assert, triumphed over his virtue and genius, might not, if in the same plenitude of power, have gone high to put even your still more exalted and independent spirits to the test.† But we are poor, short-sighted beings. We

* Norfolk Chronicle, April 12.

† It does not appear that the Whigs, even of a purer period than our own, were altogether that firm, unbending race of beings they would fain have the people believe them to be. Mrs. Macauley, herself suspected of an attachment to that party, has

only contemplate the power we wish to gain, without considering the part we may be fitted to act.

I cannot, I confess, bring myself to behold any existing Administration in the harsh light in which some writers have represented them. I cannot consent to consider them as men hardened against the sufferings of their fellow-creatures by an acquaintance with their vices, nor lost to honourable impulses by their more intimate knowledge of the profligacy of human nature. Much, certainly, of their earlier benevolence may have been impaired by repeated experience of unkindness and ingratitude; and somewhat even of virtuous principle may have been warped by those concessions, which, contrary to their better feelings, they may have been called upon to make to political exigencies, or political expedience. Still, the moment the voice of the Sovereign thinks fit to invite any set of men into office, whatever may be the habitual, constitutional line of their politics, I do think they bring with them, together with the most serious responsibility, such a pride of integrity, and such a regard for character, as they will not suffer easily to be overcome.* And it is not until the spell of all honourable

remarked, that "the Whigs who were taken into favour towards the close of the last reign, were too good courtiers not to follow strictly the example and direction of their Majesties," (as to their treatment of the Princess Anne.) But, "no sooner had death transferred the sceptre from the hands of William to this Princess, than the Whigs endeavoured, by their earnest assiduities, to make up for former deficiencies."

Mrs. Macauley's History of England.

* Neither Kings nor Ministers should lightly be thought evil of. In opposition to high authority, a celebrated historian of our own times delivers it as his opinion, that even Tiberius himself came to the Throne with laudable dispositions towards his people's good; so natural is it for exalted characters to be led by honourable principles, and for men to feel a disposition to bear with each other. "Whatever Tacitus, in his refinements of penetration, may have imagined of the simulation and of the dissimulation of Tiberius, I cannot suppose but that he meant

feeling is broken, by repeated violations of promises which they find they cannot fulfil, and repeated concessions to corrupt, to weak, or to violent measures which they become conscious they ought never to have made, that an Administration deservedly loses credit, and is no longer entitled to the confidence of the Country. This will, however, I trust, Sir, never be the fate of our present Ministry. They have taken their stand upon sanctified ground. The rudiments of their policy were, perhaps, chalked out by Mr. Pitt, but they have so filled up the magnificent outlines, and worked upon his large ideas, as, at once, to astonish foreign nations, and to secure and immortalize their own. Severe rebuke has, nevertheless, not been silent; but with a dignified feeling of decorum; with a high tone of sentiment; with a stern consistency of principle, have they answered the coarsest fulminations on their conduct, and the darkest attacks upon their character.

The present is not, indeed, an enviable time for any set of men to be placed at the head of affairs. The bitter spirit of many of the resolutions and remonstrances that fill the hands of Sir Francis Burdett and his numerous school, may, unless firmly resisted, eventually reduce the most celebrated among our own countrymen, to an adoption of the conduct of certain public characters in Athens, at that unfortunate period when, as the Historian relates "wise men accommodated themselves as they could to the temper of the times, endeavouring so to bend before popular tyranny as not to sink under it. Giving their advice in the general assembly only when pressure of circumstances required, they avoided that

to reign well, when on his outset he declared to an old enemy, "wrongs done me when in a private character, I will never revenge in the character of Prince."

Young's History of Athens. P. 50.

general direction of the republic's affairs, that situation of Prime Minister which Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Thrasybulus himself had held. It has been remarked, that Conon chose to pass his leisure in Cyprus; Iphicrates in Thrace; Timotheus in Lesbos; Charas in Sigceium, and Chabrias in Egypt, or any where rather than in Athens.* From the moment of this secession, "oratory (we are told) became a trade;" and a most miserable trade it was, dealing in every article of an incendiary complexion, and little departing, in some of its ugliest lineaments, from "the tendency of certain speeches delivered at the County Meeting, in the Shirehall, Norwich."

And for what, after all, would you have the present Ministry dismissed? For concluding a glorious war in as noble and efficient a manner as the annals of any age, or nation have afforded? For turning to the arts of peace the moment the cessation of so dreadful a contest would give them time to breathe? For contemplating the tide of public distress and endeavouring, by every means of retrenchment in their power, to resist its devastations? For beholding the progress of corruption and taking the most efficient means to arrest it? For considering the dangers to which the Country is exposed, by the revolutionary principles of designing men, by the seditious tendency of political clubs, by the inflammatory harangues of noisy demagogues, by the demoralization of society through the medium of cheap and blasphemous publications, and, with a firmness answerable to the occasion, unsealing, at once, the Magna Charta of England, and on the temporary suspension of her liberty constructing the lasting grounds of her security? O impotent and insulting frenzy! that would blast their virtues with the designation of infamy, and address their

* Mitford's History of Greece. Vol. IV.

Sovereign to turn them out of office, for having nobly done their duty and insured the salvation of the country in it!

But no considerations will weigh with the stubbornness of party spirit, the boldness of party accusation, or the inconsistency of party conduct.* You insist upon it, that unless Ministers be dismissed, the country cannot be preserved from revolution. From revolution, indeed, it may be difficult to preserve it, so long as such tirades as were delivered at our late County Meeting are stirring up the minds of people to dark surmisings and rebellious motions. Under the sanction of great names; of Sidney, of Hampden, of Lock, you scatter your firebrands and point your arrows. We revere, Sir, as much as you can, the memory of these excellent men; but there are periods, as society moves on, when it would be unsafe, perhaps, altogether to countenance the writings

* And here I cannot but notice the disingenuous methods used by men who call themselves honourable. Look at the wily Mr. Brougham, how he labours, with his usual undauntedness, to turn even the virtues of Ministers to their discredit. Had they not come forward to relieve the people, then they would have been accused of an unfeelingness towards their distresses. Now they do come forward, it is forsooth to engage, probably, the popular affection against a dissolution of Parliament. (Debate, May 14.) So again, had Ministers set off with a tyrannical use of their new powers, (in the suspension of the Habeas Corpus) the nation would have been up in arms; but now they are mild and moderate in their measures, these Orators declare "the moderation with which it was at first exercised, might be the cause of ultimate mischief, by lulling the people into indifference with respect to it." (Waithman's speech in Common Council, May 29.) Further, before the retrenchments as to sinecures, &c. nothing was heard but that such retrenchments would be the salvation of the Country; but now these have been accomplished, not a syllable of applause assaults the ear—the Country is, it seems, never the better for it. (Brougham's Motion on the State of the Nation.) Have these gentlemen no qualms of conscience, or is it all honourable bearing that bears upon the censure of Administration?

of the one, or the conduct of the other.* Still it is not departed, or even living characters like these we dread; we only dread the abuse of their opinions, when weak or vicious men affect to act upon them in corrupt and unsteady times.

Luckily, however, we have a constitution, that, under providence, will not easily deliver us over to either despotic Sovereigns, evil Ministers, or prating Demagogues. This constitution, Sir, was not the work of a day. It was, indeed, a long time struggling in its cradle, and wreathing its limbs about in vain to find some thing whereon to try its strength. It had shaped itself into a sort of form even in the days of Alfred, and, undisturbed by the depredations of the Danes, had assumed a firmer consistence in the reign of Edward the Confessor; nor did the Conquest, though it overwhelmed it with the galling chains of the feudal system, either eradicate, I conceive, its character, or endanger its existence. It was, indeed, at that revolutionary period, torn to pieces; but the scattered limbs gradually united, and the giant figure arose from his dislocations more fierce and formidable than ever. You behold our ancestors, Sir, in the very germ of their history, just such a set of men as were

* I would not, I am sure, attempt to depreciate, or injure so great a character; but still, may there not be some truth in what has been said of Algernon Sidney. "He was admired by many for his integrity and abilities; but he never was an object of love. His principles suited neither a people accustomed to the government of a single person, nor the profligacy of the times. In Rome or Athens, in the days of their simplicity and freedom, he might have arrived at the fame of their first patriots; but he was a visionary politician, and even a dangerous citizen under a Monarchy. In the extravagance of his views seems to consist the greatest defect in his judgment. He dreamed perpetually of an ideal fabric of a republic, without considering the wretched materials of which it was to have been framed."

Macpherson's History of Great Britain.

worthy of laying the ground work of such a constitution. Tacitus remarks, "the Britons themselves are a people who cheerfully comply with the levies of men, and with the imposition of taxes, and with all the duties enjoined by Government, provided they receive no illegal treatment and insults from their governors; those they bear with impatience. Nor have the Romans any further subdued them, than only to obey just laws, but never to submit to be slaves."* And the speech of Galgacus to his soldiers, at the Grampian Hills, as given by the same historian,* is such a specimen of British heroism as is never to be forgotten. They lost, indeed, the battle, and a dreadful loss it was; but their pride, their rage, their resolutions of revenge, their deep and deadly hatred of slavery, wandered wild over the field in every direction, and sank, like the storms "that beat dark December," into the soil of their very souls. There was, even in those early times, a spark of vitality about British feeling that could not be extinguished. The country might be conquered, the lands laid waste, the people oppressed, their laws infringed, their property confiscated, but the constitutional spirit that nurtured these laws yet lingered in the blood, and there they found it, couched under a threatening, dauntless brow, the moment the Roman, or Saxon, or Norman tyranny became insupportable.

Still, however, it was but a mass—a mighty, chaotic mass that rolled along in darkness through almost forgotten ages, gathering, as it proceeded, the float-ages of rough and rugged virtues which marked the varying epochs of society, and nourishing its growing soul with materials of every complexion and policies of every cast. It accommodated itself, of necessity,

* Life of Agricola.

to many peculiarities of character; and, like the common law of its Country, borrowed its variety of feature from the several subjugations of its soil. But it occasionally got the start of local prejudices, and soared into higher and happier regions. The tyranny of John, which gave birth to the *Magna Charta* of England, at length broke the fetters of the feudal system, and restored to our ancestors many of their lost, but not one of their forgotten rights.

Now was there a guiding star over the trackless ocean; an oracle to which all might resort who had duties to learn, or grievances to redress; where Sovereigns might receive instructions in their prerogatives,* and subjects initiation into their rights. Confirmed from reign to reign, as it passed through the Plantagenet, the Lancaster, the York, the Tudor lines, it received, indeed, incidental defilement from all; but, shaking off the rust of ages as it moved along, and shining with a softer lustre as it approached its zenith, the period at length arrived that was to invest it with holier and more majestic powers, and to establish, at once, the hitherto imperfectly defined principles of social union. The revolution of 1688 consolidated and compleated the constitution of England! Then appeared its stratum and substratum, as they had settled themselves after every convulsion. Then were

* It is popularly considered as a part of our constitution, and in no wise detrimental to its spirit, that the King can do no wrong. And the reasons assigned for it, by Blackstone and other writers, are such as usually meet the general approbation. In earlier times, indeed, this opinion does not seem to have been entertained so universally, (see Bracton and Fleta) but earlier times were times of greater danger from the impetuous and tyrannical disposition of Sovereigns, nor had the constitution then attained that perfection and vigour by which it sufficiently defines the limitation and sense of the expression, and preserves us from any danger that might result from the abuse of it.

discovered the deep and wide foundations, the massy moving engines of that stupendous work. Then was it seen (and cold must be the heart that does not burn with rapture at the thought) that, through every period of revolving ages, *a Monarchical Government had been its cradle, and an Ecclesiastical Establishment its crown*; and that, destitute of these solemn supporters, it would fold itself up like a scroll and “pass away like a vision of the night.” The reformed religion, therefore, of the Church of England sank into the corner stone of the British constitution; and from that moment it became a goodly fabric and strong, with excrescences, indeed, sitting upon its surface, but still “beautiful as the sun shining in its strength,” and, as it richly deserves to be, “the joy of the whole earth!”

And yet you Hampden politicians tell us that the British Constitution is sick at heart and ready to die of its own corruptions. No, Sir, while an atom remains of her original stamina, her life is in no danger. There is an imperishable purity about her that even the contaminating eloquence of a *Norfolk County Meeting* shall not be able to defile. In constant full health it is possible she may not be found; but that vivifying power with which she is endowed, will enable her to brush away the reptiles that crawl upon her flesh and would eat into her bosom, and to be the best physician to her own disorders. She will wind herself up in her beauties and her defects, and, casting her slough, will come out more fresh and healthy than ever. Subjected indeed to the blind, deleterious operations of her enemies, who are for cutting deep, though every slip of the knife would be attended by a gangrene, we might presently discover the enchantments of her youthful countenance giving place to faded features and diminished animation; but while she is supported by those who know her value, and can duly appreciate her spirit, there will

ever be found in her that happy wonderful property,
those perennial flows of blood and juices,

——— per quos renovata senectus

In florem redeat, primosque recolligat Annos.*

We are a **GREAT NATION**, and we deserve to be great. It is only such Patriots as you, Sir, who make us little. You who, like the insolent Tribunes of Rome, to serve private political purposes, cut up national glory and honour, and slaughter, with a rude barbarity, all that is excellent in the estimation of the great and good of every climate but your own. It is an unnatural conspiracy that you County Orators and your partisans have been guilty of against the fame of Old England in your *Requisition*, your *Resolutions*, your *Speeches*, and your *Address*. But take the odium of it to yourselves. The **COUNTY of NORFOLK** will not bear you out in such disgraceful proceedings. That County is shewing itself too independent to subscribe to such humiliating sentiments. What a field have you chosen for the exposition of your political resentments, and what a season for it too? To how unworthy a purpose have you perused the records, and contemplated the magnificence of departed empires. Of all that once constituted their celebrity, how little do you appear to have made your own. Their senators and warriors are gone down to the dust, and your heart seems to have buried itself with them. You recal not their sentiments; you partake not their feelings; you “roll not their raptures, nor catch their fire.” You recollect not how they mixt the loftiest passions of their nature with all that constituted their country. The very grandeur of their empires was a security for the invincibleness of their arms; and, to know themselves great, was to make themselves so. What Roman but had

* Ovid. Met.

his eye on the mighty founder of his empire, and his soul impressed with a double portion of dignity from the very view of that city which gave laws to the universe! What Grecian beheld the straits of Thermopylæ without awe, or the plains of Marathon without the proud recollection that there the power of Persia perished for ever! But alas! so narrow, so mean, so lost a thing is party spirit! the glorious prospect of England triumphant is England disgraced; and the FIELD OF WATERLOO, (at the sound of which future ages shall turn back with adoration upon the past) instead of reminding you that there a greater power than Persia perished—there a nobler nation than Greece triumphed; THE FIELD OF WATERLOO, when it meets your “blasted view,” presents merely a monument of the insufficiency of those men whom you are imploring your Sovereign to remove from his councils, if he would save his crown!

We can guard against foreign machinations—we can repel foreign aggressions—we can bear with foreign envy and malevolence—we can laugh to scorn foreign invasions of our coasts, or of our constitution—but for a crime of this parriciduous nature—a feeling of this dark, absorpt, unutterable description—this sin against all that is *British* in heart and soul, we are without a cure and without a consolation! It is a deadly blight that falls upon the glory of our Country, when it is blown from the lips of her own children. The bitterness of *such* a death is never past!

Party is abominable when it treads on such unholy ground as this. There are times, and the present is among the number, when men should be anxious to be considered as of no party. It is a sphere that precludes us from acting freely. We cannot breathe in it as we ought. We feel “cribbed and confined,” fearful that we may do something with our left hand which our right may not approve

of. Opinions formed upon this basis will be decussated in an instant; they will meet, cross, and then diverge never to meet more. Alas! to be consistent in integrity, we must often, I doubt, change sides in politics. Neither Ministers, nor their opponents are uniformly right, or uniformly wrong; nor is the voice of the people at all times to be either regarded or neglected. *Interdum vulgus rectum videt: est ubi peccat.* A sound politician will, perhaps, rarely accede to the systematic opinions of any party. Mr. Fox remarks, that "the great strength of the Whigs consisted in their being able to brand their adversaries as favourers of Popery; that of the Tories (as far as their strength depended upon opinion, and not merely upon the power of the Crown) in their finding colour to represent the Whigs as Republicans."* Perhaps the original spirit of the parties, popularly considered, is not here very unaptly defined. But this spirit was constantly so modified on each side, by existing circumstances and by the complexion of the times, that an honest Whig would, I conceive, sometimes make no indifferent Tory, and a well principled Tory occasionally settle down into a sober Whig. Great national questions, however, should absorb narrow considerations; and we should enter the lists of contending interests, like true British patriots, with our hands upon our hearts and our eyes upon our Country, and there only desire to be found where the necessities of that Country most need us. There are fearful changes in every period, when all parties must be amalgamated into the same mass, and have their enmities so paralyzed, and their affections so raised, as to come forth neither high Churchmen nor low; neither Whigs nor Tories; neither supporters of Ministry nor of opposition,

* History of the early part of the reign of James II. P. 67.

but defenders of one common faith, and preservers of one common Constitution. Let Mr. Coke lay his hand upon his heart, and make the same manly declaration with his Parliamentary colleague, and he shall stand in the same dignified light with his constituents. "As long as I believe conscientiously that his Majesty's Ministers are acting *right*, they shall have my support; whenever I think they are acting *wrong*, I will oppose them with all my strength—*so help me God!*"* Very solemn, indeed, is the appeal; but very correspondent, I make no doubt, will be the conduct.

Whom we may please, or whom we may offend by such a procedure, let us give to the winds. A judgment grounded on partial, or hasty, or erroneous views; or warped by a passionate temperament of mind; or bent upon an avengement of concealed personal wrongs; or seduced by the blandishments of a popular liberality, is a judgment which every man, at such a period as the present, will do right to cast in the back ground. We may carry our notions of liberty too far. We do so when we make it the pander of our spleen, of our malice, or of our ambition. When duly poised with reason, and accompanied by moderation, it enlarges the mind and becomes the nurse of noble sentiment and dignified feeling. But when it breaks loose from that wholesome restraint—when it takes into its train every harsh insinuation, every undigested calumny, and converts into its food the heats of party and the rage of a populace; it instantly murders all virtue, and corrupts and brutalizes the whole polished frame of society. There is, in fact, no liberty but in a due observance of the laws. Where either these are infringed, or our le-

* Declaration of Mr. Edmond Wodehouse, May 21.

gislators despised, there is faction, there is confusion, there is licentiousness—but there is no liberty.

Just so it is in a still more awful concern, and on which both law, and liberty, and all depend. The reports of the Secret Committees of the two Houses of Parliament exhibit, I conceive, as mournful a picture of the present, as dreadful a prospect of the future state of this kingdom, spiritual and temporal, as any of its bitterest enemies can wish to behold. It is not, I fear, the firmest exertions of the Magistracy; it is not the steadiest labours of the Clergy; it is not even the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, that can be of any lasting, essential service. There is an evil amongst us, that hath taken a deep root. It hath mixt itself with our best blood, and contaminated our purest sources. It hath made “the whole head sick, and the whole heart faint,” and is causing our national character to wane apace. Like the branch severed from its parent trunk, that national character will, indeed, continue to look green, while a single filament remains whereby it can imbibe nourishment from an ennobling Constitution. But the Constitution, if we are not careful, will become too good for the subject; and then, farewell to all liberal feeling and all dignified conduct!

The state of Religion among us is approaching, I conceive, to a state of perfect insanity;* and if so, I

* In general censures many exceptions must, of course, be made. It may be necessary to premise, that my opinions respecting the Dissenters and the Evangelical Clergy, are to be considered as applying to each of them *as a body*. I know there are good and serious men of every persuasion, and I am aware that much must be forgiven to wrong notions where the heart is right. Be it so—no reflections do I presume to cast upon such characters. Among these Dissenters themselves, too, there is a sect which I have never been able to bring myself to think, or to speak disparagingly of. I may be wrong—I have been told that I am so—in making any exceptions in favour of “the Friends.”

need not add to what perils our Government is, in consequence, exposed. With many creeds, we shall soon get to have no devotion. With the toleration of all opinions, we shall speedily find ourselves pestered with the vilest. With the profession of any Divinity in a Saviour, or no Divinity, we shall presently rest in the belief of any Saviour or no Saviour, any future State or no future State, any God or no God, and shall follow it up with the correspondent practice of as many, and as daring crimes as can securely be committed in the face of the sun without the fear of the gallows. I am aware what I expose myself to by opinions of this nature. But where dangers, and of the most imminent kind, are to be apprehended, and where any regard is left for an established Church, or an established Government, obloquy must not be heeded. It is scarcely possible, in a Letter of this sort, to avoid touching upon the subject. You will excuse, Sir, a few very brief reflections. They are not, alas! inapposite to the present "signs of the times." A slight expression of them will exonerate my own mind, without, I presume, any material hazard of corrupting yours, or of putting you out of love with that new family connection you seem preparing to form with our ecclesiastical malecontents.

It is difficult to trace the line of disaffection to our establishment in Church and State through its various

Still it delights me to do it—for whatever may be their religious creed; whatever their political persuasions, I see so much of good order in the society, so much of sound knowledge, so much abstaining from the usual corrupting occupations of the world, and so much consequent amiable deportment in all the transactions of private life, that I must of necessity continue, as I sincerely do, to respect them. True—there are traits about them which I do not approve of; but while I behold the benevolence of their conduct, I feel no disposition to advert to any errors in their creed.

dark and perverse windings. However, "the west still glimmers with some streaks of day," sufficient, perhaps, to guide us to the more modern fountain heads of this offence. Previously to the Reformation, one form and spirit of religion, objectionable as it was, had kept the people of this nation pretty well together. After that event, and amid the unsettled sentiments to which it at first gave rise, Calvin led the way in a crusade against sober Christianity; and he has been followed by men who, many of them, retain nothing of the character of their leader but his folly and his frenzy. Whitfield and Westley, excellent as in private life they might be, yet laid, in no inconsiderable measure, the ground of that separation from our established communion that has, of late years, so alarmingly increased. Driven from our churches, which, by their enthusiastic rantings, they disgraced, they took refuge in the fields; and there, corrupting the hearts and turning the heads of thousands of their weak and admiring votaries, with the subjugation of their spiritual, they unsettled too their temporal obedience. Others, and in countless multitudes, have since followed their fanatic example, and increased, at once, the devotional mania and the public disaffection of misguided minds.

Like the Polytheism of the early ages, the dissenting spirit has its field, which it is every day widening, for all sorts of absurdities. And when these congregate in the conventicle, pure and undefiled religion heaves a sigh and departs. "Many ills, says Dione, have the Gods inflicted on men; and many ills, in return, have men inflicted on the Gods."* Only look to the creeds of our various sectarists, and you will find the idolatries of the Christian world, quite as senseless as, and infinitely more inexcuseable than those

* See Hume's Dissertation on the Natural History of Religion.

of the heathen. The Chinese, we are informed, chastised their idols when their prayers were not answered. The Egyptians venerated the temples of their cats and crocodiles. The Laplanders worshipped the largest stones they could find. The Caunii put themselves in battle array, and, beating the air, expelled all the deities not of their own country.* Let us forbear to smile. We can match them. We can set up against them our *Calvinists*, who teach that the God of mercy is little better than a vindictive Demon—our *Socinians*, who declare that the Saviour of Mankind has not the shadow of a divine, or saving power about him—our *Methodists*, whose “young men see visions, and whose old men dream dreams,” and who fancy that inspiration awaits them wherever they set their foot, or fix their staff—our *Evangelical Clergy*, that “chosen generation,” that “peculiar people,” who finding it in their power to be as absurd and ridiculous as they please, do please to be as ridiculous and absurd as they know how,† cutting out of their own blocks any kind of divinity they chuse, and calling upon their infatuated votaries to believe in all the wild fooleries of their distempered imaginations. Here is a goodly set and precious, without taking in our Swedenborgians, our Muggletonians, our Shakers, Dunkers, Jumpers, and such a

* See Hume's Dissertation on the Natural History of Religion.

† “We have indeed the *Sales Attici*, (said pious Hervey in a letter to one of his friends) but where are the *Sales Evangelici*?” Alas! had he lived in these times, he would rather have found occasion to ask, where are they not? The pulpit lucubrations of our Evangelical brethren put all modesty of intellect to the blush. They remind us, as my Lord Orrery remarked of some of the miscellaneous volumes of Swift,* “of the famous machine in Winstanley's water-works, where, out of the same vessel, the spectators were presented with tea, coffee, chocolate, champagne, and sour small beer.” The preponderating quality of the latter article, it is perfectly needless to insist upon.

* Remarks on the Life, &c. of Swift. P. 190.

host of Bedlamites as the fanatics of the heathen world, in its darkest and most deplorable periods, never did, nor could stand a comparison with. How far this chaos of most degraded Christianity, out of which every hand is extended to snatch what portion of presumption he pleases, falls short of an insane state of religion, I leave those to determine who know what religion in its sound and sober state is.

The solemn conviction has passed over my mind that our concessions to the Dissenters, as a dissenting body, have never done us any good. I ask, is society improved by their boasted spiritual labours? Have they, in return for all our toleration, all our conciliation, all our grants and favours; have they moralized the land, and made men better or more obedient subjects, purer or more vital christians? Nothing like it—on the contrary, opposition to the Government of this Country was never more violent, more steady, more systematic, more deep and deadly in its various lurking ramifications. It combines in its powerful phalanx, all the Republicanism, all the Sectarism, all the fanaticism of the realm. Both saints and sinners swell the muster roll of disaffection, and the Church—alas! who could have thought that, in a season of danger like the present, “a man’s foes would be they of his own household!”—the Church pours forth her evangelical tribes to cement, at once, the reputation, the enmity, and the strength of the dissenting interest. Nor, indeed, are there wanting those of higher name and character among us, who, beholding this pure “progeny of light,” these closely connected “Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers,” like the Heresiarch of Heaven, “dart through the armed files an experienced eye,” and silently glory in their disgraceful strength!

Yet these, it seems, are times, in some people’s estimation, when it is necessary to concede much, if we would preserve any thing, and to draw off the

best blood of the establishment to swell the bloated carcass of Sectarism. Miserable times truly, if this be their character, and miserable men are we whose destiny it is to live at such a wretched period! But I will never believe that a degrading policy like this is required of us. If there must be concession to stave off calamity, let it spring from a noble spirit; let it be made, not as now, to canting hypocrisy, affected liberality, or popular frenzy; but let it be the spontaneous sacrifice of an enlightened mind to the progressive, real improvements of society; of a feeling heart to the interrupted, real comforts and happiness of the poor; of a fearless spirit to the advancement of the real good and security of the establishment. I know that we are enjoined by our religion to be "peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated;" and so, I trust, we are disposed to be when we light upon a proper field for the exercise of such virtues. But the same authority that commands us "to be merciful," does not require us to let "perverse men," with the ruin of all good Government, undermine the foundations of all sober religion.—It does not require us to permit "evil seducers," whose nature it is to "wax worse and worse," to poison at their leisure the very soul and body of Christianity.—It does not require us to sit still and say nothing, while the seceders from the Church are becoming daily more and more estranged from the State, and "with a willing mind" neither "rendering unto Cæsar the things that be Cæsar's, nor unto God the things that be God's."—It requires us to "refrain not to speak where there is occasion to do good;" to fear no man, but to do our duty firmly; and firmly to do our duty in crazy, perilous times like these, is, not to stand trifling at the surface, but to search with boldness the disorganizing principle to the quick. And when we have done so, and not before, we shall discover one large, deep twisted root of our national disorders in our multitarious devotions; a fixed seat

of disaffection, where are not wanting those ready at all times to receive with the prayers, the complaints of the weak, the discontented, and the mutinous.

In the mean while, encompassed as we are with dangers and difficulties, I would call upon every orthodox Clergyman and every sound Churchman to come forward and speak his mind, and discharge his conscience. The times for caution and lukewarmness, let them be assured, are gone by. The cause of our establishment must now be pleaded (if it be thought worth pleading for at all) in the face of reproach, misrepresentation and malice. There must, at this juncture, be no fear in any man who has the least regard for his Church. We must put on our armour and contend in her defence to the utmost of our ability. And though we may not be so fortunate as to convince all who peruse our arguments, that they are founded in reason and cemented by obligations of duty, we shall yet evince "what manner of men" we must be classed with, and prove that we are fearless champions of an insulted Hierarchy, whether we be powerful ones or no. The liberality of past times, we trust, we shall ever cherish; but the spurious benevolence of the present times, which gives every thing and receives nothing, we wish to have as little to do with as possible. Concession to Sectarists is all very well where it does not intrench upon the duty we owe to our excellent and much injured establishment. It is wise to yield in trifles; it is honourable: but it is neither wise, nor honourable to exterminate the higher claims of principle at the voice of popular frenzy, or, for the sake of preserving a hollow peace with our enemies, to extinguish for ever all sound of peace among our friends.

Doubtless the honest advocates of the Church of England have long felt themselves "in a strait."—We are called upon, in virtue of the present feelings of philanthropy, to overlook all dissenting enmities,

to disregard all dissenting and evangelical mummery, and, putting away the ark of God, to fall down and worship at the feet of Dagon. In good truth it is a severe trial. For depreciating our Ecclesiastical profession ; for despising our Ecclesiastical Constitution ; for ridiculing our ceremonies, mutilating our doctrines, slandering our practice, and endeavouring to extirpate the very form and figure of our Established Hierarchy—for these especial marks of Sectarian favour, to be compelled, by the liberal notions of the times, to confess ourselves extremely honoured and obliged, is a refinement of degradation hardly to be calculated upon in a period like the present. Caligula, we know, was caressed by those whose children he had slaughtered, and whose property he had confiscated. But surely we can never think of having recourse to these abject and infamous means of averting displeasure, or of appeasing resentment, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. No—if we are men ; if we are Christians ; if we are orthodox Members and Ministers of the Church of England, and, in consequence, I will still dare to add, in the very teeth of contradiction and rebuke, of the Church of Christ ; we shall scorn this trumpery liberality, which would seduce us into a sacrifice as shamefully at variance with our duty, as it is ignominiously disgraceful to our dignity. The fashion, we are told, of this world passes away ; and truly so it seems, in more senses than that solemn one in which it is here used. But there are certain stern feelings of right and wrong which are independent of all fashions. I like not this compulsory joining of hands with adverse interests and dissentient hearts. Who will may erect an altar to clemency, and surround it with the statues of Tiberius and Sejanus for me.

“ Attached to the forms of the Church, with a degree of zeal more nearly allied to bigotry and superstition than to an enlarged and enlightened morality, he re-

garded all the sects which diverged from it, in different directions, with a fixed suspicion and dislike, leading, by early and imperceptible gradations, to dread and detestation."* Such is the language of one of these insolent sectarists in speaking of the calm and chastised devotional feelings of his venerable Sovereign; of that Sovereign who has protected him and his satellites in the undisturbed exercise of their acrimonious professions! No one who knows the artist, will doubt, for a moment, of the deformity of the picture. But I hope we shall all have the courage and virtue to bear such reproaches, in such company, without complaining, and make the royal conduct, in this important respect, the measure and pattern of our own.

Where there is much of dissent there will be much of republican principle, and, of consequence, much of disaffection with the measures of all Governments at all times, and more especially in times like the present. In this predicament, Sir—and it sheds a double discredit and a double danger on your line of politics—do we now, I conceive, stand. The republican spirit has, for some years past, been rapidly gaining ground among us. It does not indeed, nor is it necessary it should, spread itself through the mass of our population; but it affects, and very powerfully, many in the various ranks of society, (not excluding even the highest) and many, particularly, in the middle ranks, the natural consequence, as I take it, of secession from our established communion. For every man lost to the Church, is lost in his veneration to our monarchy, instantly becoming republican in his sentiments, and the lower his rank, the worse probably his politics.

The rise of this spirit and feeling in this kingdom it is, perhaps, difficult to trace. It is not, however,

* Belsham's History of Great Britain. Vol. vii. p. 263.

here necessary. Certainly they have, in a good measure, taken their origin from religious dissent and fanaticism. They make indeed a part, but, I conceive, by much the smallest part of our Constitution.* We had hoped that America, colonized by the disgusting relics of the Protectorate, would, upon her dismemberment from the mother country, have bestowed upon us, at least, one blessing in freeing us from the plague of fanatical feelings. But not even that solitary comfort have we received at her hands! I will not go the length of some writers, who assure us, that "the Protestant Dissenters have entered into a solemn league and covenant to destroy our civil and ecclesiastical establishment,"† but I do think, upon no mean authority from both reason and experience, that "ill will to the establishment must, in all governments, belong to a Dissenter, if he be an honest man."‡ In every period of our history, the republican party has been strong in proportion as the Church was weak. And if it be allowed, as I think it must, that through the insidious arts of her enemies, and the lukewarmness and treachery of those who call themselves her friends, she is daily becoming more shaken, more deserted and dispised, it will follow that a democratic spirit must, in proportion, increase until it overrun the land. But is this the spirit that such men as the Earl of

* Dr. Whitaker, in his speech delivered at a general meeting of the Magistrates, Clergy, Gentry, &c. at Blackburn. (A speech, which, for its intrinsic value, it would well become my Lord Albemarle, Mr. Coke, and the flimsy reformers who are in love with their system, to read with attention and thoroughly to digest.) Dr. Whitaker observes, "that whereas the two higher branches of the legislature, by which, according to the best legal antiquaries, are to be understood the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, may be traced through the long period of the Saxon annals, the democratical branch arose at a much later æra."

† Courtenay's Philosophical Reflections on the French Revolution.

‡ Review of the Case of the Protestant Dissenters.

Albemarle, Mr. Southwell, and Mr. Coke should cherish, by joining the cry and leading the opposition, at so critical a season, against the measures of their own government, and when those measures have given satisfaction to so large a portion of the United Empire? Who hath required this sacrifice at their hands?—Not, I am very sure, the Constitution of their Country.

There is nothing in either ancient or modern republics very warmly to recommend them to the affection of the English nation. The republican Governments of antiquity had, indeed, their ages of glory and of patriotism. But nothing could divest them of an ungovernable ambition, which uniformly lead to the disquieting and subversion of their less potent, and more peaceable neighbours. Still, as some counteraction to this nefarious disposition, the greater their power, the less rule they frequently had over their own interests, and the more danger they were in of falling to pieces. The Spartans were obliged to create their ephors, and the Romans their tribunes to defend them against the injustice of their own proceedings. Under such Governments, crimes became both more frequent and more dark in complexion. In vain did Solon endeavour, by the institution of the Areopagus, to soften the ferocity and to restrain the licentiousness of democratical principles. At Athens it was evermore the popular party that delighted in war, and that used every means to foment the beginnings of it. A standing army, Sir, in the hands of a regular monarchical Government, is attended with nothing like the danger that such a description of force would be in such hands, where it would probably constitute their law as frequently as the emergency seemed to require it. The despotism, of the people will, in short, be found to be the worst kind of despotism, and, of all the Bashaws in being, a Republican Bashaw the most unbearable.

Further, the bitterness of a democratical spirit is

no mean argument against any undue nourishment of it in a Government like our own. It is never to be satiated but with the destruction of all virtue. This, Sir, is a dark blot even in the brightest periods of Roman history; and if we turn still further back to the States of Greece, it glares upon us with the same frenzied countenance in their most celebrated, their most polished, their most insidious, and altogether most republican state. I have never contemplated the treatment of Miltiades and of the Athenian Admirals at Arginusæ, without being struck with abhorrence at the sufferance of such more than savage unjust and ingratitude. All the talent, all the spirit, all the honour and integrity of the land, they were certainly, in trying emergencies, enabled to call around their standard; but they as certainly murdered all this talent and integrity when its excellence became too bright any longer to be born with. To “deliver earth and water” to a Government so constituted and so minded, is I trust a degradation never again likely to be experienced in this kingdom. We tried it once, and were ashamed of the experiment.* The truth is, men are not cut out for either such Government, or such obedience. Were human nature indeed perfect, democracy might, perhaps, be considered as the perfection of human polity. But

* “A very droll spectacle it was, in the last century, to behold the impotent efforts the English made for the establishment of democracy. As those who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of all virtue; as their ambition was inflamed by the success of the most daring of their members; as the spirit of a faction was suppressed only by that of a succeeding faction, the government was continually changing. The people, amazed at so many resolutions, sought every where for a democracy without being able to find it. At length, after a series of tumultuary motions and violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so odiously proscribed.”

Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. Vol. I. book iii. c. 3.

with so many bad passions constantly floating about us, so much corruption of heart and infirmity of mind, a well regulated monarchy is the Government, I think, which every prudent man would make choice of for the production of the greatest possible happiness, in a state where the greatest happiness possible is so small.

In democratic manners, when they become debased—and the process of their depravity is seldom tedious—there is no stand. They usually go on from bad to worse; and, beginning with contempt of established religions, soon finish with disobedience to rulers, and disregard of those bonds which judiciously tie the various discordant parts of society together. To maintain public faith with republican spirits and principles, was held to be nearly impossible in ancient times, and the American rebellion and the French revolution have pretty well convinced us that it has been quite as hard to accomplish in modern. The democratic feeling, however, in this country, with all the reforming endeavours in its favour, is not yet become general. More than a few, I trust, are still left among us (ay and even in the county of Norfolk) who scorn to “bow the knee” to this political Baal. We cannot easily forego our prepossessions in favour of an established religion and an established Government. Whether deservedly or no, they meet us in early life, invested with all the sanctity that great and good minds can bestow upon them. And as we advance in years, like the affection that indulges only on the remembrance of the past, we are unwilling to contemplate them in any other dress than “the dear fashions of their youth.” We cannot be philosophized out of our honest prejudices in their favour, and, I am sure, shall never be tempted to forsake our antiquated notions by such coarse, disgusting abuse of them as we are every day assailed with. A democracy in France fell little short of the work of the

Devil; and a democracy in England, exercising the executive powers for only a single month, would sufficiently shame every Hampden Club into a repentance of their principles, and sufficiently alarm every great landed proprietor into a regret for his opposition. But God forbid that such an experience should ever work to the conviction and reformation of Mr. Coke!

Obedience is the very soul of government; and when obedience is at an end, government dies too. I confess I know of no apology for these constant endeavours to unhinge society, by addresses to the worst passions of our fellow creatures at the worst periods. Is fame our object? Fame becomes infamy.—Is power our aim? It is the wretchedest way to it.—Is resentment our covert reason? Let us hide our heads and blush for such disgraceful sacrifices to its gratification. Are all the orders of government to be disturbed, because we are weak and do not see its wisdom, or haughty and will not submit to it, or vicious and will determine to revile it? We cannot, indeed, too much admire the merciful contrivance of Providence in the natural world, by which “all things that offend,” are wonderfully converted into good, and the corruptions of creation made to return, by loathsome channels, to renew the beauty and to increase the fertility of the earth. Neither stand we less surprized, or abashed at the same apparent awful procedure in the world of mind; where the iniquity of man, broken and blasted, turns to the glory of God, and those thoughts of the heart “that are only evil continually,” are silently counteracted by some unknown process, and enlisted on the side of that virtue which had been marked out for destruction. History, ancient and modern, bears witness to the appalling fact, that the darkest designs have been thwarted by a hand behind the curtain; by whom Kings reign and Empires flourish and decay. God fixes his eye upon them, and

"they are not!" Still this is by no means, I conceive, the natural, intended working of Providence; nor is it in the designed employment of the human mind to "do evil that good may come." Good indeed, in such instances, frequently does come; but it comes with less desire, less effect, less blessing to man, less approval of God, and (as far as our weak faculties may presume to judge) with the compleat moral ruin of the instrument by which it hath been effected. All the evil, in such a case, belongs to us; all the good to a power without us. And though in a world so chequered and changeable as the present, "it must needs be that offences come," I yet know not the created being that can calmly survey the confusions he has caused around him, when he recollects the inexorable sentence which shuts up and seals that affirmation, "but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh."

If dissenting feelings and republican sentiments are not, at this moment, overspreading the country, and are not the secret cause of much of that disaffected spirit which at present prevails, why then all I have advanced upon such presumption loses its force, and fighting with a mere shadow, I must expect to sit down with my folly for my pains. But if these feelings and sentiments be every where uppermost—if they lurk in our Senate, our Churches, our Conventicles, our County Meetings—if they infest our cities and villages,* and assimilate themselves with all professions

* Drakard, in his Stamford paper of Jan. 10, 1817, observes, (and he is but too good authority in all matters of this nature) that "several Hampden clubs have been established in Leicestershire, at Narborough and adjacent villages, which mustered sixty members the second night; at Whetsone too, Broughton, Astley," &c. Yes—this is serious information. Where seceders from the Church abound, pestiferous associations will abound; and seceders from the Church, under one disguise or other, are

and become identified with all proceedings, yet retaining throughout, under whatever plausible guise, the most decided hostility to our constitution, civil and ecclesiastical ; then must you, Sir, and every man in the united Empire, who thinks and acts as you do, consider seriously the precipice upon which you stand, and the very hazardous and, it may be, fatal game you are preparing to play. If I were asked whether the present was a time for such Addresses as you and your co-partners, in various quarters of the kingdom, are daily pouring forth before an ignorant and incensed populace, I would answer—No—It is only a time for Addresses *intended* to stir up the people to rebellion—*intended* to bring about the overthrow of all Governments—*intended* “to bind our kings in chains and our nobles with links of iron”—*intended*, in short, to open afresh the horrors of a French revolution, and to spread confusion and anarchy, with their concomitant train of miseries, over the face of the whole earth. Your integrity will here stand you in no stead. As I have before hinted, it will only increase your country’s danger and your own condemnation. The situation, Sir, in which you are now placed is of so awful a cast, that, if you are not careful, all your excelling qualities will be worse than thrown away. They will impart influence to opinions which ought to possess no influence, and will clothe that line of political conduct with the semblance of justice, which experience has stamped with infirmity, and which patriotism hath blotted from the book of wisdom. That power before whom all lips were silent; and all hearts were purified, “nec adversus Dictatoriam vim, aut Tribuni plebis, aut ipsa plebs, attollere

spreading themselves throughout the kingdom in every direction. For this defection, whoever may be, the Clergy certainly, as a body, are not to blame.

oculos, aut hiscere audebant;”* that power with us cannot last long, and is but very partially efficacious, as to any government of the thoughts, even while in its fullest operation. Far enough are we removed, not through any despotism in our rulers, but by a rank licentiousness in ourselves, from that “*rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire quæ velis, et quæ sentias dicere licet.*” (Tacit.) The dissenting infection is got into our blood. The evangelical profaneness is reaching our vitals. The republican poison is corroding and gnawing at our hearts. These are the more solid grounds of disaffected feelings and national commotions; and these, I fear, will endure in spite of every common restraint that can be placed upon them. Surely, surely, Sir, the assistance of such men as Mr. Coke is not wanted to add fuel to such hot, spreading, sulphury fires!

It is hardly possible to read the dreadful account of the Roman Republic corrupted, as given us by Sallust, without seriously thinking on and watching over the English Monarchy deteriorated—deteriorated at this moment by a variety of different machinations, and all put in motion for the purpose of directly, or indirectly overthrowing our Constitution in Church and State.† “In so vast, so populous, and so corrupt

* Liv. Lib. VI.—16.

† Let us be careful how we suffer ourselves to be smiled, or sneered, or ridiculed out of this opinion. Many who have for years thought lightly of any such notions, begin now to see too great cause for an alteration of their sentiments. We have hitherto been able to contemplate the *dissenting interest* from beginning to end; but now we have a dissenting interest spreading every where and ending no where. Let us not forget the argument for Catholic Emancipation, founded upon the superior *numbers* in Ireland embracing the Catholic persuasion. Nothing is wanting in England but an argument of the like nature, for all things “to work together” as our adversaries could wish them to work.

a city, (says the historian *) which swarmed with hordes of the vile and profligate, Cataline had at his beck a band of desperate men, who served as a body-guard near his person. Whoever was thoroughly debauched, and rendered infamous by a long course of adultery ; whoever by his gluttony, by gaming, by his headlong passions, his lawless pleasures, and festival carousals, had ruined his fortune ; whoever was overwhelmed with debts, contracted to pay the forfeit of his crimes ; the whole gang of parricides, sacrilegious wretches, convicts, or men who lived in fear of conviction, together with the perjurer and assassin, who were nourished with the blood of their fellow-citizens ; and, in short, all who felt themselves distracted by their flagitious deeds, their poverty, or the horrors of conscience ; all of this description lived with Cataline in friendship and the closest familiarity."—Your discernment, Sir, will perceive how far this description tallies with the present aspect of affairs in your own Country ; how well qualified, by broken fortunes and distracted hearts, many among us are for rallying round such a standard as Catalines ; how Republican sentiments, at variance with all notions of Monarchy, naturally lead to, and engender, and nourish such a crisis of affairs ; and how, when followers of this desperate cast abound, leaders of a cast as desperate will never be wanting. Your discernment, I repeat, will enable you to see this, and permit me to hope that that honour and virtue which you possess, and which I am not unwilling to believe you eminently possess, in private life, will deter you from any line of conduct, which, amid dissent, democracy, desperate circumstances, and callous minds, might eventually tend to stir up such a vortex of lawless and over-powering iniquity as this.

* Murphy's Translation of Sallust. P. 19.

I know not, Sir, that I can more appropriately conclude this Letter than by adverting, finally, and which I will do as briefly as possible, to the nature and tendency of your *Agricultural System* : a field where you are supposed to intrench yourself, it must be confessed, pretty strongly, but where, amid much to be commended, there is also, in my opinion, somewhat, and of no mean import, to condemn. Agricultural meetings, for the purpose of agricultural improvements, are certainly without the pale of high treason. Still, though politics may not be the order of the day, where *wool and lamb* in large lottery office letters occupy the foreground, yet political association is, I suspect, in these rural olympics not entirely overlooked. The *Holkham* interest is thereby cemented; the hard, rough knobs of opinion smoothed down; and the “coat of many colours” brushed up, and here and there darned afresh, with the hope no doubt, under the rose, that the *Holkham Republic* will continue—one and indivisible! a hope far from unreasonable when we consider, that

All sorts meet here, of whatsoe’er degree,
To blend and juggle into harmony.*

You and my Lord Albemarle are for reforming the Reports of the Secret Committees of both Houses of Parliament; and you endeavour to persuade us that they abound in insufficient and exaggerated statements. Will you have the goodness, with the same discerning equitable eye, to survey the “County Agricultural Reports” of the united kingdom, made up, I apprehend, so far as they concern themselves with *clerical property*, of as vile and rubbishy materials (to say no worse of them) as ever disgraced a set of writers, who are all, I suppose, to be classed under the denomination of “honourable men.”

These County reports have done much harm in society, and have done it in an insidious manner. They have undermined the interests of the Church and slandered her Ministers, with the specious pretence of consulting their credit. In various instances, where they have brought forward their experience in support of their opinions, they have betrayed a shameful ignorance of the origin, the nature, and the value of Church property. If this ignorance be merely affected, I can only say they have played the rogue in a most stupid manner. An infant might detect the dull, heavy absurdity of their malicious misrepresentations.

Somewhat, perhaps, of the present general distress, and a rather large portion of the present general disaffection, may be fairly imputable to this unsuspected source. Our agricultural systems and surveys do, in some measure, go hand in hand with our Hampden Clubs and Spencean Societies; corrupting the stream of public opinion, increasing public prejudice against a very useful order of men, and pouring, I conceive, a bad blood into the veins of the community. A more mournful degradation never was witnessed, than what the boasted improvements in husbandry of the present day have entailed upon the labouring poor. They have, in fact, secured the slavery of the whole agricultural, by far the most virtuous part of the population of this kingdom. We may by these improvements, indeed, have caused the earth to yield her increase in a somewhat more abundant manner, but we have done it at an expence, which, *morally* considered, we are not able to bear. We have enriched, it may be, the soil of our fields, but have starved and left naked that better soil of the human mind. These improvements have been founded upon an almost total excision of small farms and small occupiers. The little farmer, with his plough or spade, put his heart and soul into the

ground. He laboured on his own, and his own supported him. He saw a home, not as now, squalid, filthy, desolate; but neat and clean, with plenty on his rafters and comfort at his hearth. He was virtuous, because virtue was his interest. He was industrious, because he laboured for himself. He was frugal, because without frugality there was no making both ends meet. He was loyal, because in public commotions, he had every thing to lose and nothing to gain.

But as things now are, it is all over with both the little farmer and the day labourer. The poor, industrious man must never more hope to drive a light harrow at the end of his hard day's work. Where see we any slips of land as incentives to his industry, or as compensations for his fidelity? Where is his homestal, his cow, his pig, the foundations of his wealth, and the small, but certain pledges of his sobriety? Where again are the little farmer's marketable commodities, that kept down the price of many articles of consumption, and were conducive to the comfort of him and of his neighbours? All have nearly disappeared! All are merged into those overgrown estates that devour every acre of land within their voracious grasp; cultivated, it may be, to the height, but producing only despots and drudges. And, as a consequence of this, we see the large farmer every where the maker of wages, and abusing the poor's rates as a succedaneum to the deficiencies increased, frequently, by his own avarice and perpetuated by his own injustice.* Thus verify we the

* Lord Castlereagh on this subject some time ago observed, "the House and the Country ought always to keep in view, that a great proportion of the wages of labour of the Country were paid out of the poor's rates. The farmers, from a system, the bad effects of which had been already too much felt, had been long in the habit, in many parts of the Country, of paying

curse pronounced upon man at the fall, "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground." And, God knows, it is a bitter bread which some of these Egyptian task-masters (for I will not suffer myself to believe there are many) doom their poor labourers for life to swallow. While their strength lasteth, so long must their toil last. When this strength fails—there is the parish work-house and the parish allowance for their pains.

But surely, Sir, without any nice or intricate disquisition, it is consonant with reason, and comes home to common feeling, that a poor man's labour ought to supply his necessities in health,* and to furnish him, at the close of life, with expectations of better treatment and accommodation than this. He who "rises up early, late takes rest, and eats the bread of carefulness" should not be deserted when his evening sun goes down. But he is deserted, and cruelly deserted, when those who have had the marrow of his strength and have been made rich by his sweat and toil while young, forget him when he grows old—he is deserted, if they whose barns have been swelled by his patient industry, pour forth no part of

a great proportion of the wages of farming labour in the shape of poor's rates. This accounted, in a great measure, for the rapid rise in the amount of the poor's rates from one and a half to upwards of seven millions. He was convinced that, in cases where nineteen or twenty shillings in the pound were paid for poor's rates, fifteen shillings of that would be found to be wages paid in the shape of poor's rates. The Country could not, in any other sense, have supported such a load of taxes.—Debate, March 7, 1817.

* Mr. Clarkson, in his "Inquiry into the cause of the increase of Pauperism," &c. has calculated, that in the year 1688, a poor man could earn weekly, putting his wages into bread, *twenty-four* quartern loaves, whereas in 1812 he could only earn *nine*. With plain people such calculations, for their clearness, go a great way. It is divesting the question of all gaudy appendages, and bringing the matter fairly to issue in the simplest manner possible.

their abundance to cherish and relieve his wants. Are we to roll and riot in luxury, while "the showers of the mountains" beat upon their defenceless heads? Yet are these violations of feeling committed every day, and so coolly committed, as if matured reflection, which should lead to more righteous bearing, had only served to divest them of shame as well as of guilt. To a poor, industrious, good man his rich neighbour will never have performed his duty till he gets into his grave.

But the injustice is beginning to come home to us. Only, Sir, carry back remembrance thirty or forty years, and compare what our labourers and domestic servants were then with what they are at present, and the contrast, in a general view of it, will, I fear, be found to be frightful. There is a morality in agriculture as well as in taxation; and I do strongly suspect that we may thank our writers and our improvements in husbandry; our inclosures perhaps in some respects; our engrossing of land; our diminution of small farms; and our mode (together with its abuse) of maintaining the poor, for much of the evil that at present inundates society. We want no treatises on "the wealth of nations" to demonstrate, that our real gains are not increased by the alledged increase of the fruits of the earth, and by the improvements upon ancient ignorance. Even Mr. Glover, who, whatever may be your exalted opinion of him, I take to be less of a political oeconomist than Adam Smith, will probably tell you, that when you deduct the enormous additions to your rates from the increased produce of your fields, not much will be left to boast of in the article of mere individual profit only; while the loss, I conceive, on the other side, swallows up all distinction of debtor and creditor, and leaves only the wretched result that the little farmer and day labourer, with the demolition of their reasonable prospects, have estranged themselves from sober habits, and in a fear-

less desperation of circumstances, almost emptied their hearts of virtue.

I am no advocate, Sir, for an Agrarian law, but a very warm advocate for the refuse of the great proprietor's fields being thrown to the poor man's cottage. It is not certain that large farms are doing the good, even as to their supposed produce, which they have the character of doing. But it is quite certain that a few of these, broken down into lesser ones, would be a blessing to the community, and a temptation to the diligence and fidelity of our labourers, the effect of which, morally considered, we possess no means of calculating. Scatter small farms throughout the country, and see what will become of it. You will have reduced the increase of the earth a little, and, I apprehend, only a little: but you will have erected a wall of fire round your land; a refuge from commotion; a sheet anchor in unavoidable distress, and a sovereign cure for all mere political discontents and disaffections. Every house would be a house of joy, and every heart a heart of loyalty. Rome was indebted to her small farms for much of her military heroism and of her domestic probity. When estates were heaped together and got into few hands, what followed?—Every thing which a good man would wish to see away. Our agricultural population, more patient and uncomplaining in this season of difficulty than almost any other description of men,* deserve to be rendered more comfortable. But this they never can be, so long as the large farmer is suffered to add house to house and field to field, and to seize upon the poor man's lamb, to increase the already overflowing abundance of his own flocks and herds. This, I conceive, has of late years been nearly literally the case.

* See the Reports of the Committees of the two Houses of Parliament.

I say not thus in aggravation of our present troubles, but to remind you, Sir, while you are condemning the measures of Ministry with so large severity, and have even the effrontery to tell the Throne, that “already have these measures effected, to an alarming degree, a separation between the rich and the poor,”* that your own measures, and those of your agricultural friends and followers, have not been a whit less objectionable, or less injurious. Who would have destroyed such happiness as Mr. Coke might have created around him for such gains? Who would have blasted such a humble beautiful prospect as he had before him, for the sake of inverting the order of society by making his farmers Squires, and thereby not unfrequently clothing insolence in purple? How can you depend, Sir, on the *little freeholders of Norfolk* for their votes at any ensuing elections—you who have never been their friend; never consulted their interest; never thrown to them the crumbs from your twelve hundred acre farms; never, in this important respect, ameliorated their condition; never, I fear, manifested even a wish to ameliorate it? No political principles of yours; none of your “splendid improvements,” whatever “weedless surface or rich produce” they may exhibit, have ever done them any service. In vain is “*HOLKHAM, ITS AGRICULTURE, &c.*” read before philosophical societies, and afterwards sent forth from the press, to invite, and if possible, to redeem popularity throughout the county. Though breathing a spirit that compels respect, it yet fails in producing conviction. The talisman has lost its influence. The panacea is divested of its restorative properties. There is a stain, Sir, upon your agricultural system which even Dr. Rigby’s exertions will not be able to wash away; and far

enough as I am from contradicting this gentleman's assurances of your domestic worth, or of that "admirable system" of cultivation which he so warmly and so elegantly advocates, I must yet maintain, that, with all your urbanity of demeanour and your liberal treatment of your tenantry, you can never, in the general, broad, open acceptation of the term, be denominated **THE LITTLE FARMER AND FREEHOLDER'S FRIEND**. No part of his comforts has arisen from your efforts in his behalf. The principles, moral, political, and æconomical which you have adopted, have conduced, I am sorry to say, neither to the dignity of the higher, nor to the happiness of the lower orders of the community. Your system of large farms, together with "the bonus of a capital house,"* subject, as it appears, to

* Neither, in my opinion, has Dr. Rigby in his "*Holkham*," &c. brought forward the strongest objections against large farms, nor has he by any means invalidated even those he has thought proper to insist upon; while in a moral, in my mind by far the most important, point of view, he does not seem to have considered the subject at all. For such an omission it is difficult to excuse him. He ought to have done it, even though he had gone, as it is possible he might, a little out of his *beat* for the purpose. The only bearable argument for large farms, and these advocates know it, is their *superior produce*. But allowing this to any extent almost they please, (though there will be found many, beside the mere *Hommes de Lettres*, who are averse to all such allowances) so many and great objections will still remain, as to make large farms the eye-sore of our modern agricultural system, and the encouragers of such a system, the last men in the world whom their Country will hereafter have to thank as its benefactors. Is it not lawful to do what I will with mine own?" It is; but you may do very improvidently with it notwithstanding. Farming when, as discouragingly described by Dr. Rigby, "a mere system of maintenance," was perhaps, morally considered, farming in its perfection. The laws passed to restrain the monopoly of land in the age of the Tudors, does not speak much for the policy, or virtue of the practice. It is for want of such a consideration of their consequences, that many of our improvements in other branches, are, at this moment, corrupting us as a people, with far greater rapidity than they will ever, "exalt us as a nation."

very few exceptions, can only, I think, be considered as a large nuisance. The example, universally acted upon, would go near to trammel us once more with feudal services and baronial tyranny, and would spread an insolent defiance of all moral obligation over the face of the whole kingdom.

But the gentlemen of the Hampden School have a sly argument in reserve for this engrossing system (and I dare say, as they think, a pretty sure one too,) which will disarm, at any rate, one class of their objectors—viz. that the CHURCH *grows sleeky and fat upon large farms*—No, Sir; the Church has been as little substantially benefitted, in this respect, as the small freeholder or the poor. Some accession to her revenues she may, possibly, thereby have obtained; but she has lost, I apprehend, a great deal more in solid comfort than she has gained in wealth. Tithes, at all times a hateful subject with unjust men, is become more hateful since the introduction of general inclosures and agricultural improvements; because the claims of the clergy being thereby increased, the slanders and enmity of that portion of the landed interest, who, entertaining your political notions, have ever manifested a regret at granting their reasonable demands, have increased with them. Were these large farms, throughout the kingdom, dismantled and thrown into more moderate ones to-morrow, the Church would have cause to rejoice at it. She had rather, at any time, receive her tithes from the hands of a little farmer than of a large one. In the former case, an Angel comes forth and pays her with a smile of gratitude on his countenance; in the latter, the gates of Pandemonium burst open, and a fury rushes out with the dues of the clergy in one hand and their execration in the other.

If residence upon our livings is to be enforced, let residence be rendered comfortable. Let our just, moderate, legal demands be paid without the up-

braidings of those men who have, for ages, been fattening upon our lenity and laughing at our credulity; and who, though some of them tithe-holders like ourselves, and, in the true lay rector spirit, pretty strong too in their grasp, have neither the charity to think well of us, nor the sense to steer clear of abusing us.—We have suffered for the peace of the Christian Church, and we are willing to suffer. But we are not willing to be vilified as its enemies by those who affect to league with us as friends—we are not willing to have our moderation called into question, by those who were admitted into the same fellowship of interests in the hope, probably, that they would be induced to exercise the same moderation—we are not willing to behold our characters aspersed, our labours depreciated, our humblest compositions represented as extortionate, by the very men, who, if we even deserved such reproach, ought, in the recollection of their own abominable tyrannies, to be the first to extenuate our failings and the last to denounce us for our crimes. It is melancholy to think what expedients have been resorted to, at various periods, to persuade the tenantry of this kingdom that their best benefactors are their worst enemies, and the greatest sinners, so far as concerns what is preposterously called the *burthen* of tithes,* those

* I think Mr. Coke is among the number of those great landowners who look upon tithes as a burthen. (See his Speech on Lord Binning's Motion, May 19, 1808.) We know this gentleman to be no friend to the Church. Mr. Glover has, indeed, insisted upon the regular performance of his *private devotions*, as a proof of his attachment to our Ecclesiastical Establishment—a poor and flimsy proof truly, like most of the Glover tribe.—Though, however, I will not attempt to rob him of the credit of this solitary claim upon the Clergy's regard, I must observe that some doubts have been entertained of Mr. Coke's having altogether so high an opinion of *public devotion*. Some people are foud of cheap prayers when they go to Church. Fifty-two

who are themselves most "sinned against." This is no fit occasion for saying much upon such a subject; but surely, if there be one description of persons more inimical to our ecclesiastical constitution, more injurious to our ecclesiastical profession, more hardened and hostile to the mode of our ecclesiastical maintenance, and by consequence, to the efficacy of our ecclesiastical ministry than another, it is those pursy, over-grown, *Hampden* land-owners, who swell their own rent-rolls by pilfering from ours, and sanctify the sacrilege by afterwards reviling us for our extortion! I would there were spirit enough in the clergy to treat such exalted, and therefore doubly disgraceful delinquents in the manner they deserve. The tithe system, so equitable in its origin, so independent in its provisions, so merciful in its operation, and so totally incapable, from its very nature, of subjecting any farmer to injustice or oppression, is daily becoming, by these insidious machinations, a "fretting leprosy" to all who are plagued with having any concern in it, tithe-valuers (who, by the bye, give us often little more than ten shillings in the pound,) and

capital parish priest sermons have I known to have been delivered, ay, and to a substantial congregation too, for little more, upon the average, than about half a crown a head. This I can assure Mr. Coke is no joke, but a very serious fact, and a bit of a hardship into the bargain. It reminds me of the enviable situation of a Curate that I have heard of, somewhere towards the North-western part of this County, who, from an impropriate rectory of the annual value, as is supposed, of nearly six hundred pounds, for the Sunday's duty (once a fortnight) marrying, christening, burying, naming children, and all other parochial business, grubbing up votes throughout the parish for *Hampden* candidates, probably not excepted, receives, in hard cash, no less a sum than Twenty good golden Guineas a year!!—Bravo! Whig principles will never tempt us to "rob the Exchequer" to endow Churches. What would the *Abbot of Castle Acre* say to such a proof of attachment to our Ecclesiastical Establishment as this?

petti-fogging practitioners, *learned in the law*, excepted.*

I am unwilling to lengthen this Letter by much of a prospective matter since the date of its first edition. But your "Address to the independent freeholders of the County of Norfolk," issued immediately upon the close of the late election, is a document of too singular a nature to be entirely passed over. Of your exercise, Sir, of an undue influence at that period, there appears to be but one opinion. The mildest reprehension of this exercise was given by the person who was himself most likely to suffer from it.† Many points of this Address are open, I conceive, to very severe condemnation. But I refrain from adverting to them. We have master-builders among us, who, whenever it is thought fit, can take to pieces the materials of this ill-constructed monument of your unsubdued spirit. You have here touched a string that will long vibrate throughout the County. You have sent forth a *manifesto*‡ which the free-

* At no very distant period I hope to be able to employ myself on this ungracious subject; when I trust I shall be able to prove, from documents which our adversaries will not have it in their power lightly to gainsay, that the conduct of the Clergy has, herein, been at all times unexceptionable; and that the injustice, the oppression, the fraud, the falsehood, and every wrong attached to the *Tithe System*, do altogether and entirely rest with those who ignorantly, or who maliciously revile it. My ground of defence is solid, and my attack shall not be fearful.

† See Mr. Edmond Wodehouse's Speech on the day of Nomination.

‡ On the subject of the attack upon Mr. Coke, in St. Andrew's Hall, on the Saturday preceding the late Election, a difference of opinion subsists. I look upon the public communications, however, of both the late and the present Mayor of Norwich, (Norwich Mercury, Aug. 9 and 16) strengthened by an excellent preceding Letter in the Norfolk Chronicle, of the 26th July last, and signed "an Eye-witness," to be nearly decisive upon this point. As to "the state and temper of the city in which the election was held," though it has given rise to a good

holders, if they have a spark of British spirit about them, will consider as a high insult upon their late exercise of the elective franchise. It is not for Mr. Coke so to address such a County. It is not for such a County so to suffer itself to be addressed.—But enough—I now leave you, Sir, to your contemplations. That County is at length upon the alert; and I hope a spirit will be aroused against all such sen-

deal of Addressing, and as Mr. Hanks, “more in pity than in anger,” expresses it, “of harmless adulation,” yet did Mr. Sergeant Blossett, the Sheriff’s Assessor, declare, “he had never known an election more constitutionally conducted.” True it is, that “determined on giving no pretence for a public disturbance,” Mr. Coke “remained quietly at the house of a friend during the poll;” but the question is, how long he would have contented himself in this quiescent state, had his usual popularity with the freeholders encouraged him to venture abroad. Indeed I believe almost every symptom of disorder may be traced to their own school; Mr Southwell, on the very day of nomination, though professing a wish “to abate all animosity,” having been, as Mr. Mason justly remarked, “so far from redeeming his pledge, that he had, at once, thrown the apple of discord amidst his audience, by casting an odium on the public principles of Mr. Wodehouse’s friends.” (Norfolk Chronicle, May 24.) May I be permitted to ask, what would probably have been “the state and temper of the city,” if, unluckily, Hampden principles had been seconded by a Norwich mob, and *green* had been the fashionable colour of the season? And how far would Mr. Coke’s politics, or my Lord Albemarle’s eloquence, or the trumpetings of “Jupiter tonans,” have gone in restraining their fury? Where would the *pink and purple* have found an asylum then? Not, I fear, in the moderation of the *Holkham* party. Most fervently, however, is it to be hoped that we shall never more see the disturbers of order giving laws to an electioneering populace, or strangling that purer, constitutional spirit which has nobly raised its head amidst almost dictatorial influence. Most fervently is it to be hoped, (to borrow a feather from a brighter wing than my own) that it may long be allowed the truly independent freeholders of the County of Norfolk, to exclaim—

Then hail to thee *Purple*, the badge of the brave;
And *Pink* rear thy sweet blushing head from the earth;
And forsaken as *Green* be the dastardly slave,
Who the rose-bud of freedom would blight in its birth.

timents and proceedings, as tend, at a most awful crisis, to inflame the common mind, and to seduce those from their duty whose happiness can only depend upon their obedience. The time is, I conceive, fast approaching,* which will convince you that MR. COKE can carry every thing before him only when he thinks and acts in consonance with the established principles of the constitution—but that the moment he departs from the chastised deportment, the honourable bearing, the dignified feelings of a British senator, and becomes the empty echo of coarse and reproachful hostility, he will lose the confidence of the COUNTY of NORFOLK, and, with it, the esteem which every good man wishes to attach to his name and to his character.

Looking, Sir, to your elevated rank in society ; to your possessions ; your character ; the more than common weight of your example ; the more than common destructiveness of your mistakes ; your ample portion of present estimation ; your not unfounded hope of future regard ; I beg earnestly to recommend to you a review of your past political conduct ; of the

* That time is now arrived and past, and has brought with it such a weight of conviction, and of such a kind, as disappointed expectations and fallen greatness will not easily forget. A periodical publication, under the conduct of Sir Richard Phillips, (*Monthly Magazine*, June, 1817) in its provincial occurrences observes, “a Ministerial Candidate, Mr. Wodehouse, has been returned for this County (Norfolk), by a majority of 572 ; but happily the approaching dissolution will afford the men of Norfolk an opportunity of *redeeming their character* among the people of England, who, at such a crisis, expected from them a more worthy conduct.” The “men of Norfolk” are much obliged to Sir Richard ; but they fancy they have found out worthier means of “redeeming their character” than by adopting either the politics of *Holkham*, or the counsels of *Quiddenham*. They rest their hopes, where their admiration and their hearts rest—in the loyalty, the valour, the constitutional principles of *the House of Kimberley* !

existing unsettled state of your Country, together with a consideration, sufficiently serious, of the few years that may possibly be granted you for sufferance or enjoyment, for distinguished dignities, or the failure and decay of them therein. Let not those concerns, in which you may eventually have but small interest left, occupy your attention until you enter the dark, narrow avenue of age, where all sublunary gratifications go out, where "the grasshopper becomes a burden, and desire fails, and the evil days approach in which we have no pleasure;" those unwelcome precursors that "feelingly persuade us what we are;" those solemn messengers sent to convince us, that the soul is breaking up for one form of existence and preparing herself for another! Mournful, indeed, may seem this closing scene of human probation; mournful this closing change of human character! Still the season is precious; the change not undesirable. Then it is that we cease to live for the world, and though late, alas! begin to live for ourselves. Then feel we the necessity not only of making our peace with heaven, but, if we have been public men, or have borne important offices in the state, or have influenced, in any degree, important public transactions, we shall imperiously be called upon to implore forgiveness of our Country also—of that Country, which, by unhappy counsels, or unfounded opinions, or unjustifiable conduct in dark and trying emergencies, we may but too frequently and too deeply have injured.

In endeavouring, in the foregoing pages, to point out the tendency of the present line of political conduct which you, and many besides you throughout the kingdom, are, and for some time past have been, as I think, most destructively pursuing, I am not aware that I have gone beyond the bounds of such honest, unsparing censure as that conduct, thus infatuated, seemed to me to demand. Of *malice* towards you, or

towards any conscientious opposer of the administration of his country, the suffrages, I will presume to hope, of unprejudiced minds may be induced to absolve me. You have neither been "the object of my wrath, nor the victim of my maledictions."* My "curses"—if any one beside your weak and ill-judging vindicator can so term them—will, I trust, lie light upon you. They touch not your heart—your domestic conduct—your benevolent feelings—your friendly regards—your family attachments—your parental solitudes. All that makes life pleasant to man—all that makes man amiable to his fellow-creatures—the mild, retired, social circle, that quiet haven where the mind puts in from the strifes of public contention and enjoys the purest hours of her happiness—all these, Sir, I have left to you, I hope, as I found them; untouched, untainted, sacred. A dark pourtrait of Mr. Coke, I have, as I intended, most assuredly drawn—but recollect, it is only his *political* pourtrait. I have delineated you merely in those "poisoned hours that bind you up from your own knowledge," and compel your very virtues to become "sanctified and holy traitors to you." Ah! had it fallen to my lot to have found you in "the sequestered vale—far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife," I might have caught the *costume* of your early and wise retirement, and presented Mr. Coke to his admiring constituents, a far other man than what he now appears under the distorting draperies of his ambition. I might have awaked other feelings in his favour; and, working on so different materials, might have exhibited a likeness, not flattering but just; not sketched with a hurried, trembling pencil, that, doubtful of its subject, became faithless to its art, but (without "o'erstepping the modesty of nature") animated with the warm colouring of confidence

* See Mr. Glover's Answer to a Clergyman's Letter. P. 53.

and truth, and which even the eye of filial affection might, haply, in solitary moments, not undelighted have reposed upon, with that silent, tender regard which passeth all wordy approbation. But that pleasure has been denied me—mine has been a task of a rougher, ruder complexion—I regret it; but I neither repent me of my labours, nor can make any abatement of my censures. As Aristides the Locrian observed, on a memorable occasion, to the elder Dionysius, “I am sorry for what you have done, but I am not sorry for what I have said.”*

You know your character, however, Sir, among your friends. One favour I will do you at parting. I will put you in possession of what I suspect to be the true light in which you are, at present, beheld by, probably, a large portion of your political adversaries.—And I cannot do it better than in the language of that Poet who is the pride of his admiring Country, and whose works will remain when crowns and sceptres are departed, and when the same grave shall have buried in oblivion “our love and our hatred,” our hopes and our disappointments; all our national shames, and all our national glory.

————— I must not think there are
Evils enough to darken all his goodness:
His faults, in him, seem as the spots of Heaven,
More fiery by night’s blackness; hereditary,
Rather than purchas’d; *what he cannot change,*
Than what he chooses.†

With this concession, Sir, to your private virtues, which, believe me, I make with far greater pleasure than any reflections I may have found myself compelled to cast upon your political conduct, I bid you

* Plutarch’s Life of Timoleon.

† Shakespear’s Antony and Cleopatra.

farewel. For myself, I take neither praise, nor blame in having addressed to you this Letter. It was an act of duty I felt called upon to perform, and I shall not be discouraged by others denominating it an act of defamation. These are not times for smooth, milk and water compositions that mean nothing. The "native hue of resolution" I have never "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." What I have deemed it worth while to write at all, I have written (especially where the offence to be corrected seemed gross and rank) with a full heart and soul, pleasing therein certainly not my foes, sometimes, I fear, not even my friends. Throughout life, where I have thought my ground tenable, I have freely uttered my sentiments, with, perhaps, too little anxiety as to the evil it might draw after it; and, as life declines, I do not find this anxiety to increase upon me. I dare not, on looking back, commend myself for this disposition of mind, neither will I condemn it. It has been the source of much of my comfort and of no little of my uneasiness. But, upon the whole, it is not probably an enviable state of feeling. One consolation, however, remains to me. Where, upon after reflection, I have discovered any undue precipitance of judgment, or harshness of sentiment, my sorrow hath evermore gone hand in hand with my offence.

In such a predicament, I thank God, it has never mortified me to stand—but in such a predicament, Sir, believe me, I am far enough from standing at present. What I have said now, I would say again and again. What I have written now; thinking, judging, feeling as I do, it would have been a want of spirit, and even of principle, not to have written. They who are disposed to look favourably on my humble labours, are entitled to such acknowledgments as solitary gratitude has to offer—they who view them in an opposite light, have only themselves to please and will never

displease me. There my LETTER TO MR. COKE is as it is ; with faults about it abundantly sufficient for ill-nature to riot upon, and for even the partial judgment of friendship, perhaps, to regret. I leave it however, to make its way as it can. If it avoid the "tomb of the Capulets," well—if not, there let it find its inglorious resting place. As to praise or censure, the time is over with me to be greatly affected by either. I have known my own defects too long to take much credit from the one, and the discordancy of public opinion, especially when connected with party feeling, too intimately, to be inordinately depressed by the other. I have discharged my duty to the best of my ability in what I conceive a good and virtuous cause ; and, when conscience is satisfied, every passion and propensity of our nature should be satisfied too.

I remain, Sir,

With respect, &c.

GEORGE BURGESS.

